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A B S T R AC T. One of the most promising regulatory currents consists of "targeted" disclosure:
mandating simplified information disclosure at the time of decisionmaking to "nudge" parties
along. Its poster child is restaurant sanitation grading. In principle, a simple posted letter grade
('A,' 'B,' or 'C') empowers consumers and properly incentivizes restaurateurs to reduce risks for
foodborne illness. Yet empirical evidence of the efficacy of restaurant grading is sparse. This
Article fills the void by studying over 700,000 health inspections of restaurants across ten
jurisdictions, focusing on San Diego and New York. Despite grading's great promise, we show
that the regulatory design, implementation, and practice suffer from serious flaws: jurisdictions
fudge more than nudge. In San Diego, grade inflation reigns. Nearly all restaurants receive 'A's.
In New York, inspections exhibit little substantive consistency. A good score does not
meaningfully predict cleanliness down the road. Unsurprisingly, New York's implementation of
letter grading in 2010 has not discernably reduced manifestations of foodborne illness. Perhaps
worse, the system perversely shifts inspection resources away from higher health hazards to
resolve grade disputes. These results have considerable implications, not only for food safety, but
also for the institutional design of information disclosure.
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When does disclosure work? Mandated disclosure to solve informational
failures-and to empower parties to make informed decisions-has long been
recognized as a theoretical matter.' Examples of mandated disclosure abound
across regulatory areas as diverse as securities regulation,' campaign finance,'
product safety,4 energy regulation,' employment law,' environmental law,' and
health law.8 Yet despite the fact that disclosure is a mainstay of the regulatory
toolkit, a fierce debate persists about the conditions under which disclosure
works.'
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26-28, 161-64 (1982); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, ECONOMICs OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 83-84 (3d ed. 2000).
2. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
3. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2oo6)).
4. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C (2006)); see also Publicly Available Consumer
Product Safety Information Database, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
http://www.saferproducts.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (providing a publicly searchable
database where submitters can report a harm or risk of harm related to the use of a
consumer product or substance).
s. See Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Automobiles, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 259.1-259.2 (2011) (mandating disclosure of estimated city and highway miles per gallon
for automobiles); id. 5 305.11 (mandating disclosure of energy consumption and water
usage for appliances); see also Energy Star, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.energystar.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (describing a joint program with the
Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Energy concerning labeling and
environmental standards for products and buildings).
6. See OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2011) (mandating
disclosure of hazardous chemicals to employers and employees).
7. See Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 5§ 11001-
11050 (20o6) (requiring disclosure of chemical hazards to communities); Standard for
Demolition and Renovation, 40 C.F.R. § 61.145 (2011) (mandating disclosure of asbestos-
releasing demolition and renovation activity); id. 5 156.10 (mandating disclosure of pesticide
ingredients); Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (proposed
Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) (requiring reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions).
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2011) (regarding the disclosure of nutritional information for food
products); id. 5 1141.1 (concerning the display of health warnings on packages of cigarettes
and cigarette advertisements).
9. See JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND
IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005); W. Kip ViscusI & WESLEY A.
MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD
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Over the past few years, one of the most important regulatory
developments has been the emerging focus on "targeted transparency." The
chief insight, based on behavioral research, is that the public faces significant
cognitive limitations in processing information." More information is not
always better.n Instead, effective forms of regulatory disclosure are "targeted":
simplified disclosures embedded at the point of decisionmaking to "nudge"
parties along." In the terms of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler,
INFORMATION (1987); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About
Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93 (2010); Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information
Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865 (2011); Leemore Dafny &
David Dranove, Do Report Cards Tell Consumers Anything They Don't Already Know? The Case
ofMedicare HMOs, 39 RAND J. ECON. 790 (2008); David Dranove et al., Is More Information
Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555 (2003);
Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter
Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007); Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty,
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 45 (2003); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory
Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2oo6); Shameek
Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right To Know
Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997); Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047
(1995); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure
Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,"
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2011); Alan D. Mathios, The Impact ofMandatory Disclosure Laws on
Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks,
26 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 1 (2010); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999); Daniel J. Solove, The
Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967
(2003); Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1273 (1963).
lo. See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for
Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 2-12 (1986).
n1. See, e.g., Eugene G. Chewning, Jr. & Adrian M. Harrell, The Efect of Information Load on
Decision Makers' Cue Utilization Levels and Decision Quality in a Financial Distress Decision
Task, 15 AcCT. ORG. & Soc'Y 527, 539-40 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects
of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 211-
12 (1987).
1. The seminal synthesis is ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007). See also ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 339 (2d ed. 2012)
("[O]ne of the key debates in recent years has been how 'targeted transparency' can be used
to influence (or 'nudge') consumer behaviour in order to rectify the limitations of more
conventional and political-bureaucratic understandings of accountability."); RICHARD H.




interventions should focus on structuring choices to nudge parties toward
decisions that are less prone to heuristics and biases of decisionmaking." Age
grading of children's toys," star ratings for SUV rollover risk," and smart
energy meters6 arguably embody such prescriptions.
The Obama Administration has embraced targeted transparency and
HAPPINESS (2008) (proposing a framework for choice architecture to "nudge" parties toward
more effective decisionmaking); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 652, 743 (2011) (arguing that "mandated
disclosure generally fails to achieve its goals," but that "brief, simple, easy disclosures" and
ratings provide a promising regulatory alternative); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1211, 1221, 1230-32 (2003) (noting that "[t]he goal of asymmetric paternalism is to help
boundedly rational consumers make better decisions" and discussing disclosure regulations
that further that goal); David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance
of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 301
(1986) (noting that certain forms of satisficing "can be ameliorated by disclosure
requirements that reduce the costs to consumers of inspecting product attributes"); Samuel
Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICALECON. 56, 63 (2001) ("Of critical importance is not only the consumer's ability
to obtain relevant information through disclosure, but that the information be of a sort that
will prove usable within real-world time and motivation constraints."); Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, So STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1533-34 (1998) (discussing how conventional prescriptions to "provide more
information" fall short when considering behavioral insights); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 207-08 (20o6) (analyzing legal
strategies for reducing the effects of bounded rationality and discussing intermediate options
to greater information disclosure and outright bans); Mario F. Teisl & Brian Roe, The
Economics ofLabeling: An Overview ofIssues for Health and Environmental Disclosure, 27 AGRIC. &
RESOURCE EcoN. REV. 140, 144-47 (1998) (providing a theoretical framework for the welfare
analysis of information labeling that poses a tradeoff between information cost and accuracy);
David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 2S J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 155 (20o6) (reviewing principles of effective disclosure across regulatory areas).
13. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 11-13 (arguing, for example, that designers should
give choosers reminders and try to minimize costs for those who do not want to choose).
14. See Age Determination Guidelines: Relating Children's Ages to Toy Characteristics and Play
Behavior, CONSUMER PRODUCTS SAFETY COMMISSION (2002), http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo
/adg.pdf.
15. See Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act,
Pub. L. No. 1o6-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of49
U.S.C. (2oo6)).
i6. See Rebecca Smith, Smart Meter, Dumb Idea?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI24o50416142448555.html; Clive Thompson, Clive Thompson
Thinks: Desktop Orb Could Reform Energy Hogs, WIRED MAG., July 24, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/15-08/st thompson; News Release, Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, PUC Approves Smartmeters for PG&E Customers (July 2o, 20o6),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Word PDF/NewsRelease/58233.pdf.
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behavioral insights in its regulatory approach," most notably in the appointment
of Cass Sunstein as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (a.k.a. "nudger in chief"'). Executive Order 13,563, which reaffirms cost-
benefit analysis of proposed regulations and mandates retrospective review of
existing regulations, champions "provision of information to the public in a form
that is clear and intelligible."" In a series of memoranda to agency heads,
Sunstein further refined the Administration's approach: "Agencies should
consider how best to eliminate unnecessary complexity and to simplify people's
choices."2 o Information technology and intermediaries should serve that end,
with agencies encouraged to release "complex information and data in
standardized, machine readable formats [to] enable consumers to make
informed decisions."" In 2011, the Administration convened a National Science
and Technology Council Task Force on "Smart Disclosure."
Agencies, in turn, have developed a host of proposals in line with targeted
transparency. The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated a rule
requiring standardized (machine-readable) risk-return summary disclosures
for mutual funds." The Environmental Protection Agency and National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration proposed motor-vehicle letter grading
1. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Address, Retaking Rationality Two Years
Later, 48 Hous. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (2011) (discussing the Obama Administration's refinement
of cost-benefit analysis to incorporate insights from behavioral economics); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era,
95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 717 (2011) ("Regulation has entered the behavioral era."); cf Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State,
oo GEo. L.J. 53 (2011) (critiquing minimalist theories of regulatory policy).
is. Jeff Sommer, When Humans Need a Nudge Toward Rationality, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/20o9/o2/o8/business/o8nudge.html.
19. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 § 4 (2011).
20. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, for the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools 12
(June 18, 2010).
21. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, for the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 2
(Sept. 8, 2011).
22. Memorandum from Aneesh Chopra, U.S. Chief Tech. Officer &Assoc. Dir. for Tech., Office
of Sci. & Tech. Policy, for the Nat'l Sci. & Tech. Council Comm. on Tech., Winning the
Future Through Open Innovation-A Progress Report on Our Open Government Initiative
2 (June 8, 2011).
23. See Interactive Data for Mutual Fund Risk/Return Summary, 74 Fed. Reg. 7,748 (Feb. 19,




for fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions.' The Food and Drug
Administration simplified sunscreen labels to minimize consumer confusion."
The Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a grant to the
Center for Neighborhood Technology to create a national Housing and
Transportation Affordability Index. 6 And the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is currently experimenting with simplified mortgage disclosure forms."
The central ideas of targeted transparency continue to inspire scores of
normative proposals."
24. See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,078,
58,082 (Sept. 23, 2010) (proposing letter grading); 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,488-89 (July 6,
2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600, 49 C.F.R. Pt. 575) (choosing alternative
label); Fuel Economy Label: Expert Panel Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(Aug. 2010), http://www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/label/42orlogo8.pdf (making design
recommendations for letter-grade labels).
25. See Labeling and Effectiveness Testing; Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter
Human Use, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,620, 35,624 (June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201
& 310).
26. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Launches Development of a
National Housing and Transportation Affordability Index: New Tool Will Provide
Homebuyers with a More Accurate Estimate of Living Costs (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press-releases-media-advisories/2011/
HUDNo.ii-18o.
27. See Know Before You Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
28. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: How To MOBILIZE
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 79-94 (2005) (proposing a "Fair Employment
Mark" to certify that an employer abides by a set of employment policies); HEATHER K.
GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND How To FIX
IT 135 (2009) (proposing a "Democracy Index" that would create "better information
shortcuts for voters, policymakers, and election administrators" to improve the U.S. election
system); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS -AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 251-63 & n.1 (2011) (discussing how campaign finance, by failing tenets of
targeted transparency, will not fix "dependence corruption" in U.S. politics); Omri Ben-
Shahar, The Myth of the 'Opportunity To Read' in Contract Law, S EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 21-26
(2009) (proposing "a simple, intuitive format" for rating and labeling of contracts); Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 805, 865-71 (2011)
(proposing a disclosure regime for settlement mills that operate in the shadow of tort law
and discussing methods to facilitate client use); Cynthia Estlund, just the Facts: The Case for
Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 376-79 (2011) (proposing a mandatory
disclosure regime for the workplace and discussing the "ingenious" conception of targeted
transparency); Jeff Leslie & Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights Without Controversy, 70 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoBs. 117, 130-36 (2007) (discussing proposals for simplified animal welfare
products labels); Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31
CAMPBELL L. REV. 215, 251-52 (2009) (discussing efforts to improve health care quality
reporting); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 257-60,
280-84 (2010) (discussing flawed attempts of campaign finance disclosures and proposing
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Targeted transparency's poster child is restaurant sanitation grading. The
central idea is to summarize sanitation inspections with letter grades ('A,' 'B,'
or 'C') and post these in entryways of restaurants to succinctly and intuitively
inform consumers. In theory, the disclosure helps consumers select restaurants
based on health risk, which in turn incentivizes restaurants to clean up. In the
seminal synthetic work on targeted transparency, Archon Fung, Mary Graham,
and David Weil systematically review disclosure policies and associated
empirical research across regulatory areas, finding restaurant hygiene
disclosure to be one of two "highly effective" regimes because of its simplicity
and comprehensibility." Indeed, Fung, Graham, and Weil use restaurant
grading as the motivating example of how to "embed" disclosures with
individual decisionmaking in an informative and comprehensive fashion.30
Restaurant grading, according to them, exhibits congruence between policy
and consumer goals to reduce food-poisoning risk, with only a moderate
chance of misinterpretation." Similarly, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider
argue that mandated disclosure has generally been a failure across policy areas,
but they point to restaurant grading as a salutary exception and as the
prototype for promising regulatory alternatives. 2
Restaurant grading is widely considered a paragon of disclosure
regulation. In a landmark study, Ginger Jin and Phillip Leslie reported that
the adoption of grading in Los Angeles in 1997 caused a 20% reduction in
to change the level of disclosures); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair
Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 96, 126 (2010) (proposing to mandate that content owners
provide clear and explicit notification of user privileges); Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 134-43 (2001) (discussing
informational strategies for environmental regulation); Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter,
Note, Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law Firms, 6o STAN. L. REV.
2087, 2118-26 (2008) (describing data-driven efforts based on targeted transparency to
provide rankings of law firms based on hours, diversity, and attrition).
29. FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 82-83.
30. Id. at 50-83.
31. See id. at 75.
32. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 12, at 743-48.
33. See, e.g., ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONSUMER POLIcY TOOLKIT 87 (2010);
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 190; Paula J. Dailey, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure
as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089, 1119 (2007); Estlund, supra note 28, at
394-95; Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 6o; Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three
Dimensions, 2o1 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1348; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in
an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1667, 1711 (2008); Fuel




hospitalizations for foodborne illness.3 Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, who
introduced restaurant grading to New York City in July 2010, called grades
"wildly popular"s and concluded that as a result "the City made restaurants
cleaner, safer and more transparent.", 6 Forbes magazine described New York's
system as "The Most Effective Regulatory Disclosure Ever.""
Other jurisdictions, in turn, have jumped on the bandwagon. Over the past
ten years, in addition to Los Angeles and New York, Georgia,38 Hartford,"3
Louisville, 4o Mississippi," Toronto, 4  Albany County (NY),' 3  Cuyahoga
34. See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, n18 Q.J.EcON. 409 (2003).
3s. David Seifman, Mike & Health Dept. in Food-Cart Feud, N.Y. POST, Aug. 2, 2011,
http://wvw.nypost.com/p/news/local/mike-health-dept_in food-cartfeudyCF8Sl8ssu4
QTFAlwMBnJ.
36. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs, Health
Commissioner Farley Announce that One in Three Restaurants in New York City
Automatically Saved Money by Earning and Keeping 'A's - Over $3 Million in Fines Waived
over Last Six Months (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2ob/pr278
-us.html.
37. Kai Falkenberg, The Most Effective Regulatory Disclosure Ever: So Easy Even Toddlers
Understand It, FORBES, May 6, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kaifalkenberg/2ou/o5/o6
/the-most-effective-regulatory-disclosure-ever-so-easy-even-toddlers-understand-it; see also
Tom Ferrick, Jr., How New York Gets Food Inspections Right, METROPOLIS, Nov. 13, 2010,
http://www.phlmetropolis.con/2010/11/how-new-york-gets-inspections-right.php ("If you
want to see restaurant inspections done right, travel to New York City."); Elisabeth
Rosenthal, I Disclose . .. Nothing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12
/01/22/sunday-review/hard-truths-about-disclosure.html (noting that restaurant grading is
considered a helpful form of disclosure, while most disclosure policies may not work).
38. See Elizabeth Lee, Restaurants Face New Rating Code, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Dec. 1, 2007, at Ji.
39. See Jenna Carlesso, Hartford Restaurants To Get Health Grades, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 31, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-12-31/business/hc-hartford-restaurant-scoring
-1228-20111223_iinspection-restaurants-food-storage-and-preparation.
40. See Gideon Gil, New Rating System Set for Jefferson Restaurants, COUPER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Dec. 3, 20o2, at Bi.
41. See Mississippi State Department ofHealth Announces New Restaurant Inspection Rating System,
GULF COAST NEWs (Miss.), Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.gulfcoastnews.com/gcnarchive/2007
/gcnnewsnewrestauranthealthratingso91007.htm.
42. See Yvonne Blackwood, Laurels for Restaurant Inspection System, TORONTO STAR, Jan. ii,
2001, at A27.
43. See Steve Barnes, New Albany Restaurant-Inspection Grades: Excellent, Good, Fair, TIMES
UNION: TABLE HOPPING (Albany, N.Y.) (Jan. 12, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://blog.timesunion
.con/tablehopping/2819o/new-albany-restaurant-inspection-grades-excellent-good-fair.
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County (OH)," Kern County (CA), 4s Maricopa County (AZ),46 and San
Bernadino County (CA)17 have implemented grading. Around this time,
grading was proposed in Florida,** New York State,"9 Washington, D.C.,so
Albuquerques Chicago,s2 El Paso," Kaufman (TX),s4 New Haven,ss
Pasadena,s6  Pittsburgh,57  San Francisco,s" Alameda County (CA), 59
44. See Kaye Spector, Grading System for Cuyahoga County Restaurants Under Discussion, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2010
/o2/grading-system for cuyahoga_co.html.
45. See James Burger, County Restaurants To Get Health Grades, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN, Oct.
18, 2006, http://www.bakersfieldcalifornian.com/local/xl393743116/County-restaurants-to
-get-health-grades.
46. See Lauren Gilger, Maricopa County's Restaurant Inspection Process Goes from Being Easy on
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49. See Jeff Klein, Consumer Prot. Comm., Restaurants That Are Enough To Make You Sick: An
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ST. SENATE (Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.nysenate.gov/files/nyss-migrate/NYC-and
-Westchester-County-Restaurants-Enough-to-make-You.pdf.
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19, 2011, 11:3o AM), http://dcist.com/2o11/oi/cheh-reconsiders-letter.grades for.php.
51. See Dan McKay, City Chews on Grades for Eateries, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www.abqjoumal.cof/news/metro/15946252343newsmerrolo-1S-o8.htm. As described
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(WV), 6 Santa Clara County (CA) ,63 and Ventura County (CA) *64 The Center
for Science in the Public Interest advocates that " [s]tate and local governments
should pass laws requiring the posting of inspection grade cards in the
windows of all food establishments."s6
Restaurant grading has its critics, however. New York City Council
Speaker Christine Quinn called the City's grading system "inconsistent 66 and
"borderline harassment." 67 In March 2012, Speaker Quinn convened a raucous,
six-hour oversight hearing and reported from a convenience sample that 66%
of all restaurateurs (and 59% of restaurateurs who received 'A's) found the
system "poor."68 Time magazine called the system "arbitrary and imperious." 69
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66. Editorial, Food for Thought, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2012, http://articles
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67. Michael Howard Saul, Quinn Critical ofRestaurant Grade System, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBlooo14240529702o4553904577103023839163292.html; Heard
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68. Glenn Collins, Restaurateurs Voice Anger over Health Inspections, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM
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The Wall Street journal and New York Times documented suggestive evidence
of gaming of the grading thresholds, which we use as a starting point of our
analysis of New York below.7 o
Despite the pivotal role that grading commands in the debate over
information disclosure (and the exhaustive review of the literature by Fung,
Graham, and Weil), restaurant grading's merits turn out to rest on remarkably
fragile empirical grounds. The only large-scale empirical study of grading
examines Los Angeles around 1997.7' To cure this empirical gap, this Article
amasses large-scale microdata from over 700,000 restaurant inspections in ten
other jurisdictions to evaluate the efficacy of restaurant grading. 7 For
expositional simplicity, the analysis of our research team focuses on San Diego
and New York, but the findings generalize to the other jurisdictions. We
show that the benefits of grading are vastly overstated, and costs vastly
understated. The regulatory design, implementation, and practice in these
jurisdictions are flawed at their core. As practiced, regulators fudge the nudge.
The findings, in brief, are fourfold. First, nearly every restaurant in San
Diego receives an 'A,' limiting the meaningfulness of grades. Second, New
-1.812039/city-grilled-over-inconsistencies-in-restaurant-grading-system-13586988; Press
Release, N.Y.C. Council, Majority of Restaurant Inspection Survey Participants Received A
Grades and Still Rated the System Poorly (Mar. 7, 2012), http://council.nyc.gov
/html/releases/pdfs/restaurantrelease.pdf (reporting results from a survey asking, among
other questions, "how would you rate the letter grading system?"). The author of this
Article testified as an independent expert at this hearing. See Empirical Facts About Restaurant
Grading, Hearing Before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Governmental Operations, Comm. on
Health, Comm. on Oversight & Investigations, & Comm. on Small Bus. (Mar. 7, 2012)
(statement of Daniel E. Ho) (on file with author); see also Daniel E. Ho, Op-Ed., Improve
Restaurant Report Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.coM/2012/03/o7
/opinion/the-restaurant-grade-system-is-broken.html.
69. Josh Ozersky, Giving an F to New York's Restaurant Grading System, TIME, July 20, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,200519i,oo.html.
70. See Sumathi Reddy & Hilke Schellmann, Many Eatery High Marks Are Close Call, WAll ST. J.,
July 28, 2011, http://online.wsj.con/article/SB00014240531119048883o4576472323664531488
.html; Brian J. McCabe, Grading New York Restaurants: What's in an 'A'?, N.Y. TIMES:
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 19, 2011, 8:33 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.conV2oii
/oi/19/grading-new-york-restaurants-whats-in-an-a ("Closer inspection of the underlying data
reveals a suspicious distribution of restaurants near the cut-off point between an A and a B.").
pi. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 78, 82-83, 193-94 (relying exclusively on studies of Los
Angeles in assessing the efficacy of restaurant grading).
72. Five of the jurisdictions grade: San Diego, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Louisville. Three of these jurisdictions score, but do not grade: El Paso, Austin, and Seattle.
Two jurisdictions do not score or grade: Chicago and Florida. Nongrading jurisdictions
provide a comparison group, which confirms the effects of grading. See infra Appendix D.




York grades vary widely, but, unlike San Diego's underlying numerical scores,
New York scores exhibit little substantive consistency. A score (or grade) in
one year predicts little about the restaurant's cleanliness down the road. Third,
differing inspection criteria provide one compelling explanation for the
difference in consistency between San Diego and New York. The relative
complexity of New York's inspection criteria appears to impede uniform scoring
across inspectors and restaurants. Fourth, grading in New York has had no
discernible health benefits but may come at a large, previously unrecognized
cost in administrative resources. Specifically, grading reallocates inspection
resources away from restaurants that pose the greatest public health risk
toward grade resolution at lower-risk restaurants.
These findings speak richly to longstanding puzzles in regulation and
administrative law. How should policymakers best channel administrative
discretion? How does the institutional design of inspection or disclosure
regimes affect regulatory outcomes? How can we disclose information to enlist
private actors to properly incentivize regulated industries? The concrete policy
implications are considerable. Targeted transparency's emphasis on
simplification shouldn't just apply to information disclosure, but also to
information collection. What proponents of targeted transparency and grade
reformers miss is that cognitive limitations impede not just users of
information, but suppliers as well. At the same time, all raw microdata
underlying the letter grades (i.e., the full inspection database) should be made
available in machine-readable format. Combining simple retail disclosure
(letter grades) with wholesale complex disclosure (microdata) empowers
information intermediaries to develop better and more useful information
summaries. More generally, the findings show that targeted transparency is
extraordinarily sensitive to context and regulatory design. If targeted
transparency teaches us to target information, this study shows that targeting
can be achieved in myriad ways that undermine the effectiveness of disclosure.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the historical antecedents
of current grading regimes and the extant evidence of grading's benefits.
Contrary to the conventional perception of targeted transparency as a
phenomenon of the last twenty years, restaurant grading was a common
practice in the 1940s. Its demise was tied to deep skepticism in the public
health field about the benefits of grading. Currently, the only systematic
empirical evidence in support of restaurant grades comes from a study of Los
Angeles around 1997. Part II articulates the empirical approach of this Article,
namely to examine evidence from other jurisdictions. It shows why credible
policy evaluation of the impact of restaurant grading is riddled with challenges.
Examining major metropolitan areas, we show that institutional features of
inspections and of grading vary dramatically across jurisdictions, providing
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good reason to doubt that the benefits of grading in Los Angeles generalize to
other jurisdictions.
Part III turns to the evidence in San Diego, which has been practicing
restaurant grading since 1947. Part IV discusses the evidence in New York,
which adopted grading in July 2010. Part V examines whether the complexity
of inspection criteria may explain the divergence in consistency of scoring
between San Diego and New York. Part VI finds no evidence of the intended
health benefits, but documents that New York's implementation comes at a
previously unrecognized cost of shifting inspection resources away from the
highest-risk restaurants toward grade resolution. Part VII discusses policy
implications.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF GRADE REFORM
A. Historical Antecedents
In 1934, the National Recovery Administrator proposed a Code of Fair
Competition for the Restaurant Industry.74 Although the Code Authority,
which had delegated the task of developing minimum sanitation standards to a
committee, 7s would fall by the wayside," the Public Health Service (PHS) and
later the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) continued to develop a model
food code, first proposing grading in 1940." Drawing on letter grading for
milk,'5 the model code proposed rating restaurants with letter grades for
74. Nat'l Recovery Admin., No. 282, Code of Fair Competition for the Restaurant Industry
(Feb. 16, 1934).
75. Id. at 524.
76. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the
National Industrial Recovery Act and the associated industrial codes).
77. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., ORDINANCE AND CODE REGULATING EATING AND DRINKING
ESTABLISHMENTS (1940) [hereinafter 1940 CODE]. Grading also appeared in the model food
code in 1938, but this version was "tentative" because it had not been reviewed by the
Sanitation Advisory Board. See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., ORDINANCE AND CODE
REGULATING EATING AND DRINKING ESTABLISHMENTS 2 (1938). These model codes are
advisory and not codified by the federal government.
78. See RICHARD H. BOEHNKE, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON PUBLIC POSTING OF RESTAURANT
INSPECTION REPORTS, AND/OR GRADE CARD POSTING SCHEMES BASED UPON HEALTH
INSPECTIONS 4 (2000) ("A decade later, in 1934, the same United States Public Health
Service introduced the first model food code. It was based directly upon the existing 1924




sanitation standards.79 A restaurant was deemed grade 'A' if it complied with
each of seventeen inspection items (ranging from standards for doors and
windows to refrigeration of perishable food).so Grade 'B' restaurants complied
with most items but violated one of five (evidently less egregious) specific
items (i.e., floors, walls and ceilings, lighting, ventilation, miscellaneous). 8 '
Grade 'C' restaurants failed to meet either standard.2 Modern ideas of targeted
transparency were already apparent. The code required restaurants to display
grades in a fashion readily visible to customers" (not unlike the National
Recovery Administration's Blue Eagle8,). As one PHS official described it,
requiring "public display of a [sanitation] grade notice in all restaurants"
would exert "competitive effect . . . to improve . . . sanitation.""'
The idea proved popular. Large cities such as St. Louis," Atlanta'7 San
Diego, and Pittsburgh89 instituted grading systems in the 1940s and 195os.9
By one estimate, roughly four hundred U.S. cities had grading systems in place
in 1951.
PHS and FDA revised the model food code over the decades. 92 In 1962, the
79. The model code included versions for "grading" and "non-grading" jurisdictions. See 1940
CODE, supra note 77, at 5 n.i.
8o. Id. at 17-31.
81. Id. at 31-32.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 14-15.
84. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR, 1929-1945, at 183-84 (2001) (describing the Blue Eagle).
85. A.W. Fuchs, The U.S. Public Health Service Restaurant Sanitation Program, 32 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 848, 85o (1942) (paraphrasing language from the model code).
86. See Maurice E. Trout, Cleaning Up the Restaurants, 38 NAT'L MUN. REV. 335, 335 (1949).
87. See Council To Consider Restaurant Clean-Up, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 16, 1945, at 3A; Grade
"C" Eating Places Have 3o Days To Improve, ATLANTADAILYWORLD, Oct. 29, 1946, at 6.
88. See Brooke Williams & Agustin Armendariz, A Recipe for Trouble: Coming Clean on
Restaurant Grades, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com
/uniontrib/20070722/newsjlzn22recipe.html.
89. See Pittsburgh Forcing Cafes To Clean Up or Close Up, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1951, at B8.
go. Washington, D.C. proposed grading in 1943. See Anne Hagner, Bill Tightens Restaurant
Sanitary Code, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1943, at lo.
91. See Pittsburgh Forcing Cafes To Clean Up or Close Up, supra note 89, at B8.
92. See Food Service Sanitation: Proposed Uniform Requirements for State and Local
Regulatory Agencies, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,438 (Oct. 1, 1974), withdrawn by Food Service
Sanitation: Withdrawal of Proposal and Termination of Rule Making Proceeding, 42 Fed.
Reg. 15,428 (Mar. 22, 1977); see also Clinton L. Rappole, Sanitation in the Food Service
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model code continued with letter grading (and required posting of grade
placards), but based the grades on the total number of "demerit" points issued
for each violation.93 In 1976, after a failed attempt to promulgate federal
uniform sanitation standards," the FDA abandoned restaurant grading
altogether. In place of demerit points, the model code proposed a 100-point
scoring system, with weighted points ranging from i to 5 assigned to forty-four
violations. 95 A score below 6o required the restaurant to take corrective action
within forty-eight hours, and failure to do so would potentially lead to a
shutdown.96 Although the model code required that the inspection report be
available to the public on request,9 7 it made no mention of publicly posting the
score or any other inspection output.
A contemporaneous report by the General Accounting Office,9' reviewing
sanitation inspection systems, explained that "[p]ublicizing restaurant
inspection results [was] surrounded by some controversy" among health
officials. 99 FDA officials acknowledged the benefits of disclosure (empowering
customers and incentivizing restaurateurs), but noted numerous criticisms of
publicizing results, in particular the limited consumer understanding of
inspection results and the fact that "[cionditions found on inspection date may
change greatly (degrade or improve) on later days," thereby "giv[ing] the
customer a false sense of security."' By 1993, the FDA had abandoned
numerical scoring entirely."o' Currently, the FDA acknowledges that "scoring
Operation: The Implications of the Proposed Sanitation Ordinance, 18 CORNELL HOTEL &
RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q31 (1977) (describing proposed modifications to the food code).
93. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD SERVICE SANITATION
MANUAL 77 (1962) (proposing a model ordinance for the grading of food service
establishments).
94. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
FOOD SERVICE SANITATION MANUAL 74 (1976).
g. See id. at 88.
g6. Id. at 75.
97. Id. at 74.
gs. The name "General Accounting Office" was changed to the "Government Accountability
Office" by the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of2oo4, Pub. L. 108-271, § 8, 118 Stat. 811,
814 (codified as a note in 31 U.S.C. § 702 (2o6)).
99. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MWD-76-42, FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR RESTAURANT SANITATION FOUND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE 19 (1975).
loo. Id. at 20.
iol. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
FOOD CODE, ANNEX 4, at 38-41 (1993) (recommending comparison of establishments by the
number of critical violations, but noting that "there is no defined point at which a score




may provide a mechanism for consumers to make informed choices," but also
points to "negative consequences" such as a restaurant receiving "a high
numerical or letter score while exhibiting some very serious deficiencies."o 2
In sum, while scholars of targeted transparency may be right that such
regulatory interventions are a phenomenon of the last twenty years,"o3 the
historical trend in sanitation inspections is, if anything, the reverse. In line with
grading's demise in the food code, most local jurisdictions abandoned such
systems over the course of the twentieth century. 0 4
B. Public Health Doubts
The demise of the first generation of grading schemes reflects a deeper
skepticism in the public health community. A crucial predicate for restaurant
grading is that there are "consensus metrics"'o: established methods to
consistently measure attributes of direct interest. For instance, if standardized
tests represent a consensus metric (i.e., measure attributes of direct interest),
"teaching to the test" may not be problematic. As one administrative law
casebook writes: "It is useful to provide information . . . about restaurant
cleanliness, because most people agree on the relevance of those factors and
how to measure them.",io
6
A review of the public health literature, however, reveals that such
consensus may be illusory: put simply, "a single indicator has not been
developed that summarizes all the relevant factors into one measure of
safety.""o7 Several obstacles impede consensus. First, sanitation conditions can
change rapidly. Even within a single day, an inspection during the lunch rush
may yield sharply different results than in the late afternoon. "[T]he traditional
inspection represents a snapshot of the facility operation, or about one hour of
time from what may be an i8-hour day. . . ."o Moreover, restaurant patrons,
staff, and management-and, in turn, sanitation conditions -fluctuate rapidly
102. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD CODE 569 (2009).
103. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 20 ("In the last twenty years, targeted transparency
policies have played a prominent role. . . .").
104. See BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at4; Pittsburgh Forcing Cafes To Clean Up or Close Up, supra note
89, at B8.
105. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 740 (Stephen
G. Breyer et al. eds., 7th ed. 2011) (discussing FUNG ET AL., supra note 12).
106. Id.
107. Chris J. Wiant, Scores, Grades, and Communicating About Food Safety, 61 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 37,
38 (1999).
os. Id. at 37.
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across days. 0 9
Second, inspectors may use a seemingly objective scoring rubric in
drastically divergent ways. As two environmental health scholars put it: "[I]f
two professionals evaluate the same restaurant at the same time . . . are their
grades the same? . . . If one professional inspects the same restaurant at
different times . . . will the grades be the same?""o Assessing the existence and
severity of violations, such as an "improperly constructed" surface,"'
"inadequate" "personal cleanliness,""' or food not in "good condition,""
necessarily requires inspector discretion and is thereby subject to variability in
implementation across inspectors. As another health official notes, "many
departments have extensive checklists [but] it is the norm for every single
person to do an inspection differently.""4 One study of Tennessee from 1993 to
2000 documented that mean scores (out of a scale of loo) for 190 inspectors
who each performed at least loo inspections ranged from 69 to 92.11s Inspector
heterogeneity leads "restaurant inspections [to be] inherently inconsistent.""
Third, consumers may misunderstand the import of a disclosed grade (or
score). A random phone survey of two thousand Tennessee adults, for
example, documented highly unrealistic expectations of the inspection system.
Over 5o% of respondents believed health inspections should be performed at
least twelve times per year; Tennessee in fact conducted two. Forty-five percent
of respondents indicated that the minimum acceptable score to eat at a
restaurant would be 9o; the mean score in fact was 82."' In addition,
1og. Cf BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 25 ("Given the extremely high turnover rate in the restaurant
industry both in staff and in operators, a stated grade value posted at a restaurant at the time
of the patrons' visits is much more likely to be dated history than currently accurate.").
no. Owen H. Seiver & Thomas H. Hatfield, Grading Systems for Retail Food Facilities: A Risk-
Based Analysis, 63 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 22, 24 (2000).
ms. Bureau of Food Safety & Cmty. Sanitation, Self-Inspection Worksheet for Food Service
Establishments, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &MENTAL HYGIENE 2 (Dec. 2010), http://www.nyc.gov
/htmldoh/downloads/pdf/rii/self-inspection-worksheet.pdf (Violation 5C).
112. Id. at 2 (Violation 6A).
113. Food & Hous. Div., Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, COUNTY OF SAN
DIEGO DEP'T OF ENVTL. HEALTH 6 (2007), http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/deh/food/pdf
/publications-opguide.pdf [hereinafter Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide] (Violation 13).
114. THOMAS PEACOCK, IS IT SAFE To EAT OUT? How OUR LOCAL HEALTH OFFICIALS INSPECT
RESTAURANTS To ASSURE FOOD SAFETY ... OR Do THEY? 59 (2002).
115. Timothy F. Jones et al., Restaurant Inspection Scores and Foodborne Disease, io EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 688, 688 (2004).
116. Seiver & Hatfield, supra note ito, at 25.
117. Timothy F. Jones & Karen Grimm, Public Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding Public Health




consumers exhibit inconsistent risk perceptions of grades and scores, subject to
considerable framing effects: "A single grade fails to deliver a consistent
message regardless of the underlying purpose."" 8
A survey of college students and food safety professionals showed that while
grade signs affected willingness to eat at an establishment, there was no
consensus on the meaning of a grade or score. Most tellingly, a sample of
seventy-two food safety professionals was asked to interpret a 'C' grade. Forty
percent said the restaurant was "average," 32% said that the restaurant had
problems, and the rest were unclear about the meaning."' Only 22% of students
would be willing to eat at a 'C'-graded restaurant (one student thought 'C' stood
for "compliant"), compared to 65% of food safety professionals.2 o To better
understand inspection scores, one New York Times food reporter invited a health
inspector to score his home kitchen. A New York restaurant receives an 'A' if it
scores below 14 (violation) points. The score for the reporter's kitchen was 77.12'
Not only would a score of 77 knock the kitchen out of the 'A' range, but it would
also put it at serious risk for an immediate shutdown. Most home kitchens
would arguably fare poorly. Violations such as washing hands in a sink where
dishes are done or failing to label food in Tupperware containers are not
necessarily what consumers perceive as salient health risks.
Fourth, grading is in some tension with evolving conceptions of food
safety. Since 1993, the FDA has advocated so-called Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles.' The chief idea of HACCP is to
shift inspections away from "floor-walls-ceilings" approaches (where violations
at endpoints are counted) toward a focus on preventing structural risk factors
in the process of food preparation.' Restaurateurs should focus on critical
118. Thomas H. Hatfield & Owen H. Seiver, Preference Reversals in Grading Systems for Retail Food
Facilities, 63 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 19, 23 (2001).
uig. Lauren Dundes & Sushama Rajapaksa, Scores and Grades: A Sampling of How College Students
and Food Safety Professionals Interpret Restaurant Inspection Results, 64 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 14,
15-16 (2001).
120. Id. at 16.
121. Henry Alford, Would the City Shut Down Your Kitchen?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010,
http://wwv.nytimes.com/201o/o9/29/dining/29inspector.html.
122. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD
CODE, INTRO. (1993) ("[T]he new Code incorporates a framework for the application of
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles at retail . . . .").
123. BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 24; see FOOD RES. INST., FOOD SAFETY 1994, at 470 (1994); Ctr.
for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Managing Food Safety: A Regulator's Manual for
Applying HACCP Principles to Risk-Based Retail and Food Service Inspections and Evaluating
Voluntary Food Safety Management Systems, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, FOOD &
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points of the food preparation process, when food may be contaminated or
adulterated-e.g., delivery, preparation, and serving.' 4 Because more of the
onus is on restaurants to establish documentary records of the flow of food,
some argue that a more educational approach to inspections is required. "[T]he
application of HACCP principles," in that sense, "is not conducive to simple
grading schemes," 2 s which penalize violations without necessarily addressing
the processes that lead to those violations. Grading can also erode the ability of
inspectors to educate by setting up an antagonistic relationship with
restaurateurs.126
The result of these obstacles, as we show in Section II.B, is that although
virtually all jurisdictions follow the FDA's model food code, there is little
uniformity in the way violations are assessed. Nine of twenty top metropolitan
areas do not use any formal numerical score at all. And in the jurisdictions that
do use numerical scoring, violations receive drastically different weights.
Numerous health practitioners have proposed alternative scoring and weighting
techniques, arguing that extant techniques are deficient. 2 7  One study
synthesizing "best practices," based on a survey of forty-seven state and local
inspection systems, never mentioned scoring or grading as relevant practices.121
Perhaps the most compelling synthesis of these critiques comes from
Richard Boehnke, who surveyed forty-five state health agency senior officials
DRUG ADMIN. 1-2 (Apr. 2006), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/RetailFood
Protection/ManagingFoodSafetyHACCPPrinciples/Regulators/UCMo78159.pdf.
124. See Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, supra note 123, at 1-2.
125. BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 24; see also LORA ARDUSER & DOUGLAS ROBERT BROwN, HACCP &
SANITATION IN RESTAURANTS AND FOOD SERVICE OPERATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE BASED ON
THE FDA FOOD CODE 155 (2005) ("Traditional inspection is relatively resource-intensive and
inefficient and is reactive rather than preventive compared to the HACCP approach. . . .").
126. See Paul Frumkin, Health Departments Becoming Educators, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, May
6, 2007, http://nrn.com/article/health-departments-becoming-educators ("In New York, a
sense of'us versus them' seems to pervade much of the restaurant community. . . .").
127. See, e.g., Brian Emanuel, Grading a Food Establishment, 58 J. ENvTL. HEALTH 20 (1995)
(proposing a new scoring system); David Z. McSwane et al., In Search of the Ingredients of a
Successfil Retail Food Compliance Program, So J. ENVTL. HEALTH 341, 344 (1988) (discussing
criticisms by sanitation officers of 1976 food code scoring); Robert K. Stevenson, A Food
Service Establishment Evaluation Program Procedure for the 1980's and 199o's, 50 J. ENvTL.
HEALTH 25 (1987) (proposing scoring based on hazard potential).
128. See McSwane et al., supra note 127. But see Kathleen Irwin et al., Results ofRoutine Restaurant
Inspections Can Predict Outbreaks of Foodborne Illness: The Seattle-King County Experience, 79
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 586 (1989) (using case-control matching with a sample of eighty-four





across the United States." Health officials pointed to each of the criticisms
above, concluding that "consistent inspection standards are never achieved."'
In addition, officials noted two more nuanced points. Restaurants may take
measures solely to achieve a high grade, which may not in fact reduce the risk
of foodborne illness."' Conversely, officials noted the presence of "political
pressure . . . inevitabl[y] to raise grades" and that "all grades go toward 'A'
through pressure on inspectors." 32 Pressure can be quite direct. In 1988,
twenty-eight of seventy New York inspectors were charged with extortion,"'
and in Los Angeles, one inspector was caught on camera saying, "It's going to
cost $200 to get an 'A."" 34
In light of these critiques, many have called for studying the efficacy of
disclosure systems.' Yet as of 2000, only one jurisdiction (Florida) reported
ever having evaluated any form of grading."'
C. Los Angeles Faith
So where does the enthusiasm for grading come from? The only credible,
systematic, empirical evidence for the benefits of grading comes from one set of
studies focusing on the implementation of sanitation grading in Los Angeles in
January 1998.137 Prior to January 1998, Los Angeles scored restaurants
numerically based on the (weighted) number of violations, with a score of oo
indicating no violations and a score of o indicating full noncompliance. In
December 1997, the county proposed that these numerical scores be
summarized and posted as letter grades. Scores of 90-100 would turn to 'A's;
129. See BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 2.
130. Id. at ii.
131. Id. at 26.
132. Id. at 12.
133. See Howard Kurtz, 28 New York City Restaurant Inspectors Accused ofExtortion, WASH. POST,
Mar. 25, 1988, at A3.
134. Health Inspection Bribe Report Prompts Hotline, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/llAocal/me-4653.
135. See Katie Filion & Douglas A. Powell, The Use of Restaurant Inspection Disclosure Systems as a
Means of Communicating Food Safety Information, 20 J. FOODSERVICE 287 (2009); Seiver &
Hatfield, supra note 11o; Wiant, supra note 107.
136. See BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at i.
137. Studies of other inspection systems exist, but these are not focused on the impact of grading
per se. See, e.g., Sylvanus Thompson, Ron de Burger & Olayemi Kadri, The Toronto Food
Inspection and Disclosure System: A Case Study, 107 BRT. FOOD J. 140 (2005) (assessing
Toronto's food inspection system).
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80-89 to 'B's; and 70-79 to 'C's. Scores below 70 would be posted without a
letter grade. While Ginger Jin and Phillip Leslie published several leading
papers based on Los Angeles, the core findings-cited widely by proponents of
grading' - are from an article in the Quarterly Journal ofEconomics. '
The article examined data from 1996 to 1998, encompassing (1) restaurant
inspections in Los Angeles County, (2) quarterly sales-tax data for 57% of these
restaurants, and (3) admissions to hospitals for food-related and non-food-
related digestive disorders for three-digit ZIP codes.o14  Assuming that the
adoption of grading (by the county and individual cities'41) was exogenous, the
article examined several effects of grading. First, mandatory grading increased
numerical inspection scores by 4.4 points.142 Roughly 23% of the variation in
scores appeared to be explained by restaurant-specific attributes,'43 suggesting
that the score in one year reveals meaningful information about the restaurant's
future cleanliness. The "effects on hygiene from the grade cards [we]re realized
fairly rapidly,"1" within one year of the introduction of grade cards.
Second, mandatory posting caused statistically significant changes in
revenue of: (i) a 5.7% increase for 'A'-grade restaurants, (2) a 0.7% increase for
13s. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 194 (discussing studies by Jin and Leslie and noting
that these "found significant decreases in food-borne-illness hospitalizations"); Bd. of
Health, Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code,
N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE (2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh
/downloads/pdf/notice/2olo/Article-81.pdf (noting a "20% decline in hospitalizations for
food-borne illnesses" to justify the adoption of restaurant grading in New York); Klein &
DeWaal, supra note 65, at 32 (advocating that all jurisdictions adopt restaurant grading and
noting that "the grading system has contributed to a 20 percent decrease in foodborne-
illness-related-hospitalization" in Los Angeles).
139. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 34; see also Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, Reputational Incentives
for Restaurant Hygiene, 1 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. 237 (2009) (examining Los Angeles
evidence in support of restaurant grading); Paul A. Simon et al., Impact of Restaurant
Hygiene Grade Cards on Foodborne-Disease Hospitalizations in Los Angeles County, 67 J. ENVTL.
HEALTH 32 (2005) (same); Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Case in Support ofRestaurant
Hygiene Grade Cards, CHOICES, 2d Quarter 2005, at 97 (same).
140. Three-digit ZIP codes are simply the first three digits of conventional ZIP codes, and are
thus more highly aggregated.
141. See Josh Meyer, Loophole Hampers Restaurant Crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/o4Aocal/me-15324.
142. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 34, at 424-25 & tbl.3 .
143. Id. at 424 & tbl.3 (reporting an R' of 0.5874 with restaurant fixed effects and an R' of 0.3574
without fixed effects in a panel regression of sanitation scores). R2 "measures the proportion
of the total variation [in a variable] that is explained by the fitted [regression] line." GEORGE
CASELLA & ROGER L. BERGER, STATISTICAL INFERENCE 524 (1990).




'B'-grade restaurants, and (3) a i% decrease for 'C'-grade restaurants.s45 Third,
the study found some evidence that grading affected inspector discretion,
particularly a spike of the use of the score go, the cutoff for an 'A'.' 6 Fourth,
comparing hospitalization rates from 1995 to 1999 for food-related (and non-
food-related) illnesses between Los Angeles County and the rest of California,
the study found that mandatory posting "cause[d] a highly statistically
significant 20 percent decrease in hospitalizations."'4 7 Although the study
performed a sophisticated decomposition of the health effect, the intuition of
the effect, as the article discusses, can be seen in Figure i (adapted from Table
V by Jin and Leslie's study).
Figure 1.







0 "~ begins 0
0 Los Angeles 0
0.
0 o
1995 1997 1999 1995 1997 1999
Year Year
Hospital admissions for food-related digestive disorders on the left panel and for non-
food-related digestive disorders on the right panel for Los Angeles County (in black)
and the rest of California (in gray). These data are adapted from Table V of Jin and
Leslie's study and illustrate the gist of the panel design. Food-related hospitalizations
drop slightly more sharply in Los Angeles than in the rest of California, while non-
food-related hospitalizations increase more sharply in the rest of California.
The left panel plots the number of hospital admissions for food-related
illnesses (on the y-axis) against years (on the x-axis). Los Angeles County is
145. Id. at 429 & tbl-4.
146. Id. at 433-34.
147. Id. at 439-40.
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plotted in black, and the rest of California is plotted in gray. In 1997, for
example, 405 persons were admitted for food-related illnesses in Los Angeles,
compared to 654 in the rest of California. The vertical gray line indicates the
beginning of restaurant grading. The right panel similarly plots non-food-
related hospitalizations for digestive disorder. Hospitalizations for food-related
illnesses dropped in Los Angeles, from 405 cases in 1997 to 351 cases in 1998,
which is not the case for the rest of California (nor did non-food-related cases
exhibit such sharp shifts). As Jin and Leslie state, "This is basic and compelling
evidence in favor of hygiene grade cards causing an improvement in actual
health outcomes. 148
The Jin and Leslie study is admirable. It compiles rich microdata from
multiple sources, examines specific mechanisms by which disclosure affects
restaurants, and applies modern econometric (panel) approaches to study the
effect of grading. There are, however, reasons to question the findings on
foodborne illness. The number of food-related hospitalizations is very small
(certainly relative to the population incidence of food poisoning) and likely
subject to sharp movements in such a short time frame (e.g., the sharp increase
in 1996 for California). Los Angeles's drop in food-related illnesses possibly
began before the imposition of grading. As one Journal of Economic Literature
review points out, "national trends indicated a reduction in foodborne illnesses
(and hospitalizations) during the same period that the grade cards were
introduced in Los Angeles County."' 49 Los Angeles and the rest of California
diverge in non-food-related illnesses, suggesting that the rest of California (or
non-food-related illnesses) may not be a good comparison group."so
148. Id. at 438.
149. Clifford Winston, The Efficacy ofiformation Policy: A Review ofArchon Fung, Mary Graham,
and David Weil's Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 704, 709 (20o8). Winston also points to attention paid to the E. coli outbreak
and the 1998 adoption by the USDA of HACCP testing. See id. at 709-11.
15o. The credibility of a "difference-in-differences" design hinges on the comparability of a long
preintervention time series. The Jin and Leslie linear least squares regression model explains
the outcome of the number of hospital admissions for digestive disorders in one of fifty-
seven three-digit ZIP codes for a month (logged) with (i) fixed effects for each ZIP code and
indicator for whether the illness is food-related/non-food-related, (2) fixed effects for
months, (3) the proportion of a ZIP code subject to mandatory grade posting (proportion
mandatory), (4) the proportion of the ZIP code subject to voluntary grade posting (i.e.,
when a city council has not made posting mandatory) (proportion voluntary), (s) an
interaction effect between an indicator for whether the illness is food-related (food-related
indicator) and the proportion mandatory, and (6) an interaction effect between the food-
related indicator and the proportion voluntary. The joint effects of the coefficients for (2)
and (4) provide the net effect estimate of a 20% reduction in food-related hospitalizations




While understanding such threats to validity is important (and could be the
subject of an important replication study), we do not focus on these for the
remainder of this Article. Instead, this Article shows that the evidence in other
jurisdictions -which have never been studied before -should give pause to the
unfettered enthusiasm for restaurant grading, and that targeted transparency
should focus to a much greater extent on institutional design.
II. EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING GRADING
A. The Confounding Nature of Grade Reform
To assess the causal effect of grade reform, the ideal experiment would
randomize a large number of jurisdictions (or restaurants) to be subject to
sanitation grading. Randomization would ensure that jurisdictions (or
restaurants) subject to grading are comparable to those that are not."s' When
researchers cannot control the intervention, observational studies aim to
replicate that hypothetical experimental template by finding units that are
similar in all respects except for restaurant grading. Herein lies the basic
challenge for policy evaluation. Restaurant grading is essentially never
randomly adopted. To the contrary, as with much regulatory reform, the
intervention is, first, often a political response to a perceived crisis, and second,
rarely proposed in isolation."s2 The former means that any purported benefit
may be due solely to regression to the mean alone. Pasco County, Florida, for
example, instituted a grading system in the 1990s after a severe outbreak of
foodborne illness."s' A reduction in foodborne illness after the imposition of
grading may simply reflect a return to the pre-outbreak risk. The latter (that
grading is usually part of a reform package) means that isolating the causal
effect of grading becomes extraordinarily difficult.
In Los Angeles, for example, grade reform was a response to a series of
151. Of course, any single randomization might still result in groups that are distinct, but
randomization over a large sample of jurisdictions guarantees that the chances of such
imbalances are vanishingly small.
152. Cf Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7
ANN. REv. L. & Soc. ScI. 17 (2011) (discussing principles for causal inference); John J.
Donohue III & Daniel E. Ho, Does Fighting Terrorism Increase Ordinary Crime? A
Reexamination and Cautionary Tale (June 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (illustrating the difficulty of drawing inferences about the effect of increased
policing when it was part of a comprehensive response to a terrorist attack).
153. See BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 45; Bruce Vilmetti, Restaurant Ratings To Start; Health
Officials Rush To Post Grade Stickers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1987, at 1.
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television exposis of sensationally poor sanitation in several restaurants in
November 1997.154 Although one might argue that this timing is random, a
languishing health-inspection system may have facilitated the expos6. Even if
the impetus was random, the response was comprehensive. In the months
following the expos6, the county Heath Services Department closed restaurants
at three times the previous rate in a county-wide crackdown.s15 On December
9, the Board of Supervisors voted on an array of reforms." (In a further
complication, each incorporated city in the county still had to individually
adopt the posting requirement for grades.) Almost simultaneously, the state
adopted new requirements for food temperatures. 1 7
The Los Angeles experience shows that multiple, simultaneous policy
changes can confound inferences about grading. First, one typical crisis
response is to increase the number of health inspectors. Los Angeles
immediately hired twenty new inspectors, for example, to implement a "zero
tolerance" policy."' Grade reform, relatedly, is often also accompanied by a
change in the frequency of inspections. Los Angeles appeared to increase the
frequency of inspections, but, perplexingly, restaurants can also pay for an
immediate reinspection upon an undesirable grade."' Second, the reform
might also incentivize inspectors to engage in tougher inspections. In Los
Angeles, the Department flexed its muscles by shutting down more
restaurants, rotating inspectors across the county to prevent any familiarization
with regulated parties, and establishing a public hotline to register
complaints.16 o Third, the nature of the disclosure may vary, from posting the
154. Behind the Kitchen Door (KCBS television broadcast Nov. 16-18, 1997).
155. See Hector Tobar & Jeff Leeds, Restaurants Get a Taste of Tough County Health Policy, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jan/29/news/mn-13177.
156. See County To Tighten Rules for Restaurants, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1997, http://
articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/o/local/me-62632.
157. See Lauren Beth Rudolph Food Safety Act of 1997 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 114004 (West 2012)).
158. Tobar & Leeds, supra note 155; see Meyer, supra note 141.
159. An owner-initiated inspection is available once every twelve-month period to food-facility
owners who want the opportunity to improve their numerical score, letter grade, or both.
See L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.04-339 (2012); see also Bob Pool, Work Boils Over for
Restaurant Inspectors, L.A. TIMEs, July 19, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/juV19
Aocal/me-57458 ("But restaurant operators unhappy with a bad grade can do a fast cleanup
and pay a $161 fee to apply for a quick reinspection."). The reinspection fee depends on the
assessed risk level of the restaurant. L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.04-728(F) (2012).
160. See Jonathan E. Fielding et al., Making the Grade: Changing the Incentives in Retail Food
Establishment Inspection, 17 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 243, 244 (1999) (describing changes




grade, the score, an inspection summary, or some combination thereof. Fourth,
jurisdictions may also simultaneously change the underlying scoring metric,
such as California's changes in temperature controls. Fifth, jurisdictions also
often increase licensing requirements. In this case, Los Angeles required that
managers be certified in food handling."' Last, the crisis itself may change
behavior with respect to food safety, both by consumers and restaurateurs. Any
health improvement, for example, could be due to the TV expos6.
In short, grade reform is often confounded with several other policy
interventions. For a given jurisdiction, we might more credibly assess the joint
effect of the entire reform package, rather than the isolated effect of grading.
Jointly assessing the reform, however, also makes it more difficult to assess
how different reform packages in other jurisdictions will fare.
B. Jurisdictional Variation
Despite a federal model food code (or perhaps because of its advisory
nature), local jurisdictions in fact administer health inspections in divergent
ways. Table i reports results from a survey of twenty large metropolitan areas
in the United States. (Appendix E lists statutes, regulations, compliance
manuals, news reports, and phone interviews used to compile the information
in Table 1 and Table 2.)
Table i reveals several findings. Inspectors do not necessarily specialize in
restaurant inspections. In Los Angeles, some 24o inspectors are jointly
responsible for housing, pool, and restaurant inspections, such that the full-
time equivalent employees performing restaurant inspections is roughly 106. 62
Whether and how a point system is used varies considerably. Nine
jurisdictions do not use any formal numerical point system. In seven of the
twenty jurisdictions, restaurants must publicly post a grade or some other
indicator. Last, the availability of online data on individual inspections varies
considerably. In New York, one can view the specific violations cited for each
inspection, along with the score and any action taken by the restaurant
following the inspection (e.g., issuance of a notice of violation). In Baltimore,
on the other hand, consumers can only view a list of restaurants that have been
shut down by the health department.
161. See Jill Leovy, Tougher Restaurant Health Codes Urged, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1998,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/12/local/me-18325.
162. For the more precise calculation of "full-time equivalent" employees, see the caption of
Table 1, infra.
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"Regulatory jurisdiction" indicates at which level of governmental authority sanitation
inspections of food service establishments (FSEs) are conducted. In Los Angeles, both
county and city authorities retain authority. In both San Francisco and Louisville, the
city and county are a unified jurisdiction. "Establishments" indicates the number of
FSEs inspected, and may include, depending on local law, not only conventional
restaurants, but also school cafeterias, delis, and grocery stores that serve ready-to-eat
food. The "inspector" columns list (a) the estimated full-time equivalent (FTE) of
employees devoted to FSE inspections; and (b). the estimated number of individuals
with direct responsibility for conducting on-site sanitation inspections. For example, in
New York City, although there are i8o inspectors, roughly 78% of inspections are
devoted to FSE inspections, making for 14o FTEs. We report both numbers when
inspectors do not appear to specialize exclusively in food inspections. "Min.
inspections" indicates the minimum number of inspections that the jurisdiction aims or
is required to perform per year, either for all FSEs or the lowest risk FSE when a
jurisdiction bases inspection frequency on risk levels. "Public grading" and "public
posting" indicate whether local law requires that (a) a letter (or equivalent) summary;
or (b) any summary of an inspection be publicly posted for all FSEs in the adopting
jurisdiction. For example, in Los Angeles County, all FSEs in a city adopting grading
are required to post letter grades. In San Francisco, because only FSEs with certain
inspection histories are required to post a "Symbol of Excellence," it is not classified as a
grading jurisdiction. The "point system" column indicates whether a numerical point
system is used to score inspections. "Total points" indicate the maximum score, where a
(-) sign indicates that the score counts violations (e.g., in New York) and a (+) sign
indicates that the score represents the degree of compliance (e.g., in San Diego). The
"follow-up threshold" is the number of points that trigger a follow-up inspection. Cells
are gray where not applicable. The columns for "information online" indicate whether
(a) all inspections (e.g., routine and follow-up); (b) individual violations; (c) scores;
(d) actions taken by the health authority in response to the inspection (e.g., shutdown);
or (e) readily downloadable microdata are available online. These figures are estimates
based on sources listed in Appendix E.
The variation becomes even more apparent when examining the design of
grading systems. Table 2 reports differences in design elements of seventeen
grading jurisdictions. 6 , While we observe several first-generation graders
(e.g., North Carolina, San Diego, and St. Louis), most current grading systems
were adopted starting in the late 1990s. (In that sense, proponents of targeted
transparency are correct that such policy efforts emerged in the last twenty
years.) Maricopa County, Arizona, instituted grading in 2011, apparently
disregarding its opinion in 2001 that "[t]he grade card does not give the public
the complete history of the establishment, but a possible false sense of
security.",,64
163. These seventeen jurisdictions are not an exhaustive list of grading jurisdictions, but simply
provide a sense of the range of grading practices.
164. Submission for 2oo Samuel J. Crumbine Consumer Protection Award, MARICOPA
COUNTY ENVTL. SERVICES DEP'T 21 (2001), http://www.fpi.org/images/2ool%20maricopa
application.pdf.
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"Enactment" is the year (or best estimate) the restaurant grading system was
established. "Total points" indicate the total points used (with cells gray when
inapplicable). "Crit." and "gen. points" indicate the total number of points for critical
and general violations, with point ranges for individual violations in parentheses below
(c and g stand for the number of violations). The next four columns present the posted
grade or sign (in the color that it appears on the sign - in the online version of this Article
only), with corresponding criteria. When a jurisdiction's terminology differs, we translate
violations as general or critical violations. Maricopa County, for example, uses the terms
"priority violation" and "priority foundation violation." Each row of grading criteria is a
disjunctive condition. For instance, Maricopa County assigns a grade of 'D' when there
are three or more critical (c> 3) or four or more general violations (g 4). "Score post."
indicates whether the numerical score is posted in addition to the grade. The
"reinspection" columns indicate (a) whether the first reinspection can change the grade
or score; (b) the inspection result or condition that triggers such a reinspection; (c)
days until that reinspection; and (d) the dollar fee for that reinspection. A "Req." in the
trigger column indicates that a restaurant owner must request a reinspection. The last
column indicates the minimum number of inspections required per year. In Larimer
County, grades are posted only online, whereas in all other jurisdictions, grades are
posted on site. The "-" sign indicates rough approximation.
Point scores for types of violations exhibit wide differences. While Georgia
and San Diego both employ a ioo-point scale, a critical violation can garner up
to 9 points in Georgia, compared to 4 points in San Diego. North Carolina
awards 2 bonus points for food safety "education credit," a minimum
requirement in other jurisdictions. Divergent grade thresholds make it quite
difficult to substantively understand the meaning of a grade. In Louisville, a
score of 85 leads to an 'A,' while a score of 84 leads to a 'C.' The Louisville 'A'
cutoff was successively lowered over the years: from 93 for 2002 to 2010, to 90
in January 2011, down to 85 in September 2011.165 Maricopa County allows
restaurants to voluntarily opt into grading, with a dizzying translation of critical
and general violations into grades. One critical violation (given the puzzling
name "priority violation") and two general violations ("priority foundation
violations") result in a 'B';'66 zero critical violations and three general
violations result in a 'C.' Larimer County, Colorado, uses-in addition to the
state's 100-point scale-a 569-point scale for grading purposes. The county
oddly explains that the 569-point scale is "based upon similar models used in
165. See Gil, supra note 40 (noting in 2002 that "[r]estaurants will earn an A for a score of loo-
93"); Press Release, Louisville Metro Dep't of Pub. Health & Wellness, Public Health and
Wellness To Revise Food Placard System, Aug. 25, 2011, http://wvw.louisvilleky.gov
/Health/News/ii-o8-placards.htm (announcing a revised 'A' cutoff of 85); E-mail
Correspondence with Gretchen Boyd, Envtl. Health Supervisor, Louisville Dep't of Pub.
Health & Wellness (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with author) (noting the change of the 'A' cutoff
from 93 to go in 2011).
166. The new terminology comes from the 2009 model food code. See U.S. PuB. HEALTH SERV.,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 102, at x-xi.
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other parts of the U.S." 6 7
The nature of the disclosure also differs considerably. Albuquerque uses a
green/red sticker system. Toronto uses a color-coded sticker system: green for
a passing grade, yellow for significant infractions, and red for major
infractions. Maricopa County has a rare letter grade of 'D.' Across jurisdictions,
a 'B' grade may be posted in the colors blue, green, yellow, or black. (Denmark,
not in Table 2, uses smiley faces.' 68 ) All jurisdictions where grading is
mandatory establish some sort of reinspection system for grade adjustments.
C. Our Approach
As Table 2 underscores, the impact of grading is unlikely to be
homogeneous across jurisdictions. The nature of health inspections, scoring,
and disclosures differs in such sharp ways that the effects documented in Los
Angeles are unlikely to hold for other jurisdictions.
This Article's approach is to examine previously unstudied jurisdictions to
assess the efficacy of targeted transparency beyond the extant case study. We
focus primarily on New York and San Diego. Together with Los Angeles,
these comprise the three largest grading jurisdictions in the United States
(see Table 1). The size of each of these jurisdictions also means that we have
rich microdata from a large set of restaurants and inspections with which to
examine the implementation of grading. New York has the particular
advantage of having instituted grading during our observation period (in July
2010), thereby also providing us with temporal variation in grading. San
Diego, on the other hand, permits us to examine the practice of grading in a
system that has existed for many decades.16 9
Although we sought at the outset to design an evaluation of grading's
effects on sanitation and health outcomes, our analysis of the data revealed far
more fundamental concerns with each of the systems. Do grades convey any
167. Restaurant Inspection Database, LARIMER COUNTY HEALTH & ENv'T, http://
www.co.larimer.co.us/food/about.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) ("In addition to the
traditional ioo point scoring system which has been used in the past, LCDH&E has
developed its own food establishment rating system called the 'Risk Index.' This rating
system is based upon similar models used in other parts of the U.S..... Like golf scores,
the lower the risk value, the better the sanitation level . . . . There are 569 possible value
points in the risk index rating system, 53o are for critical items and 39 for non-critical
items.").
168. See Intro to Smiley System, DANISH VETERINARY & FOOD ADMIN., http://www.findsmiley.dk
/en-US/Forside.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).





information at all? Are inspection scores meaningful? What effect does grading
have on the regulation of food safety? Our findings suggest that proponents of
targeted transparency have drastically overestimated the salutary effects of
grading and failed to notice its costs.
While compiling and structuring the data (e.g., with the complex
classification algorithm we developed for New York inspections) required
considerable work, we relegate these details to the Appendix. More
sophisticated statistical methods, which we propose in Section VII.A, may be
applied, but we focus on the core findings below, which can be communicated
with minimal mathematical background. We turn first to San Diego, as the
findings are simpler and provide an important point of comparison for our
findings in New York. Appendix D demonstrates that our results generalize to
eight other jurisdictions.
III. FUDGING BY INFLATION: SAN DIEGO
We begin by sketching some brief background on San Diego's health
inspection system in Section III.A. Section III.B describes the inspections data
for San Diego restaurants, and Section III.C presents results.
A. Regulatory Background
California's Retail Food Code sets statewide standards for food safety in
restaurants. The state code establishes substantive violations, following the
2001 FDA model food code."o For example, the code specifies poultry "shall be
heated to a minimum internal temperature of 165oF for 15 seconds.""' Primary
enforcement responsibility falls upon local California agencies, in San Diego's
case the Food and Housing Division of the County Department of
Environmental Health. The agency is self-funded by permit fees, with a budget
of around $6 million,' and is responsible for administering the food code for
roughly 12,000 retail food facilities,"' including not only conventional
170. See Ass'n of Food & Drug Officials, Real Progress in Food Code Adoptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (July 1, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/RetailFoodProtection
/FederalStateCooperativePrograms/UCM230336.htm.
171. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 114004(a)(3) (West 2012).
172. Gary W. Erbeck, Samuel J. Crumbine Consumer Protection Award 2005 Submittal, CoUNTY oF
SAN DIEGO DEP'T OF ENVTL. HEALTH 3 (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.fpi.org/images
/san%2odiego%2oapplication.pdf.
173. See Food Facility Inspection Search, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov
/deh/fhd/ffis/intro.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
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restaurants, but also any establishment serving ready-to-eat food (e.g.,
convenience stores, school cafeterias, and health care facilities).' The primary
inspection vehicle is a "routine inspection," which is comprehensive and, as in
Los Angeles, scored from o to ioo points, with oo points indicating no
violations (full compliance). Common violations include failure to abide by
"holding" temperatures, dirty food-contact surfaces, improper cooling, and
failure to wash hands. Violations are classified as major or minor violations, the
former receiving higher point deductions. For example, failure to heat poultry
to 1650F is a major violation resulting in subtraction of 4 points, while failure to
wear a hair restraint is a minor violation resulting in subtraction of 1 point.7 1
Limited (or "directed") inspections are unscored.' 6  These are typically
reinspections after a notice of violation was issued to the facility or inspections of
establishments that have limited food service areas (e.g., grocery stores).
San Diego has graded a subset of food facilities since 1947.'17 Under county
code, "[a]ll restaurants, bars, taverns, retail food processors, and deli markets
where food is prepared will receive a grade card."'18 (Establishments that are
scored and inspected, but not graded, include grocery stores, gas stations,
liquor stores, and schools.) The grading system assigns letter grades of 'A,' 'B,'
or 'C,' if a routine inspection resulted in 90-100, 80-89, or 79 or fewer points,
respectively.179 A 'C' is considered a failing grade and may result in penalties
and permit suspension if the restaurant fails to achieve a score of at least 8o
points within thiry days. so (The Department of Environmental Health and the
Housing Division can always shut down a restaurant if it poses too large a
public health risk.)
The county employs around fifty inspectors ("Registered Environmental
Health Specialists"), who conduct housing and food inspections, with roughly
75-80% of time spent on the latter.'"' Inspectors are required to (i) have a
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 113789 (West 2012).
175. See Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 6.
176. See Food Facility Inspection Search: Directed, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGo, http://www.sdcounty
.ca.gov/deh/fhid/ffis/insp-result/directed.htil (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
177. See Williams & Armendariz, supra note 88.
178. See Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 29.
179. SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF REG. OPDINANCES S 61.107(a) (2012).
iso. Id. 5 61.107(b)-(c); Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 28; Food Program,
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/deh/food/food.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2012).
181. See Williams & Armendariz, supra note 88; E-mail Correspondence with Bao Huynh,
Supervising Envtl. Health Specialist, Food & Hous. Div., San Diego Cnty. Dep't of Envtl.




baccalaureate degree, with thirty semester units of basic biological, chemical,
physical, or environmental science; (2) have "[o]ne . . . year of experience
investigating and enforcing environmental, public health or sanitary laws and
regulations" or "[s]ix . . . months as a[] . . . Trainee with the County"; and
(3) pass a state civil service exam. Starting salaries range from $50,000 to
$61,ooo.8
As a general matter, the county's food safety system is reputed to work
well. In 2005, the Department received an award for food protection. With
respect to transparency and the grading system, however, performance is less
clear. In 2oo6 tO 2007, the county convened a grand jury investigation to
examine why a seemingly large number of restaurants were receiving 'A's. The
investigation did not examine large-scale data, but conducted a series of
interviews with inspectors, health officials, and restaurateurs. Noting the ratio
of then forty-eight inspectors to 12,ooo establishments, the grand jury
concluded that "[p]ressure is high for . . . inspectors to manage regular
visits"' and recommended increased funding for hiring inspectors.s' It also
found "no formal means of communication for informing the public of
restaurant closures and the outcome of subsequent inspections""' and
recommended the creation of a website of inspection data. 8 ,
San Diego Cnty. Grand Jury 20o6-2007, "A" Grades in San Diego Count)' Restaurants,
Deserved or Not?, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 3 (May 7, 2007), http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov
/grandjury/reports/2006_2007/restaurantgrade.pdf.
182. See Erbeck, supra note 172, at 6; Job Descriptions & Salaries, Environmental Health Specialist 1,
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://agency.governmentjobs.com/sdcounty/default.cfm?action
=viewclassspec&classSpeclD=80722&agency= 14o88&viewOnly=yes (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
183. Samuel J. Crumbine Consumer Protection Avard: Past CrumbineAward Winners, FOODSERVICE
PACKAGING INST., http://www.fpi.org/images/past%20crumbine%2oaward%2owinners.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012). But see PEACOCK, supra note 114, at 344 (assigning San Diego a
grade of 'C' based on a qualitative survey).
184. San Diego Cnty. Grand Jury 2006-2007, supra note i81, at 3.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 4. The grand jury focused primarily on restaurant closures by the department, as is
evident from the types of information the grand jury concluded the website should contain
(i.e., restaurant name and location, date of closure, reason for closure, date reopened, and
result of follow-up inspection). As we argue in Part VII, all inspection data should be
disclosed.
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B. Inspections Data
To empirically study the San Diego grading system, we downloaded and
extracted into proper database format all available inspection reports from the
Department's website at the end of November 2011."18 The data include 37,040
inspections of 11,941 establishments between June 2007 and November 2011.
Information includes the date, type of inspection, and score (if applicable).
Figure 2 plots the distribution of types of inspections. Just under 8o% of
inspections are routine inspections; just under 20% are directed (unscored)
inspections; and a small number of inspections are other kinds of inspections
(e.g., reinspections resulting in the restaurant closing or reopening).
Figure 2.
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Routine inspections are scored and graded. Directed inspections are limited in scope
and unscored and ungraded. Some facilities (e.g., grocery stores) may receive a routine
inspection of areas where ready-to-eat food is prepared and directed inspections in the
remainder of the facility, such that routine and directed inspections occur during the
same inspection visit. Closures may occur across different types of inspections.
Reopening inspections occur only for restaurants that have been closed.
61o
188. See San Diego Food Facility Inspection Search, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,













SCORES IN SAN DIEGO
8o 85 90 95 100
Score
This histogram depicts scores for 11,813 San Diego restaurants as of November 2011.
We first examine how the grading system operates in the most recent
inspection cycle for restaurants. Figure 3 displays a histogram of the most
recent inspection scores for San Diego restaurants from November 2011. The
black vertical line at 90 points shows the threshold for receiving an 'A.' Each
bar represents the number of restaurants receiving each raw score. The mean
score is 96 (standard deviation = 3), but there is a sharp discontinuity at the 'A'
threshold. While 703 restaurants received a score of 90, only two received a
score of 89. Out of 8,941 graded restaurants, only eight received a 'B,' and none
received a 'C.'189
If the theory of targeted transparency is to provide a signal to consumers to
differentiate amongst goods, San Diego's system appears to fall short. Because
99.9% of restaurants receive an 'A,' there is little variation from a consumer's
perspective in the sanitation level of restaurants.
189. Out of 11,813 scored inspections, only fifteen establishments received a score below 90.
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That said, the high proportion of 'A's alone is consistent with both benign
and nonbenign behavior. It may be that San Diego restaurants have responded
to the grading system by improving cleanliness precisely to target the threshold
of 90 points. But consider two other points. First, county law permits
restaurants to pay a fee ($142 per hour) to be reinspected, and possibly
regraded, within thirty days. 9 o Strategic cleanups for regrading arguably are
much less likely to yield general health benefits. Out of sixty-two graded
restaurants that have received a score below 90, the median time to scoring
above 90 points is seven days. Nearly a quarter of restaurants achieve an 'A'
within one day of the original inspection, and 8o% do so within a month. At
any given point of time, the probability of observing a 'B' grade even for these
establishments is hence extraordinarily low.'9 '
Second, as the public health literature emphasizes, inspector discretion may
well explain the discontinuity. Although scoring is conducted via a specific
worksheet, there is discretion in which violation to cite and, in many instances,
how many points to assign the violation. How would one determine, for
example, whether "[flood contact surfaces [are] clean [and] sanitized" and, if
not, whether it warrants a two- or four-point deduction?192 Health officials
report that converting scores to grades induces a form of "ethical stress[]":
''operators are likely to demand that their political representatives or the courts
intervene, or they may be tempted to 'encourage' inspectors toward good
grades through unfortunate and unethical means." 9 3 Most tellingly, one San
Diego inspector revealed: "Some inspectors will give out a B for an 89 . . . . I
usually warn somebody at that point. It's a judgment call .. "
We explore the role of inspector discretion more formally below.
0go. SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF REG. ORDINANCES § 61.1o 7(b) (2012); Retail Food
Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 29; Dep't of Envtl. Health, Food Facility Fee
Schedule Effective August 24, 2012, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov
/deh/food/pdf/publications feeschedule.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2012); Telephone
Interview with Celia Kroy, Envtl. Health Specialist & Specialist on Duty, San Diego Dep't of
Envtl. Health (Jan. 19, 2012).
191. The same pattern holds for closures of restaurants. Out of sixty-seven graded restaurants
that have been closed, the median time until the restaurant was reopened was the same day.
Four out of five graded restaurants that are closed reopen within one day. Note that such
regrading alone does not account for the discontinuity at 90. The difference in the number
of restaurants just above and below the threshold of 90 points is much larger than the
number of restaurants paying for reinspections.
192. See Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 6.
193. BOEHNKE, supra note 78, at 24-25.
194. Ed Sylvester, Making Sure Your Eating Places Are A-OK: Inspectors Rate S.D. Restaurants, L.A.




Regardless of whether restaurants are precisely targeting the threshold, the
practice of grade inflation in San Diego means that its grades fail to convey to
consumers any substantial heterogeneity in sanitation. Uniform 'A's at the very
least appear inconsistent with the Department's justification for grading. The
Department states, "local consumers and visitors quickly learn the usefulness of
the grade in selecting a place to dine."19' Like Lake Wobegon's children, San
Diego's restaurants are all "above average."
2. Scoring Consistency
Another basic way to assess San Diego's inspection system is to compare
restaurant scores over repeated routine inspections. If systematic differences in
sanitation between restaurants exist, we would expect such inspection results
to exhibit substantive correlation over repeat inspections. To be sure, we would
not expect (or desire) complete consistency: after all, a low grade should
incentivize a restaurant to clean up, and a high grade might cause a restaurant
to be less vigilant. In addition, chance factors, such as when the inspector
shows up and what food is being prepared, would attenuate the correlation. 196
But if grades based on the most recent inspection report are to have any
meaning, they should minimally convey some substantive information about
the prospective cleanliness of the establishment.
Figure 4 plots inspection scores from routine inspections for the same
restaurant across the first two observed inspection cycles.197 Each dot
represents one restaurant, with the score it received in the first cycle on the x-
axis and its score in the subsequent cycle on the y-axis, randomly jittered (and
transparent) for visibility. The top panel plots these for the full range of
observed scores from 61-oo points. Because restaurants that score below 90
points have an incentive to improve sanitation practices and are thus likely to
reduce the overall correlation, the bottom panel excludes these and focuses on
the 'A' range of restaurants. If sanitation measures were perfectly correlated,
195. Erbeck, supra note 172, at 15 (emphasis added).
196. In statistical terms, we of course expect some regression to the mean, but the correlation
coefficient provides one sense of the relative weight of systematic-restaurant-specific-
factors relative to stochastic factors.
197. To be precise, Figure 4 plots scores across the first two observed repeat routine inspections
for scored (but not necessarily graded) establishments. Results are substantively the same
for the subset of scored and graded restaurants. There are slightly more restaurants scoring
below 90 than in Figure 3, which plots the most recent inspection score as of November
2011, while Figure 4 plots the first two routine inspections from 2007 onward. Because the
frequency of inspections is tied to the risk of the establishment, we do not plot all pairs of
inspections, which would over-represent high-risk establishments.
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dots should line up on the forty-five-degree line, and the proportion of
variation explained by prior scores (R2) would equal one. We find that
inspection scores exhibit substantial consistency over time. Restaurants that
received a high score one year tend to receive a similar score the subsequent
year; there are very few data points in the top-left and bottom-right quadrants
representing restaurants flip-flopping scores across years. A one-point increase
in cycle i is associated with a half-point increase (plus or minus 0.02 at a 95%
confidence level) in cycle 2.1,8 Roughly a quarter of the score variation in the
second cycle is explained by score in the first cycle (R' = o.24 for the full range
and 0.27 for the 'A' range).99 This level of consistency appears roughly
comparable to that of Los Angeles restaurants. 2 0  Figure 5 displays more
substantively the information in San Diego's scores. The left panel plots the
distribution of scores in the second cycle for restaurants receiving below 95
points in cycle i, while the right panel plots the distribution of scores in the
second cycle for restaurants receiving 95 or above in cycle 1. The distributions
sharply diverge. If a restaurant scored below 95 in cycle i, it has a 47% chance
of scoring a 95 or above on the next cycle, compared to an 8o% chance for a
restaurant scoring above 95 in cycle 1.2'01 In short, a restaurant's sanitation score
is informative.
198. This is based on a simple linear least squares regression of scores in cycle 2 as the outcome
and scores in cycle 1 as the main explanatory variable for the full dataset.
199. See supra note 198. The same model is fit to the subset of'A'-graded restaurants.
200. See supra text accompanying note 143 (finding in an earlier study by Jin and Leslie that just
under a quarter of the variation in restaurant inspections is explained by time-invariant
restaurant-specific attributes).
zol. It is possible that anchoring bias explains the consistency in San Diego results if inspectors
are aware of the previous inspection score. But the real puzzle, as we explore below, is the
relative consistency in San Diego and relative inconsistency in New York. In both





















O R = 0.27
go 92 94 96 98 100
Cycle 1
Each dot represents one restaurant, with the score it received on its first routine inspection
on the x-axis and the score from its next routine inspection on the y-axis. For visibility,
observations are randomly jittered. The top panel depicts the full range of observed scores
and the bottom panel depicts restaurants receiving 'A' grades in both cycles. If measures
were perfectly correlated, dots would line up on the fbrty-five-degree line and R would
equal one. Roughly a quarter of the variation in inspection scores is predicted by prior
inspection scores (see Rk in the lower right hand corner), so inspections are measuring
some degree of systematic sanitation differences amongst restaurants.
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Figure 5.
PREDICTIVE POWER OF SCORES IN SAN DIEGO
CYCLE 1 SCORE < 95 CYCLE 1 SCORE 95
0
90 95 100 90 95 100
Score in cycle 2 Score in cycle 2
The left panel depicts the score distribution in cycle 2, given that a restaurant scored
below a 95 in cycle i. The right panel depicts the score distribution in cycle 2, given that
a restaurant scored 95 or above in cycle 1.
The above results paint a mixed portrait of San Diego's grading system. It is
possible that grading over the course of the last sixty years -and the concordant
stability in compliance expectations -might have caused San Diego restaurants
to improve sharply to 'A'-levels. San Diego might then be a resounding success
for targeted transparency. The sharp discontinuity at go and the ability to
request a regrade within a day, however, call this interpretation into question.
While San Diego health inspections exhibit some degree of consistency over
time, without any substantive grade variation to speak of, consumers -at least
currently- cannot rely on such grades to inform their restaurant choices. To
understand these results better, we turn to New York.
IV. FUDGING BY NOISE: NEW YORK
We begin, again, with some regulatory background about New York's
restaurant-inspection system in Section IV.A, focusing particularly on the
system as it existed immediately before and after grading was instituted in July
2010. Section IV.B discusses the inspections data, with Appendices A and B
detailing data integrity issues and the classification algorithm we developed to
address the fact that New York fails to disclose types of inspections. Section
IV.C presents results. (Appendix C shows that findings are robust to scoring
changes, different types of inspections, the time period or inspection cycles





1. Inspections 2005 to 2010
The Bureau of Food Safety and Community Sanitation (BFSCS) in the
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) administers the
city's food safety program.o 2 The Bureau inspects thirty-two different types of
facilities (e.g., senior centers, public schools, correctional institutions,
apartment window guardso'), but roughly three-quarters of its inspections are
of restaurants.20 4 Its 2007 budget was $11.7 million,os and its staff consists of
roughly 18o full-time positions.0
The frontline employees are the health inspectors ("Public Health
Sanitarians").2 o7 Qualifications are comparable to San Diego's. Inspectors must
pass a civil service exam and possess either baccalaureate degrees with at least
thirty semester credits in biological or physical sciences, or associate degrees
with twelve semester credits in biological or physical sciences and five years of
experience as public health technicians. Starting salaries range roughly from
$40,000 to $50,000.208
202. See Food Safety and Community Sanitation, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/htmVinspecVinsp.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
203. Window guards are child-safety guards on apartment windows.
204. See BUREAU OF MGMT. AUDIT, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CITY OF N.Y., AUDIT REPORT
ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE OVERSIGHT OF THE CORRECTION OF
HEALTH CODE VIOLATIONS AT RESTAURANTS 1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 AUDIT]; Office of
Community Sanitation: Special Population Inspection Program, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
MENTAL HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/inspect/comm-san.shtml#spip (last
visited Feb. 1, 2012).
205. See 2oo9 Executive Budget, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 14 (2009),
http://council.nyc.gov/html/irnitiatives/FYo9PBB-MayUpdate/o5l2o8_FYo9 DOHMH.pdf.
206. See Glenn Collins, Restaurant Grading Begins in New York, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo/o7/28/nyregion/28inspect.html. When New York's
Independent Budget Office (IBO) reviewed City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(DOHMH)'s budget programmatically, it actually listed the budget for the Bureau of Food
Safety and Community Sanitation (BFSCS) as $344,0oo with one full-time position.
Instead, IBO allocated sanitarians to "General Environmental Health." See IBO's
Programmatic Review of the 2oo6 Budget as of the November Financial Plan, N.Y.C.
INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE 21 (2006), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/agencyBudgetso5
/DOHMH%2oProgram%2oBudget.pdf; Telephone Interview with Doug Turetsky, Chief of
Staff& Commc'ns Dir., N.Y.C. Indep. Budget Office (Jan. 10, 2012).
207. See 2009 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 3.
208. Notice of Examination: Public Health Sanitarian, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITYWIDE ADMIN.
SERVICES APPLICATION UNIT (2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcas/downloads/pdf/noes
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As in San Diego, substantive violations in New York City largely derive
from the state sanitary code, with local officials bearing primary responsibility
for enforcement. 20 In contrast to San Diego's longstanding grading system,
however, New York's method of scoring inspections is relatively recent. New
York first began to use a numerical scoring system (without grades) in March
2003,210 the procedures for which were formalized in a rulemaking in February
2005.21' The point scoring system, which has remained largely the same since
2005, aimed in part to "provide a more objective method of evaluating ...
public health risks."
The point scoring system works as follows. Violations are classified as
either "critical" or "general" violations. Critical violations are those "more
likely . . . to contribute to food contamination, illness, or environmental
degradation."2 13 AS of 2005, sixty critical violations fell into one of six
substantive categories: administration, food temperature, food source, food
protection, facility design, and personal hygiene. Thirty-eight general
violations fell into one of seven substantive categories: vermin or garbage, food
source, facility maintenance, documentation, and three tobacco-related
categories. Each violation could range in severity ("condition") from I to V; the
conditions determined point scores, which ranged from two to twenty-eight
points per violation.
In an initial inspection -a full, unannounced sanitary inspection conducted
roughly once a year-inspectors chose whether to cite a particular violation and
determined the severity (or condition) of the violation. Table 3 provides
examples of common violations. For example, a 2B violation for failure to hold
a hot food item at or above 14o0 F could be assigned seven to twenty-eight
points, depending primarily on the number of food items so held. "Two hot
food items out of temperature," such as "8 chicken wings and cooked rice,"
/20110101200o.pdf; Public Health Sanitarian Series, N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.ny.gov/preventioVpublic-health works/careers/public-healthsanitarian
.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
2og. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 14-1 (1992).
210. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 798 N.Y.S.2d 711
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); see also Jennifer Steinhauer, New Restaurant Rules Violated City
Charter, a Judge Decides, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2004, http://www.nytimes.con/2004/1o/29
/nyregion/29restaurant.html (describing judicial decision requiring public comment before
the adoption of scoring system).
211. See Comm'r of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice ofAdoption ofan Amendment to Title 24 of
the Rules of the City of New York Adding Chapter 23 ("Food Service Establishment Inspection
Procedures"), 132 Crry REc. 883 (Feb. 18, 2005).
212. Id.




would constitute a 2B Condition II violation with eight points, while "[t]hree
hot food items out of temperature," such as "8 chicken wings, cooked rice and
roast beef," would constitute a 2B Condition III violation with nine points.2 4
Failure to correct any public health hazard during the course of the inspection
would result in an automatic twenty-eight points.2"
When an inspection resulted in one or more critical violations or fourteen
or more points, inspectors issued a notice of violation.21' Each violation cited
therein would carry a penalty of between $200 and $2,ooo.2" An inspection
resulting in twenty-eight or more points was considered a failed inspection,
triggering, "whenever practicable," a "compliance inspection."12,8 DOHMH
policy was to conduct compliance inspections fifteen to forty-five days after the
failed initial inspection.2 1' Failure to remedy violations after two such
compliance inspections would increase the chance of DOHMH shutting down
the restaurant, although in principle a restaurant could be shut down at any
time for posing a public health hazard.
The pre-2010 inspection system contained one additional carrot and stick.
The carrot was a "Golden Apple" award issued to any restaurant that, among
other requirements, "passed two consecutive annual inspections with no
critical violations and fewer than four general violations." 2 o The stick was an
"Accelerated Inspection Program," which increased the frequency of initial
inspections for restaurants that had failed two consecutive initial inspections.
Between 200S and 2010, DOHMH made only relatively minor scoring
214. Inspection Scoring System for Food Service Establishments, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
MENTAL HYGIENE 11 (2oo5), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/inspect/inspect
-food-safety-book.pdf.
215. Id. at 4.
216. 132 CITY REC. 884 (Feb. 18, 2005).
217. N.Y., N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 3.11 (2012).
218. 132 CITY REc. 884 (Feb. 18, 2005).
219. See 2009 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 9.
220. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Health Department Announces
"Golden Apple" Award for Restaurants with Superior Food Safety (May 6, 2004),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/press-archiveo4/pro48-oso6.shtml; see 20o9 AUDIT,
supra note 204, at 16-17. Golden Apples fell out of use after letter grading was introduced in
2010. Compare Inspection Scoring System for Food Service Establishments, supra note 214, at 8
(describing the Golden Apple initiative), with What To Expect When You're Inspected: A
Guide for Food Service Operators, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 8 (2010),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/blue-book.pdf (never mentioning the
Golden Apple).
221. 2009 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 5 .2.
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changes to the inspection system.' The only -notable change, implemented in
July 2009, was that DOHMH stopped scoring administrative and
documentation violations." Violation 1A in Table 3, for example, would still
be cited, but no longer scored.
222. In December 2007, DOHMH clarified that violations of New York's ban on artificial trans-
fat foods would not count for sanitation scoring purposes, although inspectors would cite
establishments for such violations. See Notice ofAdoption ofAmendments to Chapter 23 (Food
Service Establishment Inspection Procedures) of Title 24 of the Rules of the City of New York, 134
CITY REC. 5,o85 (Dec. 27, 2007). New York similarly introduced calorie posting and food
allergy disclosures for certain restaurants in 2008 and 2009, respectively. See Comm'r of
Mental Health & Hygiene, Notice ofAdoption of a New Chapter 27 (Food Allergy Information)
in Title 24 of the Rules of the City of New York, DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE (2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/food-allergy-information.pdf; Press
Release, N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Board of Health Votes To Require
Chain Restaurants To Display Calorie Information in New York City (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html,/pr2oo8/proo8-o8.shtml. In October 2008, to
harmonize its inspection system with state amendments, DOHMH added two violations for
"reduced oxygen packaging" (a method of removing oxygen when storing food to limit
Clostridium botulinum) and four violations to facilitate HACCP management, and amended
in small part the language of four existing violations. See Comm'r of Health & Mental
Hygiene, Notice ofAdoption ofAmendments to Chapter 23 (Food Service Establishment Sanitary
Inspection Procedures) of Title 24 of the Rules of the City of New York, 135 CITY REC. 3,159 (Sept.
29, 2008).
223. See Notice ofAdoption ofAmendments to Chapter 23 (Food Service Establishment Procedures) of





SAMPLE VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK (2005)
TYPE OF VIOLATION CONDITIONS
0CRITICAL VIOLATIONS (60) 111 I 0
Administration
iA Current valid permit, registration, or other
authorization to operate not available.
Food Temperature
2B Hot food item not held at or above 14o0 F.
Food Source
-
3D Canned food product observed swollen, leaking, 7
and rusted.
Food Protection
41 Food item spoiled, adulterated, contaminated, or 7
cross-contaminated.
Facility Design
5C Food-contact surface improperly constructed or 7
located. Unacceptable material used.
Personal Hygiene & Other Food Protection
6A Personal cleanliness inadequate. Clean outer 5
garments, effective hair restraint not worn.
- 28
8 9 to 28
8 9 10 28
8 9 to 28
8 9 10 28
6 7 8 -
GENERAL VIOLATIONS (38) I I l IV V
Vermin or Garbage
8A Facility not vermin proof. Harborage or conditions 2
conducive to vermin exist.
Food Source
9 D Food contact surface not properly maintained. 2
3 4 5 -
3 4 5 -
Facility Maintenance
ioA Toilet facility not maintained and provided with 2
toilet paper, waste receptacle, and self-closing door.
Documentation
nA Permit not conspicuously displayed.
"Conditions" indicates the severity of the violation and associated point value. In total,
there are sixty critical violations and thirty-eight general violations.
3 4 5
2 - - - -
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2. The 2oo9 Comptroller Audit
In 2009, the City Comptroller conducted a performance audit of the
restaurant-inspection system for the 2008 fiscal year.2" The Comptroller
interviewed officials and reviewed samples of fifty restaurants that were not
inspected during the year, sixty-two restaurants that failed one regular
inspection, thirty-nine restaurants that failed three or more consecutive
inspections, and twenty-one restaurants in the Accelerated Inspections
Program."' The Comptroller made numerous findings critical of the system,
but, most relevant for our purpose, concluded that "DOHMH did not
adequately track its inspectors or supervisors to ensure that inspections were
being properly conducted and monitored."226 Examining the internal DOHMH
inspections database, the Comptroller found major limitations to the database.
For example, "DOHMH officials provided a list of 194 inspectors," but the
"database file identified 280 inspector codes,"" an unexplained excess of
eighty-six inspectors. DOHMH's cryptic explanation for the deviation was the
presence of "input errors.,,8 More shocking, given that inspectors are
ostensibly assigned randomly, was the variation across sixty-seven inspectors
who conducted more than one hundred inspections in the year. The average
inspection score was 25 points, but the audit uncovered some inspectors with
average scores of 15 and others with average scores of 5o. 2 9
3. Letter Grading
In July 2010, as part of the Bloomberg Administration's push for
government transparency and digital modernization, DOHMH instituted letter
grading. (Mayor Bloomberg's slogan: "In God we trust. Everyone else, bring
data."23o) The primary change was to convert each inspection score into a letter
224. See 2009 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 1.
225. Id. at 4-5.
226. Id. at i.
227. Id. at 14.
228. Id. at 16. DOHMH also responded that it "recognized deficiencies in its current system of
OCR scanning technology that depends on handwriting recognition technology to lift." Id.
229. Id. at 13.





grade, required to be posted in a location visible to passersby."' In principle,
the conversion was simple: fewer than 14 points resulted in an 'A'; 14-27 points
resulted in a 'B'; and 28 or more points resulted in a 'C.'232
In practice, the implementation was more complicated. First, DOHMH
introduced a system of "reinspection" for grading purposes. If an initial
inspection resulted in fewer than 14 points, a restaurant received an 'A.' If,
however, the restaurant scored above 14 points on the initial inspection,
DOHMH scheduled a reinspection to occur roughly a month (and "no sooner
than 7 days"") after the initial inspection.'4 Such reinspections were, in
theory, plenary inspections conducted by a new inspector, the score of which
would determine the restaurant's grade."' For example, a restaurant scoring 20
points in the initial inspection could be issued a final grade of 'A,' 'B,' or 'C,'
depending entirely on the score upon reinspection. As before, restaurants
scoring 28 or more points on any inspection were, in principle, subject to
compliance inspections."'
Second, the 2010 revision changed the timing of the inspection cycle. For
any restaurant receiving 28 or more points on either the initial inspection or
reinspection, "[a]n initial inspection commencing a new cycle shall be
conducted 90 to iso days after the" last full inspection. 3 ' For any restaurant
receiving 14 to 27 points on either the initial inspection or reinspection, "[a]n
initial inspection commencing a new cycle shall be conducted 150 to 210 days
after the" last full inspection." All remaining restaurants received initial
inspections roughly once a year.
231. See 137 CITY REC. 1608 (June 15, 2010); 137 CITY REc. 698 (Mar. 23, 2010); see also N.Y.,
N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 81.51(c) (2011).
232. 137 CITY REC. 1607 (June 15, 2010).
233. Id.
234. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE 3 (2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/restaurant-grading-1
-year-report.pdf (noting that reinspection occurs "about a month later"). In the interim
period, restaurants were required to continue to post a prior grade, if any. See 137 CITY REC.
16o8 (June 15, 2010).
235. In Los Angeles, such reinspections are limited in that they only examine violations cited
during the initial inspection. This difference was widely contested by the New York
Restaurant Association. See, e.g., Concerning Letter Grades Proposal, Hearing Before the N.Y C.
Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene (Feb. 5, 2010) (statement of Robert Bookman, N.Y.C.
Counsel, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n).
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Third, restaurants that did not receive an 'A' upon reinspection were
provided the option of posting either the final grade (of 'B' or 'C') or a "grade
pending" card until a hearing in front of an administrative tribunal." (In
practice, most restaurants choose the latter.) Taken together, these three
complications were quite favorable to restaurants. Restaurants had a second
chance to achieve a higher grade, did not in fact have to disclose a poor grade
until an administrative resolution, faced shorter actual disclosure periods with
poor grades because of the shortened inspection cycle, and gained greater
certainty as to the timing of initial inspections and reinspections.
The 2010 changes also included some minor changes to the scoring
system." (Appendix C.1 shows that the types of violations documented are
comparable pre- and post-grading.) Yet DOHMH itself stated, "[T]he Health
Department has not changed the way it conducts inspections [with
240. Id. at 16o8. The Rules are actually unclear about the impact of administrative hearings for a
notice of violation issued in the initial inspection. Notices of violation can be issued in any
scored inspection, see id. at 1607, but a grade is required to be posted upon resolution of an
administrative hearing for a reinspection, id. at 16o8. It is unclear, for example, what
ramifications an administrative hearing that reduces below 14 points an initial inspection
score-which would retrospectively obviate the reinspection-has on the grade, which is
supposed to be based on a reinspection when conducted. Compare id. at 1607 ("The
Department shall issue a letter grade of 'A' to any establishment that receives fewer than 14
points on either the initial inspection or reinspection in a cycle.") (emphasis added), with id.
at 1608 ("[I]f the establishment does not appear at the Administrative Tribunal ... the
establishment shall, on the date of the hearing, post the letter grade card provided by the
Department at the reinspection.") (emphasis added). In June 2011, the Mayor transferred the
responsibility for holding administrative hearings from the DOHMH Administrative
Tribunal to the New York City Health Tribunal in the Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings (OATH). Compare id. (requiring adjudication by OATH, of which the New York
City Health Tribunal is a component), with Exec. Order No. 148, Transfer of Certain
Tribunals and Adjudicatory Functions Consistent with Mayor's Committee Report (June 8,
2011) (requiring adjudication by the New York City Health Tribunal).
241. For example, a 2B violation (the second entry in Table 3) was amended to allow conditions
to change when the same food was out of the holding temperature in different areas. In
2005, a 2B condition II violation was found for "[t]wo hot food items out of temperature.
Example: 8 chicken wings and cooked rice." Inspection Scoring System for Food Service
Establishments, supra note 214, at 11. In 2010, a 2B condition II violation was found for "[t]wo
hot food items out of temperature or the same type of food out of temperature in two
different areas. Example: one tray of chicken wings and a pot of rice held at 115oF; or one
tray of chicken wings on the steam table and one tray of chicken wings in the food
preparation area held at 1ioF." What To Expect When You're Inspected: A Guide for Food
Service Operators, supra note 220, at 8. In addition, some "Other Critical[]" violations were
deleted, as was a violation for "food intended for consumption in contact with toxic
material" that duplicated other contamination violations. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental
Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of a Rule Repealing and Recodifying Chapter 23 of Title 24 of the




The timing of the intervention was sharp. In the beginning of July 2010,
restaurant inspections slowed to a halt as inspectors underwent training for the
new regime. Every restaurant inspected after July 26, 2o10" would receive a
full initial inspection for grading purposes, although it would take over a year
to complete the first grading inspection for all New York restaurants.'
4. Internal Assessment
After the first year of grading, DOHMH released a triumphant
assessment."s First, based on a survey of 502 respondents, it reported that 70%
of New Yorkers have noticed grades in restaurant windows and that 88% of
those who noticed them consider the grades when deciding where to eat (a
stretch in interpretation).4 Relatedly, Zagat reported that only 1% of
respondents (albeit in a convenience sample) would eat at a 'C'-graded
restaurant.1"7 Second, the report concluded that grading "Has Contributed to
242. Letter Grading for Sanitary Inspections: What It Means for Restaurants and Consumers, N.Y.C.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 2 (June 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oath
/downloads/pdf/restaurant-grading-faq.pdf [hereinafter Grading: What It Means].
243. Technically, the rules were published on June 15, 2010, and became effective July 15, 2010.
See 137 CITY REc. 1,6o6 (June 15, 2olo); Comm'r of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of
Adoption ofAmendments to Chapter 23 of Title 24 of the Rules of the City of New York, DEP'T OF
HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 1 (2010), http://www.nyc.gov/htnl/doh/downloads/pdf
/notice/2010/notice-chap-23-title-24-the-rules-of-nyc-correction.pdf (noting effective date
of July 15, 2010). Grading's implementation, however, did not begin until July 27, 2010. See
How We Score and Grade, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 1 (2012),
http://www.nyc.gov/htmldoh/downloads/pdf/rii/how-we-score-grade.pdf (noting that
"[i]nspections before July 27, 2010" are ungraded).
244. See Grading: What It Means, supra note 242, at 2.
245. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234.
246. See id. at 1. The report, problematically, does not disclose the underlying survey instrument.
Upon obtaining the survey instrument, the interpretation is arguably imprecise. The 88%
figure is the sum of 36% who "always," 29% who "most of the time," and 23% who "some of
the time" "consider the letter grades," assuming the respondent has seen the grades (true of
70% of respondents). See Baruch Coll., Sch. of Pub. Affairs, NYC DOHMH Restaurant
Program Evaluation Poll (July 2011) (unpublished survey) (on file with author). A more
accurate statement would be that six of ten New Yorkers have seen and consider the letter
grades at least some of the time. See id.
247. Christie Rotondo & Rich Schapiro, New Yorkers Won't Eat at a Restaurant with a 'C' Grade
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Significant Improvements in Restaurants' Food Safety Practices." 8 For
example, DOHMH touted that 69% of restaurants have achieved 'A's,249 a fact
that by itself says little about the impact of grades. Third, DOHMH reported
that restaurants "improve between their initial and re-inspections," noting, for
example, that 38% of restaurants scoring between 14 and 27 points in the initial
inspection end up receiving an 'A' in the reinspection.so What this glosses over
is that 39% of restaurants receive an 'A' in the initial inspection.2s' The process
could be entirely random, with a two-fifths chance of an 'A' in any inspection.
Fourth, DOHMH reported that restaurant training has increased and that
inspectors have conducted unannounced inspections for grade card posting
compliance, with over one thousand violations cited.5  The existence of these
violations, however, also suggests that restaurants are flouting the posting
requirement. None of this DOHMH evidence amounts to a plausible
assessment of the grading system.'
B. Inspections Data
To study the grading system more rigorously, we use a publicly available
dataset from December 2011, which contains inspection results for all existing
restaurants in New York. (Our data analysis actually began with a dataset from
July 2011, but for simplicity of exposition, we focus on this most recent
version.) The primitive units are 495,568 violations (or nonviolations where an
inspection resulted in no citations). Each unit contains information about the
restaurant, permit number, inspection date and time, violation codes, action
taken by DOHMH, numerical score, and grade assigned. Using the date and
permit number, we restructure this data to the inspection level,254 creating a
dataset with 126,938 scored inspections for 23,153 restaurants.
248. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 2.
249. Id. at 2.
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 5.
253. DOHMH's 18 month report, Restaurant Grading in New York City at 18 Months, N.Y.C.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE (2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads
/pdf/rii/restaurant-grading-i8-month-report.pdf, similarly reports only superficial claims
that are difficult to understand or replicate.
254. Most compliance inspections are recorded as unscored in the dataset. For the analysis of
compliance inspections, we of course include these in our analysis. For seventy-four
restaurant-inspection dates, action codes and scores are not homogeneous. We omit these




DOHMH deserves much credit for making this data available. Most
jurisdictions have websites that allow users to look up individual restaurants
(as we did to download the San Diego data), but the full microdata are rarely
available in direct, machine-readable format (see Table i).
That said, the DOHMH data have distinct limitations. First, DOHMH
omits information for restaurants that are no longer in existence. Given that
the restaurant market is quite dynamic, with the best studies suggesting that
approximately one-third of restaurants fail within one year and two-thirds
within three years,2 s this means that we have much less information from the
early years of the observation period. Second, although our microdata in
principle cover the same inspections as the data DOHMH makes available
online, they do not include the type of inspection conducted (e.g., initial
inspection, reinspection, compliance inspection). Third, the online data appear
to be locked from access outside of the Greater New York area. California
residents (or researchers), for example, cannot access the inspection-specific
data online.26 This makes it difficult to augment our existing microdata with
the type of inspection by automatically querying the online site. We solve this
problem by developing a finely tuned classification algorithm that leverages
information in the New York City Rules and DOHMH policy to classify
inspection types (spelled out in detail in Appendix B). For a random (cross-
validation"') sample of five hundred inspections coded manually from the
online data, our algorithm classifies 97% of inspections correctly.
Fourth, the reason it does not appear possible to classify inspections
perfectly is that there are a number of internal inconsistencies within the
DOHMH data. In some instances, for example, the letter grade is inconsistent
with the numerical score. Appendix A more comprehensively documents data
integrity issues we have uncovered, which are severe but limited enough in
scope so as not to affect our findings. Last, none of the DOHMH data clearly
represent whether an administrative hearing occurred and, if so, whether the
score was reduced at the hearing. As best as we are able to determine,
DOHMH simply overwrites the score, grade, or both. (Changes in how
DOHMH accounted for hearings may explain some of the internal
inconsistencies of Appendix A.) We examine the effect of administrative
2ss. See H.G. Parsa et al., Why Restaurants Fail, 46 CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q
304, 309 & ex. 1 (2005).
256. We attempted to access the inspection-specific data from multiple California-based
machines on multiple operating systems on multiple days and with multiple browsers. The
Chief Technology Officer at Stanford Law School was not able to solve the problem.
257. By cross-validation, we mean that this sample of five hundred inspections was not used to
develop the classification algorithm.
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hearings in Appendix C.3, by using multiple versions of the dataset we
obtained privately from January 2010 to January 2012. These multiple versions
enable us to track how an inspection is recorded before and after an
administrative hearing, as differences in how the same inspection is
represented across versions are most plausibly attributable to hearings.
Figure 6.
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The vast majority of scored inspections are initial inspections and reinspections.
Figure 6 plots the distribution of types of scored inspections from our
classification algorithm. For the moment, these data exclude unscored
compliance inspections (the bulk of compliance inspections), which we return
to in Part VI. The vast majority of scored inspections are either initial
inspections or reinspections."'
258. For completeness, the other kinds of inspections are as follows. After a restaurant is shut
down, it must undergo an inspection to reopen. If such an inspection is successful, it counts
as a "reopening inspection," triggering a subsequent initial inspection; if not, it counts as a
"reclosing inspection," keeping the restaurant closed. "Pre-permit inspections" are
conducted for start-up restaurants prior to operation, and are followed by an initial
inspection. To be precise, we classify as an initial inspection an initial operational pre-permit
inspection, because the subsequent inspection typically is a reinspection (e.g., Aunt Rosie's
Coffee Shop and Diner). We classify as a pre-permit inspection an initial nonoperational
pre-permit inspection, because the subsequent inspection is typically an initial inspection






Unlike San Diego, New York exhibits considerable variation in grades.
Roughly 61% of restaurants inspected each month receive 'A's. The mean score
across all inspections is 19 points (standard deviation = 15). Figure 7 plots the
proportion of restaurants with specific grades assigned in each month's
inspections in the top panel (i.e., the "flow" of grades), the overall proportion
of restaurants with each grade (based on the most recent grade) in the middle
panel (i.e., the "stock" of grades), and the raw score in the bottom panel. The
x-axis represents the month of the inspection and the y-axis represents the
score or proportion of restaurants with a specific grade. The proportion of 'A's
assigned in any given month (the flow) remains stable across time. The
proportion of restaurants with grades pending spikes upward in the last
months of the observation period, due to pending administrative hearings.
Virtually no restaurants that were inspected in December 2011 actually posted
grade signs of 'B' or 'C,' as indicated by the dip in the dashed black and solid
gray lines. This simple time trend illustrates how the "grade pending" option
makes the system more palatable to restaurateurs. Most consumers arguably do
not know how to interpret a "grade pending" sign. The delay for a hearing and
faster pace of inspections for low-graded restaurants mean that grades of 'B' or
'C' are posted for only short durations.
Despite the fact that the proportion of restaurants receiving 'A's in any
given month (the flow) is roughly constant, the stock of 'A's (from the most
recent grade) increases over time, as depicted in the middle panel. This stock-
flow difference may be mechanistically driven-even with no general
improvement in sanitation practices and random scoring. Because the
inspection cycle is shortened for lower-scoring restaurants and more protracted
for higher-scoring restaurants, the stock of 'A's will increase over time, even
under random scoring.
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Figure 7.

















R A W SC O R E ..... .. ......... .....
1/2010 1/2011
Time
Pending grades are issued when (i) neither the initial inspection nor the reinspection
resulted in an 'A,' and (2) an administrative appeal of the inspection is pending. These
pending grades are converted to grades once the appeal is resolved.
Moreover, while DOHMH proudly cites over one thousand violations for
failure to comply with grade posting,259 such violations also suggest that
disclosure can be evaded. Figure 8 shows one example of formal compliance
with posting requirements that likely avoids informing consumers of the health
inspection result. Writes one commenter on the New York Times website:
Helpful tip to restaurant owners who happen to get C grade [sic]
whether they deserve them or not: the bright orange C letter grade
signs fade rapidly in direct sunlight so while you have your grade
630
2s. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 5.
122:574 2012
FUDGING THE NUDGE
pending signs posted-take your C letter grade home and hang it in
direct sunlight, in about 7 days it will be very faded.2"o
The New York Daily News reported that several pizzerias, a bagel store, and
a Dunkin' Donuts franchise registered as supermarkets or wholesalers, which
fall under the jurisdiction of the state Department of Agriculture, to evade
grading requirements.
Notwithstanding these forms of selective disclosure, New York restaurants
exhibit genuine grade disparities. On that measure, New York appears to
provide more meaningful information to consumers than San Diego.
Figure 8.
DISCRETIONARY GRADE DISCLOSURE2 62
This restaurant was assigned a 'B' grade and posted the grade card at the door as
specified, at least formally, by the New York City Rules. Photo by Zach Seward for the
Wall StreetJournal, reprinted with photographer's permission.
260. daniel, Comment to McCabe, supra note 70 (Jan. 21, 2011, 10:49 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2ol/ol/19/grading-new-york-restaurants-whats
-in-an-a/?comments#permid= 6.
261. See Reuven Blau & Simone Weichselbaum, How Eateries Avoid Health Dept. Letter Grades,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2o12-ol-o9/news/3o6O5668
1 letter-grades-andrew-rigic-restaurants.
262. Aaron Rutkoff, Restaurant Makes Best Out of 'B' Grade, WALL ST. J.: METROPOLIS (Sept. 17,
2010, -4:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2olo/o9/17/restaurant-makes-the-best
-of-b-grade.
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2. Grading Changes Scoring
How have inspections changed with the onset of grading? Figure 9 plots
the distribution of all inspection scores pre-grading on the left panel and post-
grading on the right panel. The dashed line on the left panel indicates the
threshold for failing a health inspection, while the dashed lines on the right
panel represent the grading thresholds. Most strikingly, sharp discontinuities
exist at each of the thresholds. Prior to grading, 1,424 inspections resulted in a
score of 13, and 1,784 inspections resulted in a score of 14. After grading, 3,923
inspections resulted in a score of 13, and 1,416 inspections resulted in a score of
14 (p-value for the difference in proportions < 0.0001).263
Figure g.
INSPECTION SCORES IN NEW YORK
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These histograms depict inspection scores for all scored inspections before grading in
the left panel and after grading in the right panel. The threshold of 28 points in the pre-
grading period resulted in compliance inspections that could lead to a shutdown. The
threshold of 14 points in the post-grading period determined the difference between an
'A' and 'B' grade. The threshold of 28 points could continue to result in compliance
inspections, but also resulted in a 'C' grade. The thresholds exhibit sharp
discontinuities.
Given the slight scoring changes and reinspection system first introduced
in 2010, we now examine scoring and violations over more fine-grained time
periods, using our classification algorithm to classify types of inspections in the
post-grading period. Figure io plots sequences of histograms as time proceeds
263. The p-value is calculated from a Fisher's exact test applied to a two-by-two contingency





across rows: the pre-grading period is split between the period before and after
July 2009 (when DOHMH dropped documentation and administrative
violations), and the post-grading period is divided into quarters containing
roughly an equal number of inspections. The columns represent initial
inspections, reinspections in the post-grading period, inspections resulting in
closures, and counts of violations. The gray vertical lines indicate thresholds
(for failure pre-July 2010 and grades post-July 2010) and the short black dashes
represent averages.
Several trends emerge. First, scoring during the pre-grading period and
first post-grading period appears comparable, which suggests that changes in
the scoring system had little immediate impact on the conduct of inspections.
Second, as time progresses over the quarters, we observe considerable shifts in
the distribution of scores in both the initial inspections and reinspections. The
discontinuity at 14 points emerges for both, but much more sharply for
reinspections. Reinspections, which typically happen within a month, are
disproportionately responsible for the shift toward borderline 'A's and 'B's.
Third, the number of violations cited in initial inspections (the gray histograms
in the right column) also appears comparable over time, but reinspections
generally result in fewer violations.264 Last, the scores of inspections resulting
in closure of the restaurant cluster sharply to the right, as we might expect. (A
considerable number of inspections result in a score of o, which may result
from inspectors shutting down the restaurant without formally tallying the
score.)
264. The difference of roughly o.6 violations is statistically significant (p-value from t-test
< 0.0001).
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Figure lo.
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The top two rows depict inspection scores prior to the grading system. The bottom
four rows depict inspection scores as time progresses from the first to the fourth quarter
of the post-grading period. The first three columns correspond to different types of
inspections: initial inspections that start a scoring cycle in the first column,
reinspections for grading purposes in the post-grading period in the second column,
and inspections resulting in DOHMH closing the restaurant in the third column.
DOHMH can shut down a restaurant for "serious and persistent violations or
uncorrected public health hazards"26s even when its score does not exceed 28. The last




column presents the number of violations for initial inspections and reinspections.
Vertical gray lines indicate applicable thresholds: (1) 28 points for a failed inspection
pre-grading or a 'C'-grade post-grading and (2) 14 points for an 'A'-grade post-
grading. Short black dashes indicate the average score for the period and type of
inspection.
As with San Diego, from this data alone, it is not possible to infer whether
the system is working effectively. The discontinuity observed at the threshold
between 'A' and 'B' grades, for example, may result from restaurants targeting
the threshold by cleaning up just enough to achieve a better grade. If anything,
however, average scores are increasing over time (see the black dashes in Figure
to), suggesting no general improvement.
3. Scoring Inconsistency
If New York is unlike San Diego in that it has actual grade variation, how
does it perform in the consistency of scores? One requirement of targeted
transparency is that the underlying information content must be meaningful.
To examine this, we compare initial inspections across inspection cycles in the
post-grading period. Initial inspections are the closest to random inspections
because their timing is the least predictable and are therefore most likely to
provide an unbiased measurement of restaurant sanitation."' As DOHMH
states, inspections across cycles "are an indicator of restaurants' typical food
safety practices. (For robustness, Appendix C.2 shows that the lack of
consistency persists regardless of the type of inspection examined.)
Figure i plots the score of the first post-grading initial inspection on the x-
axis against the subsequent initial inspection on the y-axis. Because the post-
grading period is only 1.5 years long, we observe 14,552 restaurants (roughly
63% of the sample) undergo multiple initial inspections. Each dot (randomly
jittered for visibility) represents one restaurant. Unlike in Figure 4 for San
Diego, the mass of data looks essentially random. Roughly 25% of the variation
in San Diego inspection scores can be explained by the previous cycle's scores,
but prior scores in New York explain less than 2% of score variation. Of course,
restaurants scoring poorly have an incentive to improve for subsequent
inspections. To account for this, the bottom panel focuses on the subset of
restaurants that received an 'A' in both initial inspections. Again, there is no
substantively meaningful correlation across the cycles.
635
266. See Hatfield & Seiver, supra note 118, at 23 ("[T]he re-inspection grade is less likely to be an
unbiased indication of ongoing operations.").
267. Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 4.
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Figure ii.




























12 on 8a 4 2 0o
Cyc.e *
* " ** *
Cycle 1
Each dot represents the score a restaurant received in the first initial inspection after
grading was instituted on the x-axis and the subsequent initial inspection on the y-axis.
For visibility, observations are randomly jittered. The top panel depicts the range of




grades in both cycles. Less than 2% of the variation in inspection scores is predicted by
prior inspection scores (see R s in the lower right hand corners). Unlike in San Diego,
inspections do not appear to measure meaningful systematic sanitation differences
amongst restaurants.
It doesn't take long to discover the lack of consistency upon sampling
individual restaurants on the DOHMH site. Per Se, a three-star Michelin-rated
restaurant, received 23 points on its first post-grading initial inspection, 8
points (and an 'A') on the reinspection, and 41 points on the next initial
inspection.8 Mamoun's Falafel, a popular, hole-in-the-wall falafel shop in
Greenwich Village, received 59 points on its first post-grading initial
inspection, s points (and an 'A') on its reinspection, 16 points on its subsequent
initial inspection, 9 points (and an 'A') on the reinspection, 27 points on its
third initial inspection, and 26 points (grade pending) on the reinspection.
The considerable noise in New York inspection scores - particularly when
compared to their relative consistency in San Diego -means that grades are not
particularly good predictors of future inspection scores. A io-point increase in
one initial cycle is associated with a statistically significant 1.4-to-1.7-point
increase (at 95% confidence) in the subsequent initial cycle. Figure 12 illustrates
what this substantively means, plotting the distribution of scores in the
subsequent initial cycle given an initial inspection in the 'A,' 'B,' or 'C' range. If
a restaurant receives a score in the 'A' range, it has a 37% chance of getting an
'A' the next time around; a 'B'-range restaurant has a 27% chance, and a 'C'-
range restaurant has a 20% chance. To be sure, repeat initial inspections do
exhibit some degree of correlation, but grades as disclosed provide customers a
false sense of certainty about the restaurant's current sanitation practice.6
Unlike in San Diego, the distributions (particularly in the 'A' and 'B' panels)
exhibit strong similarities.
268. After the first draft of this Article, the New York Post reported that the manager of Per Se,
whose owner has ties to Mayor Bloomberg, called DOHMH to improve the sanitation score of
an inspection outside our observation period. See David Seifman, 'A-Rated'Assist for 'Connected'
Eatery Following Violations: Se What? 'Connected' Eatery's Grade Bump, N.Y. POST, Mar. 3, 2012,
http://www.nypost.conVp/news/local/manhattaVrated-assist T4QQelSEBqiiqHo2ftltrl.
269. For some discussion of the limits of R as a measure of substantive consistency, see Daniel E.
Ho, Reconciling Punitive Damages Evidence, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 27
(2010).
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Figure 12.
LACK OF PREDICTIVE POWER IN NEW YORK
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Each panel depicts cycle 2 scores given the restaurant grade in cycle i. For example, the
left panel depicts the score distribution in cycle 2, given that a restaurant received an 'A'
in cycle i. Although there are shifts, the distributions are not sharply distinguishable
from a substantive perspective. For visibility, scores are censored at 6o.
V. EXPLAINING THE SCORING DIVERGENCE
What explains the sharp differences in inspector scoring practices between
San Diego and New York? After all, the inspections systems share some
considerable similarities: both (1) follow the FDA model food code (as do
many jurisdictions); (2) employ a point scoring system for substantively
comparable violations with reinspections for grading purposes; (3) engage in
similar hiring practices for health inspectors; (4) operate in relatively diverse
restaurant markets; and (5) visit establishments at comparable frequencies.2 7o
There are of course other factors that may explain the difference, such as
greater dynamism in New York's restaurant market, the shorter amount of
time its system has been in place, and the penalties the two jurisdictions
impose for poor performance (which we address in Appendix D).
We explore one alternative explanation. Perhaps targeted transparency has
emphasized the demand side of information but ignored the supply side. Put
differently, targeted transparency prescribes simplifying information to enable
270. The average number of days between scored inspections for an establishment is 151
(standard deviation = 139) in New York and 184 (standard deviation = 116) in San Diego.
Although Table 1 indicates that the minimum number of annual inspections is one in New
York and two in San Diego, those minima refer to the number of inspections for the lowest-




consumers to act in a sophisticated way, but perhaps New York fails in
simplifying the inspection process sufficiently to enable inspectors to score in a
consistent way. Differences in the way inspectors conduct on-site visits might
explain the noisiness in the New York data.
To investigate this possibility, we studied in detail the inspection processes,
documentation, and scoring worksheets used in San Diego and New York. Our
goal was to formalize how each jurisdiction might treat the same underlying
behavior or condition. We used our materials to map 115 New York
violations271 to fifty-two San Diego violations, allowing for any kind of
mapping (e.g., one New York violation might match several San Diego
violations). In some instances, the matches were straightforward. For example,
San Diego's violation of "returned and reservice of food" 72 matched New
York's violation of "unprotected food re-served." 73 Other instances, however,
required more detailed parsing of the materials. "Food handler training" in San
Diego, 74 for example, requires that any employee in contact with food have a
valid food handler's card. New York's requirement of a food protection
certificate, however, applies only to supervisors,2 7s and therefore is not a
substantive match.
Figure 13 presents the results from this comparison, focusing on scored
violations that are cited at least once. The rows represent scored violations and
are sorted by the frequency of citation in New York (plotted on the left panel).
Each square represents point values that can be assigned to that violation. Gray
squares are general (or minor) violations, and black squares denote critical (or
major) violations. For example, the top row in the New York scoring panel
represents a violation for improper maintenance of a non-food-contact surface.
In New York, this ioF violation is a general violation, denoted by the gray
boxes, and may be assigned 2, 3, 4, or 5 points. The lines connect New York's
violations to a comparable San Diego violation. For example, the horizontal
line in the top row matches New York's toF violation to San Diego's #33
violation for an unclean non-food-contact surface, which is a minor violation
scored at one point.
271. One hundred fifteen is more than the number of violations noted in the caption of Table 3
primarily because of unscored, administrative violations added since 2005.
272. Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 12.
273. What To Expect When You're Inspected: A Guide for Food Service Operators, supra note 220, at 13.
274. Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note n3, at 8.
275. What To Expect When You're Inspected: A Guide for Food Service Operators, supra note 220, at 12.
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Figure 13.





The left panel depicts the frequency of violations, based on New York data in the post-
grading period. For example, improper construction of a non-food-contact surface is
the most frequently cited violation. The "New York Scoring" and "San Diego Scoring"
panels depict the points that an inspector can assign to such violations in New York and
San Diego, respectively. For example, a New York inspector can assign 2, 3, 4, or 5
points for improper maintenance of a non-food-contact surface violation, while a San
Diego inspector can assign 1 point. Black indicates a "critical" or "major" violation and
gray indicates a "general" or "minor" violation. The vertical lines represent the
thresholds for an 'A' grade in the two jurisdictions. The light gray lines connecting
these panels match up substantive violations. New York disaggregates classes of
violations more finely than San Diego and uses a much wider point range (relative to the
grade threshold) for most violations. Both factors arguably increase inspector discretion.
Two findings emerge from Figure 13. First, New York inspectors have a
larger set of violations to score. While New York inspectors can cite sixty-eight
possible scored violations, San Diego inspectors can only cite forty-eight. This
does not mean, however, that San Diego inspectors ignore underlying behavior
that is cited in New York. Most New York violations can in fact be mapped to a
San Diego violation, as indicated by the connecting lines between the panels.
The difference, instead, is that New York disaggregates classes of violations
more finely, as can be seen by the fact that a single violation in San Diego is
often mapped to multiple New York violations. For example, a violation of
"[n]o rodents, insects, birds or animals" receives either 2 or 4 points in San
Diego.27 6 New York, however, records separate violations for (1) "[e]vidence of
rats or live rats," (2) "[e]vidence of mice or live mice," (3) "[1]ive roaches," and
(4) "filth flies," each of which can be scored 5, 6, 7, 8, or 28 points, depending
on the amount of evidence. 77 Thirty "fresh mice droppings in one area" result
in 6 points, but thirty-one mice droppings result in 7 points.178 Other "[l]ive
animal" violations are assigned 5, 6, 7, or 8, but never 28, points."
Second, New York inspectors retain much more discretion in the potential
range of point scores for the same underlying violation. For instance, general
violations for plumbing not being "properly installed or maintained" (ioB),
pesticide use "not in accordance with label or applicable laws" (8C), or simply
"other" issues (99B) can carry anywhere from 2 to 28 points.2"o In principle,
276. Retail Food Facility Operator's Guide, supra note 113, at 6.
277. What To Expect When You're Inspected: A Guide for Food Service Operators, supra note 220, at 14-
15; see Inspection Scoring System for Food Service Establishments, supra note 214, at 3.
278. What To Expect When You're Inspected: A Guide for Food Service Operators, supra note 220, at 14.
279. Id. at 15.
280. Id. at 21, 20, 23.
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condition levels are meant to capture the severity of a violation;281 in practice,
they afford more discretion to inspectors, thereby potentially undermining the
goal of numerical scoring to make the inspection process more objective. Relative
to respective 'A'-grade thresholds (the vertical lines), New York inspectors have
much more discretion than San Diego's to amass violation points.
Could such differences in the inspection score sheet matter? There are
several reasons to think so. First, New York inspectors do not appear to be
specializing exclusively in restaurant health inspections. In the 2009 audit, the
Comptroller found that only sixty-seven inspectors (out of some 16o at the
time) actually conducted more than one hundred restaurant inspections per
year.' Second, given the salary levels, it may not be easy to retain talented
inspectors, leading to turnover in staffing. Third, the inspection score sheet
may uniquely matter for the twenty new inspectors hired by New York after
the grading system. Each of these new hires would have little prior experience
scoring inspections, thereby exacerbating variability across inspectors. Fourth,
supervision, as the Comptroller's audit showed, is lackadaisical.284 Given the
sheer number of inspections, New York's scoring system may be too ambitious
to induce any consistency across inspectors. Fifth, because the scoring system
was only introduced in 2003, inspectors have at most eight years of experience
with the system. Last, the design of inspection worksheets appears to matter
elsewhere. In Santa Clara County, for example, one inspector inflated swaths of
Palo Alto restaurant scores by accidentally checking off major and minor
violation boxes for the same underlying violation. That inspector in Santa Clara
County reported 442 major infractions; another inspector reported none."'
It is of course possible that other differences in institutions (e.g., the degree
to which inspectors specialize in food safety) - not the design of the inspection
scoring process -explain the divergence between San Diego and New York.
Los Angeles, however, uses scoring comparable to San Diego and exhibits
similar consistency across inspections, but its inspectors specialize to an even
lesser degree than those of San Diego (24o individuals functioning as the
281. See McSwane et al., supra note 127, at 344 (discussing proposals to change the loo-point
score worksheet of the 1976 model food code to allow for weighting by severity of
violations).
282. This remains the case even if we ignore point values of 28, which, one might argue, simply
represent the ability that most jurisdictions have to shut down an establishment for a serious
public health hazard.
283. See 2009 AUDrr, supra note 204, at 13-14.
284. Id.
285. See Steve Johnson, Errors in Food Safety Checkups Inspections; Variations in Restaurant




equivalent of io6 full-time employees). Until designs are tested, we will not
know for sure. Nonetheless, the substantive comparison of the scoring process
(and evidence across these jurisdictions) suggests that there may be such a
thing as too much information, not only on the disclosure side, but also on the
production side.
VI. INTENDED AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS
We return now to New York. Its implementation of grades during our
observation period allows us to potentially assess some effects of grading
(subject to the caveats in Section II.A). Section VI.A focuses on grading's
intended effects, namely on the risk of foodborne illnesses. While we find no
evidence of intended health benefits, Section VI.B provides evidence of an
unintended cost in resource allocation.
A. Health Outcomes
The ultimate goal of restaurant grading is to reduce the risk of foodborne
illness. The prevalence of foodbome illness from restaurant consumption,
however, is extraordinarily difficult to measure.28 6 Most instances of food
poisoning do not result in formal complaints, news stories, or hospitalizations.
Moreover, the source of food poisoning may be difficult to trace. We here explore
several indicators of food poisoning to assess the impact (if any) of the grading
system on public health outcomes."' The indicators are imperfect, but if the health
benefits are anywhere near as large as the 20% reduction in hospitalizations
reported for Los Angeles, we should nevertheless expect to detect some effect.
286. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that there are roughly 48 million
cases of foodborne illness each year, but only 128,ooo hospitalizations (less than 0.3% of
cases). See CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/PDFs
/FACTSHEET A FINDINGS_updated4-13.pdf; see also Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks-United States, 2oo6, 58 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 609, 614 (2009) ("[O]nly approximately half of the [1,270]
reported outbreaks [of foodborne illness] in 2006 had a confirmed etiology . . . ."); Paul S.
Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 607, 609 (1999) (discussing factors complicating the surveillance of foodborne
illness, including underreporting).
287. We did not examine hospitalization data, which are available only via a protracted and costly
information request. Hospitalizations are an imperfect measure of food poisoning incidence
because only a very small number of cases of food poisoning result in hospitalization, and
diagnoses cannot be readily traced to restaurants. See sources cited supra note 286.
Constructing a credible control group to New York City is not straightforward.
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Figure 14.
CALL COMPLAINTS OVER TIME
All 311 Complaints All Restaurant Complaints Food Poisoning
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Each panel depicts counts of 311 call complaints on the y-axes against months on the
x-axes. The dashed, vertical gray lines indicate the onset of restaurant grading. The top
left panel presents all complaints. The second top panel presents all restaurant
complaints. The remaining panels present any restaurant complaints made over 450
times during the observation period.
First, we focus on 311 call data. New York's 311 phone line is a centralized
information phone line for city agencies and services. During our observation
period, it also served as the official route by which to report restaurant
complaints, including food poisoning, to DOHMH. DOHMH itself has used
complaints as a measure of performance. 8 If there were substantial
improvements in sanitation, we would expect 311 calls to drop with the onset of
grading. ' But this is not the case. Figure 14 plots time series from 2009 to 2011
288. See The Mayor's Management Report: Preliminary Fiscal 2012, CITY OF N.Y. 3-4 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr/0212_mmr.pdf (citing decreases in
child-care and pest-control complaints as evidence of departmental performance).
289. Of course, grading might also heighten consumer awareness of sanitation conditions or
DOHMH's existence, which might increase 311 calls. It is possible that the constant rate of
122:574 2012
FUDGING THE NUDGE
of types of 311 calls, with the gray vertical line indicating the onset of grading.
The top left panel plots all 4.8 million 311 calls, the volume of which is stable
during these years. The second panel in the top row plots the time series for all
restaurant complaints, over 23,000 total. Each subsequent panel plots a type of
complaint that was lodged at least five hundred times and is related to restaurant
sanitation (e.g., food poisoning, rodents, bare-hand contact with food). The
grading intervention has little association with the volume of any of these calls.
Second, we examine Google search trends, which have been documented to
reflect general public health outcomes both temporally and geographically."" If
grading has a sharp effect, it should manifest itself in the search volume for food
poisoning. For most cases, consumers may be more likely to search online for
home remedies than to check themselves into a hospital. Moreover, such search
data allow us to leverage both temporal and geographic differences (a difference-
in-differences design). The left panel of Figure 15 demonstrates that search
activity can reflect foodborne outbreaks. Beginning in July 2011, for example,
there was an outbreak of listeria tied to contaminated cantaloupes. The search for
"listeria" spiked in late 2011 and did so, as we would expect, more sharply in
Colorado-the origin of the contaminated cantaloupes -than in New York.
(Cantaloupes are of course shipped across state lines, so we would not expect
search activity in New York to remain entirely unaffected.) The right panel plots
search activity for "food poisoning" in New York in dark gray and neighboring
metropolitan areas without grading systems (Albany-Schenectady-Troy,
Rochester, and New Jersey) in light gray. The curves are indistinguishable both
before and after the implementation of grading (p-value = 0.098 for, if anything, a
positive effect), 91 providing little evidence of a benefit in public health outcomes.
calls is thereby consistent with a sharp increase in sanitary conditions. Grading may also
cause consumers to substitute, for example from 'B'-grade to 'A'-grade restaurants, which
might relatively increase complaints in high-grade establishments and decrease complaints
in low-grade establishments.
29o. See Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data, 457
NATURE 1012, 1012 (2009) ("Because the relative frequency of certain queries is highly
correlated with the percentage of physician visits in which a patient presents with influenza-
like symptoms, we can accurately estimate the current level of weekly influenza activity in
each region of the United States, with a reporting lag of about one day."); Camille Pelat et
al., Letter to the Editor, More Diseases Tracked by Using Google Trends, 15 EMERGING
INFECTIOus DISEASES 1327, 1328 (2009) ("[F]or each of 3 infectious diseases, 1 well-chosen
query was sufficient to provide time series of searches highly correlated with incidence.");
Ari Seifter et al., The Utility of "Google Trends"for Epidemiological Research: Lyme Disease as an
Example, 4 GEOSPATIAL HEALTH 135, 135 (2010) ("Google Trends ... approximate[s] certain
trends previously identified in the epidemiology of Lyme disease.").
291. This p-value is from a standard difference-in-differences least squares regression model with
search volume as the dependent variable and region fixed-effects, a post-July 2010 indicator,
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The x-axes represent months and the y-axes represent volume, standardized so that too
represents the maximum and o represents the minimum volume. The left panel
presents time trends for New York (light gray) and Colorado (dark gray) for the word
"listeria" to demonstrate that search activity can meaningfully reflect public health
problems. The spike in late 2011 corresponds to the listeria outbreaks stemming from
Colorado cantaloupes. The right panel presents search activity for "food poisoning" in
New York City (dark gray) and neighboring metropolitan areas from Albany-
Schenectady-Troy, Rochester, and New Jersey (light gray).
In short, we find no evidence based on these indicators of positive health
effects. Over the long run, such benefits may still materialize, but the evidence
does not corroborate DOHMH's own claims of the program's benefits in the
first year,' 9 nor the rapid and large effects for Los Angeles.' 9 Perhaps this is
not surprising- after all, the grades themselves do not convey meaningful
information that would enable consumers to choose between establishments
based on the degree of health risk.
and an interaction term for New York City and post-July 2010. The coefficient on the latter,
an estimate of the treatment effect, is an increase in search volume of six units, plus or
minus eight at a 95% confidence level.
292. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 2 ("Grading has contributed
to significant improvements in restaurants' food safety practices.").
293. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 34, at 426 (detecting sharp public health benefits within one year




B. Perverse Resource Allocation
While the evidence of the impact on health outcomes is weak, it turns out
that grading has one strong effect, namely on the internal allocation of agency
resources. One of the primary changes in the inspection system in 2oo was the
introduction of reinspections solely for grading purposes. Most of the
reinspections center around the 'A' threshold of 14 points (for example, the
modal reinspection scores are just under 14 points in the reinspection column
in Figure io). Prior to grading, the primary on-site visits to restaurants
following an initial inspection were compliance inspections. These focused, by
law, on restaurants scoring worse than the 'C' threshold of 28 points. 94 While
compliance inspections still formally exist for restaurants scoring above 28
points,' 9 we find startling evidence that grading displaced agency resources
away from compliance inspections (generally at worse-scoring restaurants) to
reinspections (generally at better-scoring restaurants).296
The left panel of Figure 16 plots the proportion of all inspections that are
compliance inspections over time. Each dot represents the proportion in one
month, weighted by the total number of inspections in that month, with
95% confidence intervals. (The light gray curves plot the 95% confidence interval
from a generalized additive model.) Prior to grading, 8-15% of all inspections
were compliance inspections. After grading, that proportion dropped
sharply to less than 5% of all inspections. The right panel plots the proportion
of reinspections, which increased sharply to adjudicate grade disputes.
Unlike compliance inspections, however, 58% of these reinspections are of
restaurants initially in the 'B' range.' 9 Grading thereby causes inspection
resources to be shifted toward higher-scoring 'B'-range restaurants and away
from lower-scoring 'C'-range restaurants. As far as we're aware, no proponent or
opponent of restaurant grading has articulated this concern. In a world where
most health departments fall short of the FDA recommendation of a
294. 132 CITY REC. 884 (Feb. 18, 2005).
295- 137 CITY REc. 1607 (June 15, 2010).
296. The public health evidence on the relationship between sanitation scores and health risks is
inconclusive. Compare Irwin et al., supra note 128 (finding sanitation scores to be predictive
of foodborne illness), with Jones et al., supra note i11, at 688 (finding no statistically
significant association between sanitation scores and foodborne illness). Given this
inconclusiveness, there is no obvious way to assess the differential risk from an 'A' to a 'B' to
a 'C' restaurant. In the Irwin study, the point at which risk for foodborne illness increases is
an "unsatisfactory" inspection, suggesting that there may be a threshold at worse-scoring
ranges of the score.
297. This proportion is of all reinspections following an initial inspection for which the initial
inspection resulted in a score of 14 or more points.
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minimum of two inspections per year (see last column of Table 2),298 resource
allocation matters.
Figure 16.






1/2008 1/2009 1/2010 1/2011 1/2008 1/2009 1/2010 1/2011
Time Time
The x-axis represents months, and the y-axis represents the proportion of all
inspections. Each dot represents the proportion of that month's inspections that were
compliance inspections (left panel) or reinspections (right panel), sized proportionally
to the number of inspections, with a vertical bar indicating a 95% confidence interval.
The vertical gray line represents the onset of restaurant grading, after which resources
shift sharply from compliance inspections (at the failure threshold of 28 points) to
reinspections (at grading thresholds). The light gray curves represent the predicted
(pointwise) 95% confidence interval from a generalized additive model allowing for
smoothened trends before and after grading, with a sharp break for July 27, 2010.
Several caveats should be mentioned here. First, recall that New York also
sought to hire twenty new inspectors with the onset of grading. The combined
effect of adding a reinspection system and twenty new inspectors may be that the
total number of inspections at initially 'C'-range restaurants may not change as
sharply as the left panel of Figure 16 suggests.29 9 However, we should
distinguish between reforms that impose grading -virtually always accompanied
by a reinspection system -and those that step up enforcement resources. Adding
298. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 102, at 204.
299. This inference is complicated because of the inconsistency of scores. Ideally, we would
calculate the average frequency at which a 'C' restaurant is inspected under the pre-2010 and
post-2010 systems. But the populations of pre-20o and post-2olo 'C'-range restaurants are
not perfectly comparable, because (1) restaurants that received a 'C' on a post-201o initial
inspection and a 'B' upon reinspection would have been a 'C'-range restaurants before
grading, and (2) some pre-2010 'B'-range restaurants might have received 'C'-range scores




grading alone draws inspection resources from somewhere else.
Second, recall that the 2010 reforms also accelerated the inspection cycle for
low-scoring restaurants. One might argue that there is simply less of a need for
compliance inspections post-201o because reinspections take the place of the
first compliance inspections, and the next initial inspection comes sooner for
some restaurants.3 oo Before 2010, however, DOHMH already had in place an
"Accelerated Inspection Program" that increased the frequency of inspections
for high-risk restaurants.30 ' Unfortunately, the program policy is not spelled
out in sufficient detail to understand the exact impact of the 2010 reforms.
Moreover, compliance inspections pre-2010 were conducted fifteen to forty-
five days after a failed initial inspection and repeated every fifteen to forty-five
days until the restaurant came into compliance.30 2 Post-2010, reinspections
occur within roughly thirty days of the initial inspection,303 and the next initial
inspection does not occur until ninety to 15o days later, even for the highest-
risk restaurants scoring 28 or more points on any inspection. 304 Reinspections
alone thereby cannot fully compensate for compliance inspections.
Third, DOHMH also deploys inspection resources solely to monitor proper
posting of grades.0 s These resources, again, must be drawn from somewhere.
Last, the redistributive shift is further complicated by the fact that the
underlying inspection scores are quite noisy. If the difference between an
initially 'B'-range and 'C'-range restaurant is not meaningful, then the
reallocation of enforcement resources may not matter either. (Though recall
from Figure io that shutdowns of restaurants certainly take place at worse-
scoring ranges; distinctions at the 'B'-threshold may be much less meaningful
than distinctions at higher ranges.) Taking the inspection system on its own
terms, however, grading focuses resources on generally cleaner restaurants.
Although targeted transparency is often billed as a cheap regulatory tool,
grading in fact has concrete costs. In New York's case, two of every three initial
inspections require a plenary reinspection,30 and the majority of these
300. Along similar lines, perhaps the penalty of decreased customers is so much sharper upon
receipt of a 'C' grade that there is no need to conduct compliance inspections.
301. 20o9 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 5 & n.2.
302. See id. at 9.
303. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 3.
304. See 137 CITY REc. 1607 (June 15, 2010).
305. See Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 5 ("Inspectors also conduct
targeted, unannounced inspections for card posting compliance at restaurants required to be
posting B or C cards.").
306. Id. at 3.
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reinspections are of initially 'B'-range restaurants. In retrospect, the resource
shift may appear obvious. To provide a kind of safety valve to restaurants,
grading was introduced in tandem with reinspections. The political economy
of grade reform may well explain the design of reinspections, but reform comes
at a previously unrecognized institutional cost. Viewed in light of these costs,
the discontinuity of scores around the 'A' threshold may, counterintuitively,
constitute a positive development. Inspectors may be compensating for the cost
of grade resolution, assigning 'A's to borderline restaurants so as not to waste
inspection resources on establishments that, at least subjectively, do not pose
grave public health threats.
One of DOHMH's responses to the 2009 audit was that it would begin "in
July 2010 to post letter grades at all restaurants and further increase inspections




How do we design a better grading system? We now articulate policy
implications of our study that may apply to grading jurisdictions specifically
and inspection systems generally.
First, our study underscores the need for transparency about transparency.
The availability of rich inspection microdata empowers information
intermediaries to rigorously examine how well food safety programs function
and to convey that information more persuasively to consumers.3o As Sam
Issacharoff argues, "What is needed is a regulatory regime that would promote
a market for intermediaries."3 '0 The Obama Administration's emphasis on
nicrodata disclosure potentially facilitates such intermediation.3"o Indeed, the
brunt of this Article can be considered a form of information intermediation
that sheds light on restaurant grades. New York-one of only several major
metropolitan areas that makes microdata readily available (see Table 1) -is a
307. 2009 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting DOHMH officials).
308. For example, scorecard.org uses toxicity reports to convey health hazards more
meaningfully to consumers. See SCORECARD: THE POLLUTION INFORMATION SITE,
http://scorecard.goodguide.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
309. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 66; see also FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 122-26 (discussing the
importance of information intermediaries).




model jurisdiction in that sense. All jurisdictions should follow New York's
lead and release full health-inspection data in machine-readable form. The
disclosure should be comprehensive, including inspector identification codes,
specific violations and point scores, types of violations, and data from
restaurants that no longer exist. Even New York falls short of this goal, making
it much more difficult to comprehensively assess its grading system.
The benefits of wholesale disclosure extend beyond policy evaluation.
Wholesale disclosures empower intermediaries to deliver information to
consumers in more direct and effective ways. Inspection microdata, for
example, would enable Yelp, a website that aggregates information about
ratings of local businesses reaching roughly 66 million unique visitors per
month,311 to include health inspection data in its restaurant characteristics.
Similarly, the website Scorecard compiles data from over four hundred
government and scientific websites to provide environmental information
about localities."' Disclosure of real property records by state and local
government agencies empowers intermediaries like Zillow, a website that uses
fine-grained information on oo million homes,"' to deliver simplified, useful
information, such as local home-value trends that are based on housing-price
models, directly to home buyers. Smart phones permit dissemination to the
immediate time and place of decisionmaking.
Second, inspection criteria should be simplified to reduce variability across
inspectors. The same behavioral insight of simplifying information for
consumption should also apply to information generation. New York, for
example, could adopt a scoring worksheet closer to San Diego's, which would
likely increase consistency across inspections. Ideally, agencies would conduct
experiments to choose violation items and to determine the optimal level of
inspection worksheet complexity.3 14 A complementary approach would be to
conduct more frequent, but shorter, inspections of a random subset of violations
(weighted by risk). Such an approach might enable more objective measurement
because inspectors could focus on a smaller set of more easily measurable
311. See About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) ("Yelp had an
average of approximately 66 million monthly unique visitors in Q4 2011.").
312. See About Scorecard: Scorecard's Data Sources, SCORECARD: THE POLLUTION INFORMATION
SITE, http://scorecard.goodguide.con/about/txt/data.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
313. See What is Zillow?, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/corp/About.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
314. For an inadvertent experiment and discussion of how to do scale equating to bridge distinct
forms, see Daniel E. Ho & Timothy H. Shapiro, Evaluating Course Evaluations: An Empirical
Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment at the Stanford Law School, 2000-2007, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 388
(2008).
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violations (e.g., food temperature of three randomly chosen items) and
restaurateurs would have little time to clean up during the inspection. Removing
inspector discretion by design (i.e., by random selection of objectively
measurable indicators) may greatly improve the accuracy of inspection scores.
Modern survey measurement relies on the same principle: random sampling of
respondents removes surveyors' discretion to choose respondents.31s
Overly complex criteria appear to undermine inspections in other
regulatory fields. As John and Valerie Braithwaite convincingly demonstrate,
the complexity and specificity of criteria plague the consistency of nursing
home inspections." Similarly, inspections by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
which have no formalized score sheets3 17 despite a large number of possible
violations,1s are subject to sharp criticisms of inconsistency. 9 The
Braithwaites argue that simplification in particular promotes consistency by
315. Quota sampling, for example, in which surveyors chose respondents within subsets of
covariates (age, race, gender), infamously introduced substantial bias. See DAVID FREEDMAN,
ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 337-39 (4 th ed. 2007).
316. See John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics ofLegalism: Rules Versus Standards in
Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 307, 317 (1995) ("Reliable ratings of the
quality of care in nursing homes are possible when professional raters use a limited number
of criteria; but when raters use the large number of specific American regulations as their
criteria, reliability is lost.").
317. See NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 269o: Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor
Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations and for 1o CFR Part 71 Transportation
Packagings, NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION 9-10 (Mar. 9, 2012), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs
/ML1203/M1L120390 4 15 .pdf; E-mail from Rodney M. Brown, Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
to Mridula Raman (Mar. 26, 2012) (on file with author).
318. For mining safety, see 30 C.F.R. § 1-1o4 (2012). The regulations therein "aim to regulate all
aspects of miner's [sic] safety and health." Jay Lapat & James P. Notter, Inspecting the Mine
Inspector: Why the Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Bar Government Liability for
Negligent Mine Inspections, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 413, 416 (20o6). For regulations
concerning spent nuclear fuel storage, see to C.F.R. § 72 (2012).
319. See Office of the Inspector Gen.,Audit Report: Audit of NRC's Oversight ofindependent Spent Fuel
Storage Installations Safety, NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION 6-15 (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-r/doc-collections/insp-gen/2on/oig-n1-a-12.pdf (NRC); Austin
Hoffman, South Dakota's Mining Controversy, KELOLAND.COM (May 13, 2011, 9:58 PM),
http://www.keloland.con/news/eyeonkeloland/NewsDetail64o3.cfm?Id=5187 (MSHA);
Lawmakers Express Concern and Seek Answers Regarding MSHA Enforcement, NEB. CONCRETE
& AGGREGATES Ass'N NEWSL. (Dec. 2011), http://www.nebrconcagg.com/assets/Newsletters
/December2ol/Declnews final%201oW/o2ores.pdf (MSHA); John Thune, Inconsistent






fostering deliberation and a form of peer review among inspectors.32 o Our
findings corroborate that simplification on the information-supply side may
improve inspections in other regulatory areas.
While our evidence suggests that reforms would reduce the impact of the
inspector lottery, the major remaining limitation lies in inspection resources.
Without sufficient supervision and training of inspectors,' 1 it may not be
possible to achieve satisfactory uniformity across inspections. From that
perspective, the more difficult policy decision may be whether to increase the
budgets and salaries of health departments.
Third, inspections should take place at truly random intervals to eliminate
short-term changes taken solely in anticipation of the inspection.322 A
pernicious feature of existing regimes is the relative predictability of when
inspections will occur. In San Diego and Los Angeles, restaurants can pay for a
next-day reinspection. In New York, the July 2010 reforms spelled out in
concrete terms when to expect inspectors -seven days to roughly a month for
reinspection, and ninety to 15o days for the next initial inspection for
restaurants receiving 28 or more points.' Such certainty enables restaurateurs
to devote resources to a temporary cleanup in advance of the inspection.
Greater randomness would make such strategic cleanups far more difficult.
Increasing the randomness in timing of inspections takes real political will, but
making inspection scoring more consistent may reduce restaurant hostility
toward grades, making such reform more feasible.
320. See Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 316, at 319-22.
321. See Michelle Cotterchio et al., Effect of a Manager Training Program on Sanitary Conditions in
Restaurants, 113 PUB. HEALTH REP. 353 (1998) (finding that manager training and
certification programs may lead to better sanitary conditions in restaurants).
322. Of course, there are different forms of randomness. A simple rule would be that an inspector
could appear for the next inspection in a random interval between one and 365 days after an
inspection has occurred. Stratified randomization to account for the risk of an establishment
is also possible. For example, an inspector could appear in a random interval between one
and 182 days for "high-risk" restaurants (however defined) and 183 and 365 days for "low-
risk restaurants" (however defined). For some discussion of randomization to reduce
behavioral biases in the election context, see generally Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai,
Estimating Causal Effects of Ballot Order from a Randomized Natural Experiment: The California
Alphabet Lottery, 1978-2002, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 216 (2008), which shows that cognitive
limitations that lead voters to be affected by ballot order can be overcome by randomization
and rotation of ballot order across districts; and Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization
Inference with Natural Experiments: An Analysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall
Election, oi J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 888 (2oo6), which shows the same.
323. See 137 CITY REC. 1607 (June 15, 2010); How We Score and Grade, supra note 243 ("An
inspector goes back to the restaurant unannounced, typically within a month . . . " (emphasis
added)).
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Fourth, to battle grade inflation, jurisdictions like San Diego should
consider changing the thresholds for letter grades to generate meaningful
distinctions. For instance, if San Diego employed a threshold of 95 points to
receive an 'A,' consumers would receive more information about the relative
risk of establishments. At minimum, the overall proportions of restaurants
receiving each grade should be disclosed on the grade placard.
Last, health departments (or information intermediaries armed with more
comprehensive data) should apply well-known statistical adjustments for
differences across inspectors and inspections. 3 4 The intuition behind such
models is that good scores by tough inspectors are more meaningful than good
scores by easy inspectors. Statistical models can adjust for inter-inspector
differences so that the numerical score is comparable across restaurants,
regardless of what the grade threshold may be. (Insights from such models
could also be applied to adjust for the time of the day.) Moreover, any
disclosure to consumers should convey uncertainty in the scores.325 For example,
one simple proposal would be to disclose the (model-based) probability that a
restaurant would receive an 'A' if inspected on a future day. Such adjustments
would appropriately tailor the strength of the disclosure to the consumer by
the uncertainty in distinguishing sanitation levels of restaurants. New York's
grades aim to cure an information deficit but, if anything, may overcompensate
by creating a false sense of certainty.
B. Retargeting Transparency
Beyond these specific design elements, this Article raises profound questions
about mandated disclosure and targeted transparency. First, given that the poster
child of targeted transparency is itself susceptible to ineffective implementation,
this study raises questions about the design of disclosure policies far beyond food
safety. It calls into question the design, implementation, and administration of
324. See, e.g., EXPLANATORY ITEM RESPONSE MODELS: A GENERALIZED LINEAR AND NONLINEAR
APPROACH (Paul De Boeck & Mark Wilson eds., 2004); cf Michael Peress & Arthur Spirling,
Scaling the Critics: Uncovering the Latent Dimensions of Movie Criticism with an Item Response
Approach, 1o5 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 71 (2010). Applying item response theory, for example,
inter-rater adjustments could be applied to account for differences across inspectors, while
differential item functioning could be applied to test for the timing of the inspection.
325. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Improving the Presentation and Interpretation of Online
Ratings Data with Model-Based Figures, 62 AM. STATISTICIAN 279, 279 (2008) (observing that




disclosure in a myriad of regulatory areas."'
Second, while behaviorally informed regulation is an extraordinarily
promising approach, the contextual nature of behavioral effects also makes it
difficult to extend findings from one arena to the next. Nudges are contextually
dependent. A yellow 'C' grade, for example, may have quite different effects
from a red 'C.' New York already had a means of publicly indicating positive
sanitation results prior to July 2010-the Golden Apple-but one that
apparently did not function effectively. What our findings underscore, then, is
the increasingly recognized need to evaluate empirically the efficacy of such
design elements, with field experimentation being the most credible
assessment tool.32 7 Fortunately, the changing evidentiary base of government,
combined with the increasing availability of rich microdata about and from
administrative agencies, facilitates the systematic assessment, understanding,
and, ultimately, improvement of the regulatory state in ways previously
unimaginable.
Third, nudges cannot compensate for underlying problems in regulatory
design. Slapping a grade onto a score from a faulty inspection system provides
the imprimatur of transparency, without a public health basis. If the simplified
grade or score is merely a proxy (that is, if it reflects but does not directly
measure the concept of interest, namely the risk of foodborne illness), it can be
326. Cf Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 12, at 743 (arguing that mandated disclosure
generally fails across substantive areas, but that restaurant letter grading is one effective
example).
327. See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
929 (2011); Gary King et al., A "Politically Robust" Experimental Design for Public Policy
Evaluation, with Application to the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Program, 26 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 479 (2007); Christine Jolls, Review ofDraft 2o1 Report to Congress on the
Benefits and Costs ofFederal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal
Entities, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/comments/jolls.pdf (calling for experimental assessment of
regulatory policy changes).
328. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at 170-82; David Bollier, The Promise and Peril ofBig
Data, ASPEN INST. (2010), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content
/docs/pubs/ThePromise andPeril of BigData.pdf; Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a
Wide Range of Uses, U.S. GEN. AccT. OFFICE (2004), http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/do4548.pdf; Daniel C. Esty & Reece Rushing, Governing by the Numbers: The
Promise of Data-Driven Policymaking in the Information Age, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2007),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2oo 7/o 4/pdf/data-driven
policy-report.pdf; Daniel E. Ho, Big Data, Small Tax Gap? Detecting Cash-Only Tax
Evasion in Manhattan Restaurants (Nov. 8, 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author); Gary King, Albert J. Weatherhead III Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., Horizons in
Political Science Talk at the Harvard University Government Department: The Social
Science Data Revolution (Mar. 30, 2011).
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strategically gamed by restaurants and inspectors, thereby losing validity. 9
Fourth, the broader desirability of grading (and nudging) depends on a
normative theory of the regulatory regime. Is the purpose of such systems, for
example, to identify sanitation outliers? In that respect, San Diego's system
actually performs far better than New York's: a 'B' is truly informative and
heightens the expected penalty of noncompliance. Or is the purpose of the
system to incentivize restaurants to improve across the board? In that case, we
might favor more grade discrimination between restaurants, as in New York.
Given fixed resources, however, the latter comes at a considerable cost-a
reinspection system for grade resolution, which is part of every mandatory
grading jurisdiction we have examined.
Last, our findings also point to the political economy constraints of
regulation. Disclosures, like bureaucracies, are "not designed to be effective."33 o
The lurking political economy explanation for grade reform may be that it
simultaneously allows an administration to visibly and publicly claim credit for
transparency, while providing sufficient assurances for the regulated industry
to contain grading's impact in practice.33'
CONCLUSION
Targeted transparency remains one of the most promising regulatory
approaches of this generation. As the rare instance in which disclosure can
broadly affect behavior, it has the possibility to transform mandated disclosure
into a genuine tool for empowering cognitively constrained consumers.
This Article has shown, however, that even the perceived paragon of
targeted transparency can be seriously flawed in implementation. Our
examination of over 700,000 inspections in San Diego, New York, and eight
other jurisdictions shows that grades can be uninformative and costly.
Targeted transparency cannot solve or avoid the core issues of administrative
329. This is known by some as "Goodhart's Law." See generally Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton &
Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, io8 COLUM. L. REV.
1803 (2008) (analyzing the difficulties of summarizing corporate governance practice in one
index); Esty & Rushing, supra note 328, at 38-39 (discussing how data-driven governance
can improve decisionmaking but noting the risk that scorecards can "misdirect attention and
incentives").
33o. Terry M. Moe, The Politics ofBureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267,
267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) ("American public bureaucracy is not
designed to be effective.").
331. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 12, at lo6-26 (discussing the sustainability of targeted




law- the institutional design of inspection agencies, the development of
administrable rules and standards, and the accountability and oversight of
expert agents. Without these elements in place, health inspections cannot
generate meaningful information, and targeted transparency risks turning into
a facile mantra of regulatory reform."'
To quote the "nudger in chief': "[D]isclosure may greatly alarm people ...
without giving them any useful information at all.""3
332. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect
and Abuse ofAdministrative Law, 57 U. PiTT. L. REv. 405 (1996) (discussing the deep tensions
between regulatory reform efforts and principles of administrative law).
333. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 123 (2005).
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APPENDIX
Appendix A documents integrity issues that affect the DOHMH data.
Appendix B spells out the details of the classification algorithm that uses our
substantive knowledge of the DOHMH inspections system to classify
inspection types. In a cross-validation test, it classified 97% of inspections
correctly, with the 3% classification error largely attributable to underlying
errors in the DOHMH data. Appendix C shows that types of violations are
comparable before and after grading and that the consistency findings for New
York remain the same when examining other types of inspections, adjusting for
administrative hearings, and replicating the analysis exclusively from DOHMH
website data. Appendix D shows that evidence from eight other jurisdictions
confirms our findings above. Appendix E provides sources used to compile the
information about jurisdictional differences in health inspections and
sanitation grading in Table i and Table 2.
A. DOHMH Data Integrity
This Appendix reports in more detail the data integrity issues we
discovered to affect DOHMH data. Table 4 summarizes major issues and also
provides, where possible, the number of inspections affected. Although these
inconsistencies might ultimately be explained-for example, by unobserved
score changes after administrative hearings or unobserved changes in database
conventions -the data that DOHMH has made available do not allow us to do
so. We divide our discussion into errors that can be assessed (i) by using solely
the December 2011 version of the dataset ("December Version"); (2) by
comparing the December Version and the DOHMH website; and (3) by
comparing how the same inspection was represented over six versions of the
dataset from January 2010, July 2011, August 2011, October 2011, December
2011, and January 2012. Each of these versions covers inspections starting from
at least 2007.
1. December Version
More than 6,ooo inspections appear to violate DOHMH's inspection and
grading procedures. Most commonly, an inspection has a grade that is
inconsistent with its score (Table 4, row A). For example, the October 5, 2011,
inspection at Ohiyo i-Cafe has a score of 12, but a 'B' grade. Over 550
inspections assign a grade but no score (Table 4, row D). The score and action
code may also diverge. In 315 instances, an action code of 'B,' for example,




positive score (Table 4, row G). Several inspections have an action code of '8,'
which is not, to our knowledge, a valid code (Table 4, row I). One possible
explanation for such invalid action codes is transcription and data entry errors,
which the 2009 Comptroller's audit also found to be significant."' We also
detect over 1,6oo inspections for which an initial inspection with a score of 13
or lower is followed by a reinspection (Table 4, row B).33 s
Table 4.
DOHMH DATA INTEGRITY ISSUES
AFFICTED
ISSUE UNITS
Grade inconsistent with score
Reinspection follows initial score < 14
Inspection grade changes more than twice over
Graded inspection without score
Score changes more than twice over datasets
Grade worsens over datasets
Positive score but 'B' action code
Multiple entries for same inspection
Action code of'8'
Website score differs from dataset score












Data integrity issues encountered in an audit of six versions of the DOHMH dataset
(from January 2010, July 2011, August 2011, October 2011, December 20u, and January
2012) and online website data. Although these errors are small relative to the total
number of inspections, they suggest that DOHMH has not properly designed the
database. The second column provides an estimate of the number of affected units,
where a "?" indicates that an estimate is not possible without direct access to
DOHMH's underlying database.
2. December Version and DOHMH Site
Even more concerning is that the December Version exhibits numerous
















See 2oo9 AUDIT, supra note 204, at 14.
To estimate the frequency, we report the number of inspections with an action code of 'P'
(indicating that a reinspection was scheduled) and a score below 14.
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website against a dataset downloaded less than one month earlier. Unscored
inspections on the website sometimes have a score of o in the December
Version (Table 4, row K). Scored inspections that received o violation points
on the website have missing scores in the December Version. The numerical
scores can also diverge. The December 23, 2010, reinspection at Jenni Coffee
Shop Corp., for instance, has a score of 22 on the website but a score of o in the
December Version.
DOHMH also does not clearly distinguish between inspections. On rare
occasions, restaurants are inspected more than once on the same day, but
neither the website nor the December Version can distinguish between
multiple inspections, and multiple (false) entries for the same inspection. On
the website, for instance, Manatus Restaurant is listed as having two
inspections on May 5, 2010, both with a score of 25 and five violations; the
December Version also records two inspections on that day, one with 23 points
and five violations and one with 25 points and no violations. As another
example, each of the violations at Imperial Bakery's July 5, 2011, inspection is
listed twice in the December Version. Outright duplication, however, appears
to be rare. In thirty-eight instances, a restaurant appears to be cited twice for
the same violation at a single inspection.
Finally, in several instances, a restaurant is listed on the website as having
received two consecutive reinspections (Table 4, row L), which contradicts the
New York City Rules."' Piadina Restaurant, for example, received graded
reinspections on September 7, 2011, and September 28, 2011, with no other
inspections occurring in between.
3. Comparison ofFive Versions
Although our analysis relies primarily on the December Version, we
collected additional versions of the DOHMH data from January 2010, July
2011, August 2011, October 2011, and January 2012. (Because DOHMH
systematically deletes restaurants from the most recent releases of the dataset,
these versions are necessary to reconstruct a comprehensive version of the
DOHMH data.) Comparing these different versions uncovers several thousand
336. See 137 CiTy REC. 1607 (June 15, 2010) (defining an "inspection cycle" as a series of
inspections "consisting of at least an initial inspection and including, if triggered by the
initial or any subsequent inspections within that cycle, a reinspection" and defining a
"reinspection" as an "inspection conducted for the purpose of grading following receipt of a
score of 14 or more points on an initial inspection" (emphasis added)); id. (providing that
when there is an increased risk to public health the Department may "inspect[] an




instances where a score changed after an administrative hearing. However, we
also discovered cases where there were more than two changes in the score or
grade across different versions (Table 4, rows C, E, and F). The August 24,
2009, inspection at Vernisazh Restaurant, for example, had scores of 59 in
January 2010, 28 in July 2011, 11 in August 2011, and 28 again in December 2o11.
An inspection sometimes also has a worse grade in a more recent version of the
data, which, as far as we understand, cannot happen due to an administrative
hearing. The grade for the October 15, 2011, inspection at Mi Colombia Bakery
changes from an 'A' in the December Version to a 'C' in January 2012, even
though the score (8) is the same. An employee of Mi Colombia claimed that the
grade was still pending.
In sum, although New York is a model jurisdiction in making the
inspection microdata available, the database exhibits an array of internal errors.
While these are disturbing, their number is small relative to the size of the
database, and therefore unlikely to explain our general findings. They do,
however, provide an additional reason to question the reliability of grading in
New York.
B. Classification Algorithm
Our algorithm for classifying types of health inspections formalizes the
inferences one would draw from the descriptions and information in the
database and the Rules of the City of New York. We focus on scored
inspections in the post-grading period and use the following pieces of
information: (1) the date sequence of inspections for a given restaurant; (2)
"action codes" recorded by inspectors; (3) the grade assigned (if any) during an
inspection; (4) the score assigned during an inspection and on prior
inspections; and (5) the date an establishment enters the data. The DOHMH
website distinguishes between graded, ungraded, and unscored inspections.
Graded inspections are either "[i]nitial inspections that result in an A" or "re-
inspections that result in a grade of A, B or C.""3 Ungraded inspections are
"scored but not graded" and include "[i]nitial inspections that result in more
than 13 points," "inspections at new, not-yet-opened restaurants," and
inspections "at restaurants the Department closed that are being considered for
337. Inspection type descriptions can be found on the DOHMH inspection information page for
any New York restaurant. See, e.g., Restaurant Inspection Information, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, http://a8l6-restaurantinspection.nyc.gov (last visited Sept. 2,
2012) (enter "iool NIGHTS CAFE" in the "Restaurant Name" field, click "List Results,"
click on the first result, and move the mouse over the question mark next to "Graded,"
"Ungraded," or "Unscored" to bring up a description of that inspection type).
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re-opening."1338
The algorithm is somewhat complex, but can be sketched out, from the
simplest to most complex decisions, as follows. First, we classify as a reopening
inspection any inspection with the action code '0' or the current grade 'P,' both
of which denote that DOHMH reopened the establishment after a DOHMH-
ordered shutdown.3 Second, we classify as a reclosing inspection any
inspection with the action code 'W,' indicating that DOHMH decided not to
reopen an establishment that it ordered shut down.
Third, to classify compliance inspections, we use the Rules of the City of
New York, which provide that DOHMH "may ... also conduct a compliance
inspection after any inspection that results in a score of 28 points or more."o34
DOHMH clarifies in a brochure that a "restaurant that receives 28 or more
points on a re-inspection will receive a 'compliance inspection' roughly 30 days
after the re-inspection" and that DOHMH "will continue to conduct
compliance inspections roughly every 30 days until the restaurant scores under
28 points or is closed by the Department."3 4 ' Because a new cycle is mandated
to start "90 to 150 days after the final inspection of the cycle at an
establishment that receives a score of 28 or more points on its initial inspection
or reinspection,"34  the compliance inspection after sixty days effectively
becomes an initial inspection. We therefore classify as a compliance inspection
(i) any inspection following a graded inspection when (a) the restaurant
received a score of 28 or above in one of its last two scored inspections, (b) the
current inspection occurs within sixty days of the last inspection, and (c) the
last inspection was not an initial inspection; and (2) any inspection following
an ungraded inspection that is (a) not graded and does not result in a
shutdown (in which case it would be a reinspection), (b) does not follow a
reopening (or reclosing) inspection, and (c) occurs less than sixty days after the
last inspection and the restaurant received a score of 28 or above in one of its
last two scored inspections.
338. Id.
339. The action code '0' appears to indicate that the restaurant reopened, while the current grade
'P' indicates a placeholder for a grade during a reopening inspection.
340. 137 CITY REC. 1607 (June 15, 2010).
341. Grading: What It Means, supra note 242, at 3. This statement conflicts to some degree with
New York's rules, which indicate that compliance inspections may be performed after "any
inspection" that results in a score of 28 points or more. 137 CITY REC. 1607 (June 15, 2010).
Moreover, the DOHMH website and database do not record scores for the large bulk of
compliance inspections, leading one to wonder how it is that the Department makes the
judgment that the restaurant has scored below 28 points.




Fourth, we classify as an initial inspection (1) the first inspection occurring
after July 26, 2010 (as the Department used a sharp date cutoff to begin initial
inspections for grading purposes); (2) an inspection that occurs after a
reopening inspection;' (3) an inspection occurring after a graded inspection if
the inspection is not a compliance inspection; and (4) an inspection occurring
after an ungraded inspection that is (a) not graded and does not result in a
shutdown, (b) does not follow a reopening (or reclosing) inspection, and (c) is
not a compliance inspection.
Fifth, we classify as a reinspection an inspection that occurs after an
ungraded initial inspection and is graded or results in a shutdown. Lastly, an
inspection occurring after an ungraded inspection that is neither a reinspection,
nor a compliance inspection, nor occurs after a shutdown, is classified as an
initial inspection following a pre-permit inspection if it is the first appearance
of the restaurant in the dataset. For our purposes, we equate initial operational
pre-permit inspections with initial inspections, as the subsequent inspection is
typically termed a reinspection by DOHMH (e.g., the March 21, 2011, and
April 27, 2011, inspections at Aunt Rosie's Coffee Shop and Diner). An initial
nonoperational pre-permit inspection, on the other hand, counts as a pre-
permit inspection for our purposes, as the subsequent inspection appears to be
termed an initial inspection (e.g., the March 25, 2011, and June 21, 2011,
inspections at Bad Horse Pizza).
For unscored inspections (used to examine the shift from compliance
inspections to reinspections), the classification is simpler. Compliance
inspections are unscored inspections, unless DOHMH separately reports
administrative violations when a scored inspection has been performed on the
same day. 3
Table 5 reports the results from a cross-validation sample (i.e., a random
sample hand-coded from the DOHMH website). Importantly, the sample was
randomly drawn and not used to develop the algorithm. The classification
accuracy is 97%. As best as we can tell, the small number of misclassifications
stems from errors and inconsistencies in the DOHMH database that are not
343. Id. ("An initial inspection commencing a new cycle shall be conducted within 60 to 120 days
of reopening for an establishment that is authorized by the Department to reopen following
a Department closure that occurs on an initial inspection or reinspection of that
establishment.").
344. The DOHMH website describes unscored inspections as ones involving "prohibiting
smoking or the use of artificial trans fats or laws requiring certain chain restaurants to post
calorie information." Restaurant Inspection Information, supra note 337 (following the same
instructions). Even when a full sanitary inspection is conducted, these administrative
violations are separately noted in the unscored category.
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reducible and in fact appear to violate the Rules of the City of New York. Two
misclassifications, for example, stem from back-to-back ungraded initial
inspections. Three misclassifications stem from ungraded reinspections. In
another instance, an inspection is unscored on the DOHMH website, but
receives a score of o in the data file.
Table 5.
CROSS-VALIDATION OF INSPECTION CLASSIFICATIONS
IN63A 5 4 o o I
* * 3 00 0 0 0 1 0
CO L ** o0 0 8 o0
*THE 2 1 O O O O
Cross-validation of the classification algorithm for scored inspections in the post-
grading period. The rows represent the classification of soi randomly sampled cases by
our algorithm. The columns represent the true type, as hand-coded from the DOHMH
site. The sample was a true cross-validation sample (i.e., not used to develop the
algorithm). Ninety-seven percent of inspections are correctly classified in this sample,
as represented by the bolded diagonal numbers.
C. Robustness
1. Types of Violations
Here we show that the few changes in violation codes over time do not
affect our findings. To assess the potential impact of these changes, we remap
violations from all pre-grading periods into their post-grading violation
codes. 45 The left panel of Figure 17 plots the proportion of each type of
345. For example, we remap a 1A violation to an 18A violation. See Bureau of Food Safety &
Cmty. Sanitation, Self-Inspection Worksheet for Food Service Establishments, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 4 (2oo), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads
/pdf/rii/self-inspection-worksheet.pdf; Inspection Scoring System for Food Service




violation in the pre-grading period on the y-axis and in the post-grading period
on the x-axis. Although there are some slight differences, the panel shows that
the system has by and large remained stable in terms of the overall distribution
of violations cited. The right panel plots the use of violation codes in initial
inspections and in reinspections, showing that the types of violations cited in
these types of inspections are also comparable.
Figure 17.
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The left panel plots the proportion of violation codes issued in initial inspections post-
grading on the x-axis and for the pre-grading period on the y-axis. The right panel
plots the proportion of violation codes for initial inspections on the x-axis and
reinspections on the y-axis. The scoring changes from grading minimally affected the
distribution of types of violations found. Dots are plotted with gray transparency for
visibility.
2. Consistency in Other Types oflnspections
We focus above on initial inspections across inspection cycles, as these are
closest to random inspections. Several alternative explanations, however, might
exist. First, perhaps the initial inspection serves no purpose other than that
akin to an audit lottery - i.e., randomly generating a real inspection in the form
of the reinspection.* in that case, we might want to focus on reinspections
346. See McSwane et al., supra note 127, at 344 ("[M]any jurisdictions advocated using the
mnspection as a screening device to identify high-risk operations and those requiring closer
scrutiny. ").
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across cycles. The top-left panel of Figure 18 shows that the same lack of
consistency persists when we focus on reinspections. Second, perhaps what
matters is whether the graded inspection (which could be an initial inspection
or a reinspection) is informative about the subsequent graded inspection, even
if reinspections are predictable from the restaurant's perspective. The top-right
panel of Figure 18 shows the same lack of consistency across graded
inspections.
Figure 18.
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Each dot represents the score a specific restaurant received in the first inspection cycle
on the x-axis and in the subsequent inspection cycle on the y-axis. The first panel plots
reinspection scores for restaurants that received reinspections in subsequent cycles; the
second panel plots inspections resulting in a grade; the third panel plots the second and
third inspection cycles after grading began; and the fourth panel plots initial
inspections in the pre-grading period. For visibility, observations are randomly jittered
and censored at sixty.
Third, perhaps the lack of consistency is simply a short-term finding. Both
inspectors and restaurants may require several cycles to learn about the grading
system, which would then induce some correlation across cycles. If true, this of
course means that grades in the first few periods are essentially meaningless,
which would contradict Jin and Leslie's finding that effects are realized within
one year." Moreover, the bottom-left and bottom-right panels of Figure 18
show that the lack of consistency persists across the second and third post-
grading cycles and across cycles in the pre-grading period.
Lastly, grading may have beneficial effects even if the inspection scores are
uninformative. Grading may cause restaurateurs and consumers to be more
conscientious of sanitation practices in a way not manifested in inspection
scores. Alternatively, perhaps the real signal is not the grade that a restaurant
posts, but whether or not it complies with the posting requirement. Customers
could use the posting itself (regardless of its content) as a signal of restaurant
quality. These conjectures do not appear borne out by the findings of Section
VI.A. To some extent they cannot be directly tested with the data at hand, but
in any case they are also divorced from the concept of targeted transparency.
3. Administrative Hearings
How do administrative hearings affect the inspection system? On the one
hand, hearings might be the root cause of inconsistencies. Differences across
administrative law judges, for example, might create or exacerbate inconsistencies,
in which case we would falsely attribute inconsistencies to inspectors. On the
other hand, the hearing process might regularize outcomes. Administrative law
judges, who, after all, observe inspections from multiple inspectors, might grant
relief whenever an inspection appears to deviate from overall patterns. If so, the
underlying inspection scores should exhibit even less consistency than we
document above, as the scores in our data are largely post-hearing scores.
Unfortunately, New York does not disclose the results of hearings. From
the December 2011 data, we do not directly observe whether a hearing occurred
(or whether the notice of violation was settled before a hearing), or whether
347. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 34, at 426.
667
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the score in the dataset represents a reduced score from a hearing favorable to
the restaurant or the score assigned by an inspector. To solve this, we compare
multiple versions of the dataset (from January 2010 to January 2012), which we
privately obtained. Each version contains the then-current scores, a subset of
which would be pending a hearing. If a hearing reduced the score, a
subsequent version of the dataset would contain that reduced score.14 As a
result, for a subset of over six thousand inspections (roughly 5% of our
inspections) we can separately identify the score assigned by an inspector and the
reduced score assigned by the administrative law judge. Although we cannot
infer the overall success rate of appeals (our data provide a lower bound), we can
examine whether hearings reduce or exacerbate inconsistencies.349
348. It is possible that some of the scoring changes stem from data-entry errors that are corrected
over time. DOHMH provides no documentation for such changes. Because scoring
reductions in the post-grading period stem overwhelmingly from restaurants with grades
pending, our best assessment is that these reductions are the results of hearings. In a subset
of cases, DOHMH reports online that "[n]o violations were recorded ... or violations cited
were dismissed at an administrative hearing." E.g., Restaurant Inspection Information, supra
note 337 (search "Bella Napoli," click on "List Results," then click on the Bella Napoli
associated with "iso West 49 Street Manhattan, looi9," and select the entry for
"o8/o8/20ii") (emphasis added).
349. The Bloomberg Administration reports that "83% of grades are unchanged between
inspection and hearing." Restaurant Letter Grading: The First Year, supra note 234, at 2. But a
larger proportion of inspections may be subject to score changes that reduce fees, but do not





THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
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The top-left panel plots the point reduction in administrative hearings of any
inspection resulting in a reduction. The panels in the middle column plot reinspection
scores across cycles for any restaurant that successfully appealed its score from at least
one of the reinspections, with pre-hearing scores on the top and post-hearing scores on
the bottom. The right column plots reinspection scores across cycles for any restaurant
that successfilly appealed its scores from two subsequent reinspections. Observations
are censored at sixty for visibility. These results suggest that hearings do not account
for the lack of consistency. Hearings improve scores for a small subset of restaurants,
but the underlying inspections (pre-hearing) exhibit even less consistency than
inspections without appeals or point reductions.
The top-left panel of Figure 19 plots the pre-hearing score assigned by an
inspector on the x-axis and the post-hearing score on the y-axis for all
inspections that we observe as resulting in a point reduction. The average
score reduction (given a successful claim) is roughly io points (standard
deviation = 9). A considerable number of hearings result in the dismissal of all
violations. In 117 hearings, for example, the score was reduced from above 27 to
o. In the post-grading period, as one might expect, score reductions
overwhelmingly occur for reinspections. The two panels in the middle column
plot the correlation of reinspection scores (in the post-grading period) for the
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subset of restaurants for which the score was reduced at least once. The top
panel represents restaurant scores pre-hearing and the bottom panel represents
restaurant scores post-hearing. If the correlation were more strongly positive
for the pre-hearing (top) data, it would suggest that administrative law judges
exacerbate inconsistencies. If the correlation were more strongly positive for
the post-hearing (bottom) data, it would suggest that administrative law
judges reduce inconsistencies. Although the correlation for this subset of
restaurants is weaker, there is no appreciable difference in the consistency pre-
hearing or post-hearing. Administrative hearings, in that sense, appear to have
no impact on the general noisiness of inspection scores.
One challenge to the findings in the middle column is that restaurateurs
choose whether to proceed with a hearing. Some may do so only when the score
exceeds a certain threshold. The correlation in the middle panel then might be
plotting a successful hearing in one cycle against the score in a cycle where the
restaurateur chose not to proceed with a hearing. To account for this, the two
panels in the right column focus on ninety-two restaurants that have
successfully secured reductions of scores from reinspections across two
inspection cycles. If anything, it appears that there is a negative correlation in
the pre-hearing scores (in the top-right panel), which becomes
indistinguishable from zero for the post-hearing scores (bottom-right panel).
This provides some (albeit weak) evidence that hearings eliminate certain
outliers. Without observing choices made by restaurateurs and administrative
law judges more directly, we cannot definitively say much about the role of
hearings except for the following: hearings alone do not account for New
York's inconsistency of scoring.
4. Random Sample from the DOHMH Website
The DOHMH microdata may differ from what DOHMH releases on its
website. In particular, the microdata lack information on the types of
inspections. To examine the sensitivity of our results to the classification
algorithm and other potential differences between the microdata and the
website, we replicated our basic analysis on a random sample of restaurants
exclusively using information from the website.
To do this, we proceeded in three steps. First, we retrieved the population
of all 25,182 New York restaurants via a blank search in each borough. These
searches were conducted from February 21, 2012, to February 24, 2012. Second,
we randomly sampled restaurants from this set. Third, if a restaurant received
at least two initial inspections in the post-grading period, we recorded scores
from the first two initial inspections. As before, we treat operational pre-permit





Our initial sample size was 686. Two of these corresponded to restaurants
that were marked as closed, which we excluded. Five duplicates, resulting from
changes in the database during the data collection process, were omitted.
Of the remaining 679 restaurants, 516 (76.o%) record at least two initial
inspections. Applying the same analysis, we find that roughly 2% of the
variation in the second initial inspection score is explained by the first
(R = 0.02). In sum, these results are identical to our analysis based on the
microdata.
D. Corroborating Evidence from Eight Other Jurisdictions
To examine how representative San Diego and New York are, we collected
data on restaurant inspections from eight other jurisdictions: North Carolina,
South Carolina, Louisville, El Paso, Austin, Seattle, Chicago, and Florida.3 so
These data comprise 434,418 routine inspections for 114,141 restaurants, ranging
from 2008 to December 2011. Although there are small differences between these
jurisdictions, the basic features of the inspection systems are comparable. We
therefore apply the same analysis to each of these jurisdictions.
Figures 20 to 22 present the results. Figure 20 presents data from the three
grading jurisdictions: North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisville. The first
row of panels presents the score distribution, with the 'A' threshold plotted as a
gray vertical line. Each jurisdiction exhibits sharp discontinuities at the
threshold. Most compelling is the case of Louisville, which changed its
threshold from ninety-three to ninety in 2011. The discontinuities track this
change in threshold directly. The second and third rows of panels present the
consistency of scores across routine inspections, with the third row magnifying
the 'A' range. (The formal name and method of reinspection differ across these
jurisdictions, so we focus only on the inspections closest to routine
inspections.) The levels of consistency in South Carolina and Louisville are
comparable to that in San Diego, with North Carolina exhibiting even higher
consistency (R is between o.44 to 0.47). Grade inflation characterizes each of
these jurisdictions: 99%, 97%, and 94% of restaurants receive 'A's in North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisville, respectively.
Figure 21 presents analogous findings for three jurisdictions that score but
do not grade: El Paso, Austin, and Seattle. These jurisdictions provide a
relevant comparison group to assess the potential effect of grading on the score
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distribution. Unlike in grading jurisdictions, there is little evidence of
discontinuities at the closure or reinspection thresholds. Consistency, however,
is comparable to grading jurisdictions other than New York: prior scores
predict roughly 0.09 to 0.46 of variation in scores. Lastly, Figure 22 presents
results from Chicago and Florida, which neither score nor grade. As there is no
formal scoring, we present counts of violations, which exhibit no
discontinuities and some degree of consistency. No jurisdiction exhibits as
much inconsistency as New York.
To assess the impact of scoring complexity, we also examined the scoring
worksheets of each jurisdiction. All of the jurisdictions have scoring worksheets
that are dramatically simpler than New York's, as measured by the number of
violations and possible point ranges. Indeed, the only jurisdiction that comes
close to New York's level of inconsistency is Florida, and Florida has over one
thousand possible violations"s' (scored on handheld personal digital
assistants"s2), although the score sheet lists only sixty-eight.s 3
One other conjecture that these additional data allow us to examine is
about the role of penalties. New York's penalty scheme, which generates over
$30 million for the city each year,s 4 may provide an incentive for inspectors to
generate violations, thereby potentially driving the inconsistency. We
examined evidence for the imposition of penalties across these jurisdictions,
which we find to be mixed. While Chicago and Florida seem to have stronger
penalty systems35s and relatively lower consistency, for example, Seattle
officials "seldom use civil penalties"s,6 with comparable levels of consistency.
In addition, jurisdictions may collect revenues from delinquent restaurants
through other means: Austin, San Diego, and Seattle all charge for
351. See Food Violation Reference, FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF. REG., http://
www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/hr/documents/foodreference.xls (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
352. See Long Range Program Plan: Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Through 2016-2017, FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. &
PROF. REG. 25 (Sept. 30, 2011), http://floridafiscalportal.state.fl.us/PDFDoc.aspxID=6142.
353. See Food Service Inspection Report, FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF. REG. (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/hr/forms/documents/5022_05.pdf.
354. See Jana Kasperkevic, Those Health Grades You See on New York Restaurants Have Been a
Windfall for the City, Bus. INSIDER, Mar. 26, 2012, http://articles.businessinsider.cOM/2012
-03 -26/news/31238524_restaurant-grade-cards-fines.
355. See FLA. STAT. § 381.oo61 (2011); CHI., ILL., BD. OF HEALTH R. &REGS. § 108 (2012).
356. Phuong Cat Le, Restaurant Inspections Skipped, Fines for Infractions Infrequent, SEATTLE PosT-





reinspections, for example.117 The distinction between penalties and fees is not
always clear. As penalty structures are a major component of institutional
design, however, their relationship with inspection outcomes warrants further
exploration in the future.
In sum, the evidence from other jurisdictions corroborates our evidence
from San Diego and New York. Grading is associated with sharp
discontinuities and grade inflation. New York remains the only jurisdiction
with meaningful variation in grades, but its scores are less informative than the
scores in any other jurisdiction.
3S7. See Dep't of Envtl. Health, supra note 19o; Envtl. Health Serv., Food Protection Fees,
AUSTINTEXAS.GOV (2012), http://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Health
/Environmental/fees_2012.pdf; Food Protection Program Service Fees-2o12, PUBLIC HEALTH-
SEATTLE & KING COUNTY (2012), http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health
/ehs/-/media/health/publichealth/documents/ehs/2012FoodProtectionees.ashx.
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Figure 20.
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Each column corresponds to a jurisdiction that scores and grades restaurants. The top
row summarizes the data for each jurisdiction, listing the number of establishments,
number of inspections, and date range. The second row presents histograms of raw
inspection scores. The third and fourth rows depict the consistency of routine
inspections from one cycle to the next, with the fourth row focusing on inspections in
the top grade range. The adjacent bars represent the R2 for each of the plots. There are
discontinuities at each grade threshold. Across all three jurisdictions, few restaurants
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Each column corresponds to a jurisdiction that scores inspections but does not issue
grades. The top row summarizes the data for each jurisdiction, listing the number of
establishments, number of inspections, and date range. The second row presents
histograms of raw inspection scores. The third and fourth rows depict the consistency
of routine inspections from one cycle to the next, with the fourth row focusing on
inspections that score above the threshold for closure or reinspection. The adjacent bars
represent the R2 for each of the plots.
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Figure 22.
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Each column corresponds to a jurisdiction that neither scores nor assigns grades. The
top row summarizes the data for each jurisdiction, listing the number of
establishments, number of inspections, and date range. The second row presents
histograms of violations counted at inspections in each jurisdiction. The third row
depicts the consistency of routine inspections from one cycle to the next. The axes












E. Sources for Tables i & 2
The following documents the sources relied upon to compile Table i and
Table 2. For shorthand, we place in parentheticals the cell(s) that the citation























For example, the first entry for Albany ("Albany County Bd. of Health Res. No. 155
(2012) (2a)") indicates that the date of enactment in Table 2 stems from a health
resolution by the Albany County Board of Health, made effective July 1, 2012.
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Albany County Albany Cnty. Bd. of Health, Res. No. 155 (N.Y. 2011), http://blog.timesunion.com/tablehopping
/files/2012/ol/albanyco-inspection-resolution.pdf (2a); Barnes, supra note 43 (2a, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2i);
Telephone Interview with Marianne Stone, Assoc. Pub. Health Sanitarian, Cmty. Health & Food
Prot., Enytl. Health Servs., Albany Cnty. Health Dep't (Jan. 24, 2012) (2j); Telephone Interview
with Marianne Stone (Sept. 26, 2012) (2g - confirming that restaurants can receive a new grade
upon reinspection); Albany Cnty. Dep't of Health, About the Inspection Process,
ALBANYCoUNTY.COM, http://www.albanycounty.com/departments/health/restaurantinspections
/default.asp?id=1413 (last visited Apr. 9,2012) (2h, 2k).
Albuquerque Valerie Santillanes, Restaurants Must Make the Grade, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 28, 1998, at Ai (2a -
this is the earliest record we have found mentioning the red and green stickers); Restaurant
Inspection Results, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, http://www.cabq.gov/environmentalhealth/food-safety
/restaurant-inspection-results (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (2e, 2g, 2k); Telephone Interview with
Susan Spring, Field Operations Officer, Albuquerque Envl. Health Dep't (Sept. 26, 2012)
(2e - noting that a restaurant can improve its rating upon reinspection; noting also that
Albuquerque has recently adopted a ioo-point scoring system); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF
ORDINANCES S 9 -6-i-6(F)(2) (2012) (2h, 2i); id. § 9-6-1-12(B)(9) (2j); Telephone Interview with
Joe Anguiano, Supervisor, Consumer Health Prot. Div., Albuquerque Envtl. Health Dep't (Apr. 24,
2012) (2j - clarifying that the reinspection fee is for a second follow-up inspection, which must be
requested by the establishment); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES S 9-6-1-12(B)(9)
(2012) (2j); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES S 9-6-1-6(A) (2k).
Allegheny Telephone Interview with Dave Allen, Supervisor, Allegheny Cnty., Pa., Health Dep't Food Safety
County Div. (Jan. 19, 2012) (2a - indicating that the placard system began around 1994, 2g, 2j); Bruce
Dixon, Don't Worry, Our Food Is Safe: Allegheny County Has an Excellent System of Restaurant
Inspection, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories
/opinion/perspectives/dont-worry-our-food-is-safe-314639 (2a - indicating that the placard system
has been used for about 20 years); Restaurant Search in Allegheny County, ALLEGHENY COUNTY
HEALTH DEP'T, http://webapps.achd.net/Restaurant (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (2e); ALLEGHENY
COUNTY, PA., HEALTH DEP'T R & REGS., art. III, 5 33 S.1(A)-(B) (2002) (2e, 2i); Telephone
Interview with Donna Scharding, Envtl. Health Supervisor, Allegheny Cnty. Health Dep't (Sept.
26, 2012) (2h, 2j - indicating that reinspections are triggered by critical violations and confirming
that there is no fee for reinspections); Patricia Sabatini, Little Bite Put in Restaurant Inspections,
PITTSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE, Dec. 28, 20o8, http://www.post-gazette.comVstories/sectionfront
/life/little-bite-put-in-restaurant-inspections-626775 (2k).
Atlanta GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-5-14-.01 (2012) (Ia - noting that the "Health Authority" may be the
Georgia Department of Human Resources or the "County Board of Health acting as its agent");
Food Services, FULTONCOuNTYGA.Gov, http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/environmental-health
/ 3724-food-services (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (1b); Telephone Interview with Barney 
Harmon,
Supervisor, Fulton Cnty. Envtl. Health (Apr. 6, 2012) (sc - stating that there are fourteen inspectors
assigned to food safety who conduct food and tourist accommodation inspections) (but cf Klein &
DeWaal, supra note 65, at ii (noting 24 inspectors)); 2012 Proposed Budget, FULTONCOUNTYGA.
Gov 121 (2012), http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/images/stories/FY2012_-ProposedBudget.pdf (ic
- listing 7,843 food service inspections per year and 314 tourist accommodation inspections
annually suggests food constitutes 96% of inspections); GA. COMP. R. & REGS, 290-5-14.10 (2012)
(Id, ie, if, ig, ih, ii); Fulton County Public Health Inspection Page, DIGITAL HEALTH DEP'T,




Austin Health & Human Servs. Food Protection, AUSTINTEXAS.Gov, http://www.austintexas.gov
/department/food-protection (la, ib); Caylor Ballinger, Food Safery a Priority: Inspections Data Going
Online in January, EL PASO TIMES, July 8, 2010, http://www.elpasoimes.convnews/ci_15461742
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (ic - noting the number of inspectors in Austin); Telephone Interview
with Inspector on Duty, Food Prot., Health & Human Servs., Austin Dep't of Health (Apr. 6, 2012)
(itc - suggesting that 8o% of time is spent on food establishments, confirming 25 inspectors); YELP,
http://www.yelp.com/austin (enter the key term in "Search for" box; repeat for other search terms;
to restrict to "Driving (5 mi.)," check that option under "Distance" in the filters section)
(ic - searching for "food," "swimming pools," and "child care & day care" in Austin, TX, suggesting
that "food" makes up 93.8% of establishments); 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE S 229 .171(1)(2)(C) (2006) (id
- minimum inspections); id. 5 229.171(h) (2006) (id, ii - "When the total cumulative demerit value
of an establishment exceeds 30 demerits ... (olne or more reinspections shall be conducted. .. ");
Telephone Interview with Sabrina Vidaurri, Rest. Inspector, Austin Health Dep't (Jan. z6, 2012)
(ic, if); AUSTIN, TEx., CITY CODE 5 10-3-2(C) (2012) (ig - "[E]xcept as provided in Section 10-3-124
(Dogs Permitted in Outdoor DiningAreas), the City adopts the Texas Administrative Code Title 25, Part i,
Chapter 229, Subchapters K (Texas Food Establishment Rules) . .-. ."); Ud 5 10-3-153 (ih); Tesas Retail
Food Establishment Inspection Report, TEX. DEP'T OF ST. HEALrTI SaRvs. (20o6),
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspxPLinlddentifier=id&ItemlD=8589953691 (ig, sh);
Restaurant Inspection Scores, DATA.AusTINTEXAs.Gov, https://dataaustintexas.gov/dataset/Restaurant
-Inspection-Scores/ecmv-9xxi? (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (1j).
Baltimore Food Control Section, BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP'T, http://www.baltimorehealth.org/foodcontrol.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (la, ib); Klein & DeWaal, supra note 65, at 13 (ib, ic); Telephone
Interview with Tanya Taylor, Envti. Sanitarian, Food Control Section, Envtl. Inspection Servs.
Program, Balt. City Health Dep't (Apr. 12, 2012) (ic - confirming 14 full-time food inspectors);
Dep't of Audits, Performance Audit Report: City of Baltimore Health Department Division of
Environmental Health Bureau of Food Control, BAIT. CITY COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE 9 (Feb. 2005),
http://www.comptroller.baltimoredty.gov/AudiS%2olnfo/Audit%2oReports/FOOD%20CONTROL
%2oREPORT.pdf (id - noting that low-risk facilities are required to be inspected on a bi-annual
basis); Telephone Interview with representative at the Balt. City Health Dep't, Envtl. Health Div.
(Jan. 26, 2012) (if - verifying that there is no mandated posting of inspection results); Recent Food
Establishment Closures, BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP'T, http://www.baltimorehealth.org
/foodclosures.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ij - providing monthly reports that list information
relating only to closed restaurants).
Boston Health Division - Frequently Asked Questions, CiTYoFBOSTON.Gov, http://www.cityofboston.gov
fisd/health/faq.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (la, id - noting that "(flood service establishments are
inspected at least once per year"); Klein & DeWaal, supra note 65, at 14 (ib, ic); Office of Budget
Mgmt., FY12 Adopted Budget Vol.3, Environment & Energy Cabinet, CiyoiBOSTON.GOV 238, 243 (2011),
http://www.cityofboston.gov/ImagesDocuments/1O%2oEnvironment%20%26%2oEnergy%2o
Cabinet%20Atcm 3-24789.pdf (ic - presenting a budget for eighteen Health Inspectors whose job is
to inspect restaurants, caterers, health clubs, massage practitioners, and recreational camps); Data
Boston, CITYOFBOSTON.GOV, http://www.cityofboston.gov/doit/databoston (last visited Feb. 21,
2012) (ic - noting 2,066 restaurants, 79 seasonal pools, 1o year-round pools, and 27 recreational
camps, to estimate that food is 93% of inspections); Telephone Interview with Bos. Inspectional
Servs. Dep't, Health Div. (Apr. 5, 2012) (ic - confirming that inspectors do not specialize in food
inspections); Telephone Interview with representative at Bos. Inspectional Serv. Dep't, Health Div.
(Apr. 13, 2012) (ic - verifying only 17 inspectors are actually employed); Telephone Interview with
representative at the Bos. Pub. Health Comm'n (Jan. 26, 2012) (if); Mayor's Food Court -
Establishment Search, CITYOrBOSTON.Gov, http://www.cityofboston.gov/isd/health/mfc/search.asp
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ij).
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Charlotte N.C. GEN. STAT 5 130A 34(a) (2011) (ia - giving county health departments the responsibility to
provide public health services); Welcone to the Digital Health Department, MECKLENBURG COUNTY
HEALTH DEP'T, http://mecklenburg.digitalhealthdepartment.com (last visited May 28, 2012)
(lb - adding up the number of restaurants and "mobile food units", ic - noting that restaurants and
mobile food carts make up 55.4% of establishments inspected, ij); Registered Sanitation Training and
Authorization System, N.C. DEP'T OF ENvrtL. & NAT. RESOURCES, http://apps.bluelizard.com/rstas
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (ic - noting 66 active EHSs assigned to Mecklenburg County); Envtl.
Health Div., Dept. of Health & Human Serys., Staff Contact Information, CATAWBA COUNTY, N.C.,
http://www.catawbacountync.gov/Environmentalhealth/staffcontacts.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 202)
(Ic - noting that only half of inspectors in Catawba County are assigned to Food & Lodging; the
same ratio suggests 33 food and lodging inspectors in Mecklenburg County, yielding an FTE
estimate of 18 based on the 55.4% figure cited above); Telephone Interview with representative at
Mecklenburg Cnry. Envtl. Health Servs. (Apr. 5, 2012) (Ic - confirming that inspectors do not
specialize in food inspections); ioA N.C. ADMIN. CODE 46 .0213(a)(i) (2oio) (id); 15A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE i8A .2660 (2012) (le, if); iSA N.C. ADMIN. CODE i8A .2662 (ig); Div. ofEnvtl. Health, Food
Service Establishment Inspection, N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCES, http://
charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/HealthDepartmenVEnvironmentaHealth/Programs-Services
/FoodserviceandFacilities/Documents/DENR4o07.pdf (1h); Mike Baker, Assoc. Press, Some
Restaurants Get Questionable 'A' Grade, SALISBURY POST (N.C.), Feb. 27, 2011,
httpT://www.salisburypost.com/NeWS/o227h-Restaurant-inspections-story-from-AP-qcd(ii-"The
inspector can return within io days to make sure the critical violation is fixed. . . .").
Chicago Food Protection Division-Food Inspection Reporting System, CITY Or CHI.,
http://webapps.cityofchicago.org/healthinspection/GeneralInfo.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (sa,
id); Klein & DeWaal, supra note 65, at 15 (ib); Telephone Interview with Patrick O'Connor,
Supervisor, Food Prot. Div., Chi. Dep't of Pub. Health (Apr. 12, 2012) (ic - noting 27 field
inspectors, iS of whom also perform pool inspections, and 8 supervisors, and estimating that 90%
of inspectors' time is spent on food; the FTE calculation further assumes that supervisors spend 50/o
of their time conducting field inspections); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE S 7-42-Oio(b) (2011) (if); Food
Protection Division-Food Inspection Reporting System, CITY OF CHI. http://webapps.cityofchicago.org
/healthinspection/inspection.jsp (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (ij); Food Inspections, CITY OF CHI. DATA
PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/Health-Human-Services/Food-Inspections/4ijn-s7e5 (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (ij - providing inspection data).
El Paso Dep't of Pub. Health, Food Inspection Program, CITY Or EL PASO, http://www.elpasotexas
.gov/health/food.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia); Caylor Ballinger, Food Safety a Priority:
Inspections Data Going Online in January, EL PASO TIMEs, July 8, 2oo (ib, ic - noting eighteen
inspectors doing food inspections, id); Telephone Interview with David Sublasky, City OfEl Paso
Dep't of Pub. Health, Dev. Assistance Ctr. (Mar. 19, 2012) (ic - verifying that inspectors specialize
in food inspections); Disclaimer, CITY OF EL PASO DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.elpasotexas
.gov/health/establishment inspection.disclaimer.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (ig); Jennifer
Shubinski, Food Inspections Fall Behind; 12 County Food Inspectors Monitor 6,ooo Eateries, EL PASO
TIMES, July 7, 2002, at iA (ih); Aaron Bracamontes, How Safe Is Your Food? Search Food
Establishment Inspections, EL PASO TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.elpasotimes.com
/ci_19215166 (ii); Food Establishment Inspections, CITY OF EL PASO DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH,




Georgia Interpretation Manual for the Rules and Regulations Food Service Chapter 290-5-14, GA. DEP'T OF
PUB. HEALTH, at vii (2011), http://health.state.ga.us/pdfs/environmental/Food/Rules/FinalFS
InterpretationManual.pdf (2a); Press Release, Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., Effective December i:
New Food Service Regulations (Nov. 30, 2007) (on file with author) (2a); GA. DEP'T OF CMTY.
HEALTH, DivisION OF PUBLIC HEALTH FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT INSPECTION REPORT (20o9)
(2b, 2c, 2d); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-5-14-10 (201) (2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h, 2i, 2k); Telephone
Interview with representative at Ga. Dep't of Pub. Health, Envtl. Health Div. (Sept. 26, 2012)
(2j - noting the fee for a reinspeection varies by county, and estimating a range of $50-200).
Houston Dep't of Health & Human Servs., General Information, CITY OF Hous., http://houston.tx
.gegov.com/media/index.cfin (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia, ib); Telephone Interview with Bom
Hsu, Supervisor, Bureau ofConsumer Health Servs., Hous. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Apr.
12, 2012) (ic - explaining that 37 individuals conduct inspections, of whom 3 are supervisors, 1o
conduct pre-opening inspections of food establishments and other businesses, 1 primarily trains
food operation managers, and 4 also conduct pool inspections during the summer; FTE estimates
assume these 18 individuals on average spend half to two-thirds of their time on food inspections);
Hous., TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES S 20-20(a), (c) (2011) (sd, if); Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Search, CIy OF Hous., http://houston.tx.gegov.com/media/search.cfm (last visited Feb. 3,
2012) (ij). Despite adopting the Texas Food Establishment Rules, HOUS., TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES 5 20-17, Houston does not use a 100-point system when inspecting its restaurants.
The Department of Health and Human Services uses an internal point system in which it rates
restaurants on a scale of a to S. These ratings are not made public. Telephone Interview with
representative at Hous. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Apr. 9, 2012).
Larimer County Sonja Bisbee, Inspections End in Lou Scores for Local Eateries, FORT COLLINS COLORLADOAN, July 11,
i999, at iA (2a - providing the earliest record we have found of this system); Telephone Interview
with Jim Devore, Inspector Supervisor, Larimer Cnty. Dep't of Health & Env't, Envtl. Health
Servs. Div. (Jan. 19, 2012) (2a - suggesting that this system began in 1999 or 2ooo); Dep't of
Health & Env't, Food Inspection Form, LARIMER COUNTY, http://larimer.org/food/violation.asp (last
visited Apr. 9, 2012) (2b, 2c, 2d); Dep't of Health & Env't, Ratings, LARIMER COUNTY,
http://larimer.org/food/asp/scoring.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (2e); Telephone Interview with
Jim Devore (Sept. 26, 2012) (2e - confirming that follow-up inspections are to ensure compliance
and cannot change rating); Telephone Interview with Katie Sall, Inspector, Larimer Cnty. Dep't of
Health & Env't, Envtl. Health Servs. Div (Jan. 19, 2012) (2g, 2h, 2i, 2j); Dep't of Health & Env't,
Food Safety Program, LARIMER COUNTY, http://www.larimer.org/health/ehs/food.asp (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012) (2k).
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Las Vegas/ Mary 1. Hahn, Letter to the Editor, 62 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 27, 31 (2000) (2a); Food Establishment
Southern Inspection Report, S. NEV. HEALTH DIST. (2oo), http://www.southemnevadahealthdistrict.org
Nevada /download/eh/fe-inspection-report.pdf (2b, 2c, 2d - for the purposes of this Article, "critical" and
"major" violations are grouped together as "critical violations," 2e); S. NEV. FOOD ESTABLISHMENT
REGS. 8-303.11 (2012) (2e, 2f, 2g, 2h, 2i); S. NEV. FOOD ESTABLISHMENT REGS. 8-30.11(B) (2012)
(2i); Telephone Interview with representative at Food Operations in Food & Beverage
Establishments, S. Nev. Health Dist. (Jan. 19, 2012) (2f); Envtl. Health Div., Permit & Plan Review
Fee Schedule, S. NEV. HEALTH DIST. (2010), http://www.southernnevada
healthdistrict.org/download/eh/eh-fee-schedule.pdf (2j - listing the fee for a reinspection that
results from a downgrade to a 'C'); Restaurant Inspections, S. NEv. HEALTH DIST.,
http://www.cchd.org/restaurants/index.php (last visited June 3, 2012) (2k).
Los Angeles Envtl. Health, Retail Food Inspection Guide, L.A. COUNTY DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH 3, 11, 13 (May 2011),
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/eh/docs/RetailFoodlnspectionGuide.pdf (Ia, ig, ih, 2C, 2d - for
the purposes of this report, "Section 1" and "Section II" violations are considered "critical
violations" and "Section III" violations are considered "minor violations"); Food Facility
(Restaurant/Market) Rating, L.A. COUNTY DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://lapublichealth.org/rating
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (2a - noting that "[tjhe cities of Long Beach, Pasadena and Vernon inspect
their own retail food facilities", ij); L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE S 11.02.030 (2012) (sa); Jin & Leslie,
supra note 34, at 415 (sb); Anna Chow, Protecting the Health ofResidents Every Day, CAL. COUNTIES,
Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 18, 18 (it - noting about 24o field inspectors); 2009-20o Annual Report: Creating
a Healthier LA County, L.A. COUNTY DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH 29 (2010),
htrp://www.lapublichealth.org/docs/annualreportFYog-o- 3MB-L.pdf (ic - noting that roughly
55,ooo of about 125,000 total inspections were of restaurants); Telephone Interview with
representative at L.A. Coty. Dep't of Pub. Health, Envtl. Health, Food Establishments & Events
Dist. (Mar. 19, 2012) (ic - confirming that inspectors do not just conduct food inspections);
Telephone Interview with Okey, Envtl. Health Specialist and Supervisor, L.A. Cnty. Dep't of Pub.
Health (Jan. 13, 2012) (id, Ii, 2h, 2i, 2k - noting that reinspections depend on which violations were
cited, not the number of points, 2i, 2h); L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES 55 8.04.225, 339,
645 (2011) (ie, 2e, 2g); Telephone Interview with a Senior Inspector, L.A. Cnty. Dep't of Pub.
Health (Sept. 26, 2012) (2g, 2h, 2i - noting that a restaurant owner dissatisfied with his/her initial
grade may request a reinspection within three days of the routine inspection; the owner must pay
the appropriate fee within ten days of this request, and the restaurant will then receive a
reinspection within ten days of the payment); L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES
5 8.o4-752(A) (if); L.A. COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE 97-0071 (1998) (2a, 2b); Fung et al., Restaurant
Hygiene Grades, THE TRANSPARENCY POLICY PROJECT, http://www.transparencypolicy




Louisville Restaurant and Food Service Inspection Scores, Louisvi.EKY.Gov, http://www.louisvilleky.gov
/Health/RestaurantnspectionScores.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (isa - noting that
"[i]nspections are conducted by the Louisville Metro Department of Public Health & Wellness Food
Hygiene Program"); Louisville/Jefferson County Merger, LOuisvILLEKY.Gov, http://wwvw.louisvilleky
.gov/yourgovernment/merger.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (1a - describing consolidation of
Louisville and Jefferson County); Open Data Portal to Restaurant Inspection Data,
LoUIsvILLEKY.Gov, http://portal.louisvilleky.gov/dataset/restaurant-inspection-data (last visited
Oct. 30, 2012) (ib - based on the number of unique name/address combinations in the data, tj); E-
mail from Gretchen Boyd, Envtl. Health Supervisor, Louisville Dep't of Pub. Health & Wellness
(Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with author) (ic - confirming 13 full-time inspectors assigned to food
hygiene); Telephone Interview with Gretchen Boyd, Envtl. Health Supervisor, Louisville Dep't of
Pub. Health & Wellness (Apr. 13, 2012) (tc - indicating that there are actually 14 inspectors assigned
to Food Protection but 2 split their time between food and lead inspections); Gil, supra note 40 (id,
2a, 2k); About Restaurant Establishment Scores, LOuISVILLEKY.GOv, http://www.louisvilleky.gov
/Health/aboutinspectionscores.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (Ie, li, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2l, 2i); LouISvILEu&
JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY., BD. OF HEALTI SANITARY CODE 400.03 (1996) (1f); Cabinet for Health
& Family Servs., Food Establishment Inspection Report, DEPT FOR PUB. HEALTH, COMMONWEALTH
of Ky. (2009), http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/94EBo 33 8-Co83-4 6E 5-8 9 CF-E7C67E6 730F3/
o/NEWDFS2o8RETAILFOODINSPECTIONFORlMRevisedoio82010.pdf (ig, ih, 2b, 2c, 2d); Ken
Neuhauser, Making the Grade; Restaurants Adjust to New Health Inspection Ratings, COURIER-J.,
July 25, 2011, at As (2e - noting immediate closure for restaurants scoring below 60); Rick
Howlett, Health Department Revising Restaurant Ratings, WFPL NEws, Aug. 25, 20i,
http://archives.wfpl.org/2oni/o8/25/health-department-revising-restaurant-ratings (2f - noting
accompanying image of sample grade card includes field for score); Telephone interview with an
inspector, Food Hygiene Program, Louisville Metro. Dep't of Pub. Health (Jan. 2o, 2012) (2j).
Miami/Dade Div. of Hotels & Rests., Public Food Service and Lodging Inspections, FLA. DEP'T OF BUS. & PROF. REG.,
County (FL) http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/hr/inspections.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia); Div. of
Htoels & Rests., RestaurantsFood Service Public Records, FL.A. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF. REG.,
http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/sto/file.download/public-records-food-service.html (last
visited Feb. S5, 2012) (lb - based on unique license numbers between Jan. i, 2011 and Jan. 1, 2012; ic
- finding the ratio of unique addresses in Dade County and Monroe County to help calculate FTE,
ij); E-mail from Carlos M. Lezcano, Dist. Manager, Div, of Hotels & Rests., Miami Region, Fla.
Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Regulation (Jan. 20, 2012) (on file with author) (ic - confirming 26 sanitarians
to inspect restaurants, caterers, hotels, and motels); Div. of Hotels & Rests., Annual Report
2010-2o1, FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF. REG. 11-12 (2011), http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr
/hr/reports/annualtreports/documents/arzolo it.pdf (ic - determining that "public food service
inspections" were 76% of all inspections); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 61C-1.oo2(8)(d)(i) (2012)
(id); Telephone Interview with Call Ctr., Div. of Hotels & Rests., Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof.
Regulation (Jan. 26, 2012) (af - verifying that inspection results do not have to be posted inside the
establishment).
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Milwaukee Health Dep't, Food Establishment Inspection Reporting System, CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
http://itmdapps.ci.mil.wi.us/cehri/search.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia); Klein & DeWaal, supra
note 65, at 2o (ib, ic - noting 17 inspectors); Telephone Interview with Envtl. Health Specialist
II, Disease Control & Envtl. Health Div., Milwaukee Health Dep't (Apr. 12, 2012) (Ic - noting 16
current inspectors, 14 in food and 2 in weights and measures, with 2 of the food inspectors
also inspecting tattoo and piercing parlors, and explaining that food inspectors also inspect
surveillance and crime prevention systems; FTE estimates assume these inspectors collectively
spend 5o-8o% of their time on food.); Frequently Asked Questions, CITY OF MILWAUKEE HEALTH
DEP'T, http://itmdapps.ci.mil.wi.us/cehri/faq.jsp#types-inspections (last visited Apr. 9, 2012)
(id); Telephone Interview with Julie Tranetzki, Envol. Health Specialist, Disease Control & Envtl.
Health Div., City of Milwaukee Health Dep't (Jan. 26, 2012) (if - verifying that inspection reports
do not have to be posted); Search, CITY OF MILWAUKEE HEALTH DEP'T, http://itmdapps.ci.mil.wi.us
/cehri/search_by.jsp?conch=88 9 23o6oo2tsG6cr9VPdkfssg2zl5r4RBoVo3s6VvB (last visited Apr.
9, 2012) (ij).
Mississippi Mississippi State Department ofHealth Announces New Restaurant Inspection Rating System, supra note
41 (2a); Understanding Food Facility Inspection Grades, MIss. ST. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
http://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/3o,53o1,77,333.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (2e, 2h);
Telephone Interview with representative at Miss. State Dep't of Health (Sept. 26, 2012) (2g - noting
that restaurants can improve from a 'C' to a 'B' upon reinspection); Telephone Interview with John
Luke, Dir., Div. of Food Prot., Miss. State Dep't of Health (Jan. 19, 2012) (2g, 2i, 2j, 2k).
NewYork Restaurant Inspection Information, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/rii/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (Ia, ib, ij); Collins,
supra note 206 (Ic - noting IS7 current inspectors and 23 new inspectors); 2009 AUDIT, supra note
2o4, at i (Ic - noting that approximately 78% of inspections were restaurants); Food Safety and
Community Sanitation: Public Health Role and Responsibility, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/inspect/insp.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2012)
(ic - noting "[because [Public Health Sanitarians] are cross-trained, they are periodically
reassigned to different programs"); 137 CITY REc. 1607 (June 15, 2010) (id, ie, ig, ii, 2e, 2g, 2h, 2i,
2k); id. at 16o8 (if); id. at 16o8-o9 (ih, 2e - adding up the greatest number of points possible for
each violation); Restaurant Inspection Results, N.Y.C. OPEN DATA, https://nycopendata.socrata.com
/Health/Restaurant-Inspection-Results/4vkw-7nck (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (ij - providing a tool
to download inspection results); 137 CITY REC. 16o6 (June 15, 2010) (2a); id. at 1608-o9 (June i5,




North Carolina 194 N.C. Sess. Laws 435-36 (2a); 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE i8A .2606 History Note (2olo)
(2a - noting revision in 1980); John Cochran, Restaurants May Change Sanitation Grade Systen,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Dec. I, 1997, at Bi (2a - quoting an official stating that grading system
has been in use for 5o years); Div. of Envtl. Health, Food Service Establishment Inspection, N.C. DEP'T
OF ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCES (2008), http://www.deh.enr.state.nc.us/images/food/inspectform
/DENR%20 4 007/o20(1- 31-o8)(4%5E45pmi).doc (2b, 2C, 2d); i5A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 18A .2662(a)
(2012) (2C); i5A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 18A .266o (2012) (2f); id. 2661(h) (2g, 2h, 2i - noting that a
reinspection "for the purpose of raising the alphabetical grade" must be requested and would occur
within 15 days of request); Mike Baker, Some Restaurants Get Questionable 'A' Grade, SALISBURY
POST (N.C.), Feb. 27, 2011, http://www.salisburypost.com/News/o227i-Restaurant-inspections
-story-from-AP-qcd (2i - "The inspector can return within to days to make sure the critical violation
is fixed . . . . "); Telephone Interview with J. Lynn Lathan, Envtl. Supervisor, Food & Facilities
Sanitation Program (Jan. 12, 2012) (2j); ioA N.C. ADMIN. CODE 46 .0213(a)(1) (2010) (2k).
Philadelphia Envtl. Health Servs., Food Protection, CiTy or PHILA., http://www.phila.gov/health/environment
/foodProtection.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia); Press Release, Pa. Dep't of Agric., Agriculture
Secretary: New Law Improves Food Safety Oversight, Adds Additional Transparency, Uniformity
to Inspections (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.agriculture.state.pa.us/portal/server.ptopen
=i8&objlD=io96o99&mode=2 (ia - noting that the Pennsylvania Department of Health
established a statewide standard for inspections in 2010); Klein & DeWaal, supra note 65, at 23 (b,
ic); Patrick Kerkstra & John Sullivan, City in Need of Restaurant Inspectors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
16, 2oo6, http://articles.philly.com/2oo6-in-i6/news/2S407532_ tfood-inspections-critical-violation
-food-carts (ic - "The city has 32 inspectors."); Telephone Interview with Bernard Finkel, Chief of
Food Prot., Phila. Dep't of Pub. Health (Mar. 29, 2012) (Ic - verifying that inspectors do not
specialize in restaurant inspections); Telephone Interview with Bernard Finkel, Chief of Food Prot.,
Phila. Dep't of Pub. Health (Apr. 10, 2012) (Ic - estimating that inspectors spend around 8o% of
their time on food inspections); Don Sapatkin, Turning up the Heat on Phildelphia Food-Safety
Inspections, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7, 2009, http://articles.philly.com/2oo-o8-07/news
/24986078.ifood-safety-restaurant-inspectors-food-temperatures (id - noting the once-a-year
minimum); Telephone Interview with Sheri Morris, Program Manager, Bureau of Food Safety &
Lab. Servs., Pa. Dep't of Agric. (Jan. 13, 2012) (id - confirming the once-a-year minimum);
Telephone Interview with Bernard Finkel, Chief of Food Prot., Phila. Dep't of Pub. Health (May to,
2012) (if - verifying that there is no mandatory posting of inspection results); Envtl. Health Servs.,
Food Safety Inspection Reports, CITY OF PHILA. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.phila.gov
/health/environment/FoodSafetyReports.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (1j).
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Phoenix Food Inspection Grading System, MARICOPA COUNTY ENVTL. SERVICEs DEP'T,
http://www.maricopa.gov/ENVSVC/Envhealth/PermitScoring.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (Ia,
ie- describing voluntary grading system; 2e - for the purposes of this Article, "priority violations" are
considered critical violations and "priority foundation violations" are considered general violations. As
of April 2012, the grading scheme in Maricopa County was voluntary); Gilger, supra note 46 (ib);
Telephone Interview with Bryan Hare, Envd. Health Operations Supervisor, Cent. Region, Maricopa
Cnty. Envl. Servs. Dep't (Apr. lo, 2012) (IC - Conflnning 75 EHSs, 14 supervisors, and 8o-85/. of
inspectors' time spent on food); Telephone Interview with Ben, Inspector, Maricopa Cnty. Envl.
Services Dep't (Jan. 17, 2012) (id, if, 2h, 2i, 2j, 2k - stating that a restaurant will have a follow-up
inspection if it has one or more pnority or priority foundation violations; given the voluntary nature of
the grading regime, it remains unclear whether a reinspection can change a restaurant's grade);
Press Release, Maricopa Cnty. Envl. Servs. Dep't, An "A" for Food Safety: Maricopa County
Environmental Services Announces Its New Food Inspection Grading System (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.maricopa.gov/envsvc/EnvHealth/News/Release--illol3-Food%2oGrading%2OSystem.pdf
(ie, 2a); Envl. Servs. Dep't, Food Establishments Searrh, MARIcoPA COUNTY, http://www.maticopa.gov
/EnvSvc/envvebapp/business search.aspx ?as-page-title=Food%2oEstablishments%20Search&as
-type=Food (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ij).
San Bernardino See Ghori, supra note 47, at B3 (2a); Envtl. Health Serys., ABC Retail Food Inspection Guide,
County COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (Mar. 2012), http://www.sbcounty.gov/dehs/Depts/Environmental
Health/EHS%2oDocuments/abc -retail food inspection-guide.pdf (2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h, 2i,
2k); Telephone Interview with Stephanie, Div. of Envtl. Health Serv., Dep't of Public Health,
Cnty. of San Bernardino (Sept. 26, 2012) (2g - confirming restaurants can improve their grade
upon reinspection); Scott Vanhorne, Board Alters Eatery A-B-Cs; Reinspection Time Trimmed from
30 to to Days, THE SUN (San Bemadino, Cal.), June 15, 2004 (2j).
San Diego Food Facility Inspection Search, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov
/deb/fhd/ffis/intro.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia, ib, if, ij); E-mail Correspondence with Bao
Huynh, Supervising Envd. Health Specialist, Food & Hous. Div., San Diego Cnty. Dep't of Envtl.
Health (Apr. 11, 2012) (on file with author) (ic - verifying 69 EHSs, 51 conducting inspections, 49
conducting inspections full time, and estimating 75-80% of time spent on food inspections);
Williams & Armendariz, supra note 88 (id, 2a, 2k); SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF REG.
ORDINANCES 5 61.107 (2011) (le, ii, 2e, 2g, 2h, 2i); Telephone Interview with Bao Huynh (Apr. to,
2012) (Ii, 2h - confirming that restaurants that receive a 'B' or a 'C' grade will be reinspected
within 30 days); San Diego Food Facility Inspection Search, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
http://www2.sdcounty.ca.gov/ffis (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (1j); Retail Food Facility Operator's
Guide, supra note 113, at 6, 29 (ig, ih, 2b, 2c, 2d); John Woollard & Vojkan Stefanovic, Scores on
Doors Schenes: International Study Tour Report, ACT GOVT HEALTH DIRECTORATE 8 (June
14-25, 2o1), http://www.health.act.gov.au/c/health?a=sendfile&ft=p&fid=-1629748169&sid= (2f);
Dep't. of Envtl. Health, Food Facility Fee Schedule, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (Rev. Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/deh/food/pdf/publicaions-feeschedule.pdf (2j - noting an hourly
rate for re-grades of $142); Telephone Interview with Liz Pozzebon, Assistant Dir., San Diego
Cnty. Dep't of Envtl. Health (Apr. 23, 2012) (2j - clarifying that the fee applies to a second
reinspection that results from noncompliance and any reinspection that is a re-grading inspection);
Telephone Interview with Celia Kroy, Envtl. Health Specialist & Specialist on Duty, San Diego




San Francisco S.F. HEALTH CODE 5 452(a) (2011) (1a - noting that food service establishments within the City and
County of San Francisco must have a permit from the Department of Public Health); Food Safety
Program: Inspections, S.F. DEPT OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.sfdph.org/dph/EH/Food
/Inspections.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (1b, id, ig); Telephone Interview with Lisa O'Malley,
Manager, Food Safety Prot. Program, S.F. Dep't of Pub. Health (Apr. 6, 2012) (ic - confirming 24
inspectors, and that inspectors also inspect about 6,8oo food establishments, 40o laundry facilities,
960 tobacco shops-many of which are part of food establishments-and pet shops with overnight
kennels. Assuming half of tobacco shops are also food establishments, food establishments make up
88% of establishments inspected, suggesting 21 FTE food inspectors.); S.F. HEALTH CODE 5 456(C)
(if- discussing the Symbol of Excellence); Food Safety Program: Restaurant Safety Scores, S.F. DEP'T
OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.sfdph.org/dph/EH/Food/Score/default.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012)
(if- discussing the Symbol of Excellence); S.F. HEALTH CODE §5 456.i(A)-(C) (if- noting that the
Symbol of Excellence must be posted as well as the inspection report); MISSiONLOCAL,
http://missionlocal.org/san-francisco-restaurant-health-inspections (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ig,
ih); Telephone Interview with Lisa O'Malley (Jan. 25, 2012) (ii); Envtl. Health, Enter the Business
Name or Street Address, S.F. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://dph-extranet2.sfdph.org:7777
/pls/eeop-htmildb/fp=1 321: 425350377 77 66 9 5 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ij).
Seattle Food Protection Program, PUB. HEALTH-SEATrLE & ICNG COUNTY, http://www.kingcounty.gov
/healthservices/health/ebs/foodsafery.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (ia); E-mail Correspondence
with Phil Wyman, Health & Enytl. Investigator III, Envtl. Health Serv. Div., Dep't of Pub. Health,
Seattle & King Cnty. (Apr. 12-13, 2012) (on file with author) (itc - stating 37 total inspectors and 32
FTE food inspectors); Risk Based Inspection Program, PUB. HEALTH-SEATTLE & KING COUNTY (201s)
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/ehs/foodsafety/FoodBusiness/TastingRoon/-/media
/health/publichealth/documents/foodsafety/2oiiRiskBasedInspectionProgram.ashx (id); Telephone
Interview with Rosemary Byrne, Health & Envtl. Investigator III, Envtl. Health Servs. Div., Dep't
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